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THE GERMAN MENTALITY

THE GERMAN MENTALITY

BY
VERRINA

“WER DIE WAHRHEIT KENNT UND REDET SIE NICHT,
DER IST FÜRWAHR EIN ERBÄRMLICHER WICHT.”

(German Students' song)

(Who knowing the truth doesn't speak it out,
That is, indeed, a contemptible lout.)

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Chapter I

The Contents and the Aim of This Book—The Morbid Mentality of Germany

Every politician, every lawyer or merchant, who is accustomed to carry on far-reaching and difficult negotiations, is aware, that it is not sufficient to master every problem in question, but that, above all, the mind and the methods of the opponent must be understood. You have to be acquainted with your adversary's own peculiar intuition, you have to be able to look at matters "with his eyes", reflect "with his brain", and even, as the "devil's advocate", you have to foresee all conceivable objections. Only then can you deal adequately with your opponent at the round table, and either convince him, or urge reasonable proposals upon him. Again, those who do not want to make a treaty, but intend to conquer their adversaries—whether in battle, in diplomacy, in less dramatic economic struggles, or even in a court of justice, have not only to survey the proportion of their respective military forces and economic power, and consider the real and juridical position of the parties, but, first of all, they must know, what the opponent looks like from within. What to expect at the enemy's hands, and how best to obstruct him, can only be visualized by one, who has as close an acquaintance as possible with the other side's spirit, character, sentiments, and mind, and of his method of fighting and negotiation. Even a conqueror who, having won the war, is in a position to dictate the peace treaty, will act wisely in the interest of his country's safety, taking into account not only his own requirements, but the "MENTALITY" of the conquered nation.

Since twenty-five years Germany has been the focus of the

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world's interest. For seven years she has kept mankind in a state of incessant excitement. For two years, scarcely a day has gone by, when the Man in the Street has not been expecting some German surprise. Since September 1939 it is war again. What are those peculiar people? You speak about Hitler and his gangsters, about generals, politicians, and the Gestapo. But Germany and the Germans—much more rarely are they the subject under discussion. Who knows them indeed? Not he who has travelled for a few weeks in the Black Forest or in Thuringia, in the Bavarian mountains or in the Rhineland? He, who studied a term at a German University, many years ago, or was a prisoner of war in Germany, the soldiers of the last war, those who attended international sports meetings, or those who have read some German books, or literature on Germany? Or a journalist who—after a short, superficial observation—published his “impressions”? Or even one who is fighting in the new war? Even he, who has listened with disgust to the German propaganda lies, or compared their hypocritical manifestations with their barbarous outrages, is little more than stupefied. Germany—the Germans of to-day? Who knows them in practice? The foreigner, who earnestly asks this question, and compares what he thought he knew of this people with all that has been happening in Germany for seven years, and especially since the new war began, must now confess, that the Germans are not really much more understandable to him than the peoples of Eastern Asia, of whose mystical minds so much is written and so little actually told. Yet to-day it is more necessary than ever before to look into the range of ideas of the average German, and especially to obtain a clear diagnosis of his political mentality.

The task is as difficult as it is essential. If one defines as “mentality” the whole mind and intuitions—a mixture of inborn and implanted qualities of the spirit, sentiments, and character, the general picture of a single person is difficult enough to visualize, and more difficult to describe. It can only be pieced together from single features, and finally only felt. The same is true of a people's mentality. Even the fact, that anything of the kind is in existence at all, is not proved positively, and intrinsically by feeling only. Methods of mass observation on certain generally interesting and fascinating questions are inconceivable, of course, in the Germany of to-day, and if they had taken place, the results, dictated by fear

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and force, would have been as worthless, as regards any practical knowledge of the German mentality, as all the Nazi polls and plebiscites. Incidentally, the value of these—apart from the untruthfulness of the announced figures—is illustrated by a significant episode at one of the 98½ per cent plebiscites at a time before the “orders of Nuremberg”, when even the Jews were still allowed to poll. The votes of the inmates of the then Jewish infirmary in Berlin, which—so as to be better controlled!—formed a “special constituency”, were “unanimously” pro-Hitler!—Also the statements of many political writers, that the majority of the German people, or even a certain percentage, have embraced this or that opinion, mean very little. They are subjective feelings of the authors without any real foundation. These declarations—for instance, about the percentage of genuine supporters of Hitler—lack any real value. You can only get a conception of the mentality of the German people by drawing conclusions from the political and historical development of Germany, and especially from the events bearing upon the most essential provinces of life in that country during the last generation, and by noting the reactions of the German people to the most outstanding ones. A look at the foundations of education and at the cultural, legal, political, economic, and social conditions in Germany provides valuable informations as to why and in which way this people’s mind differs so much from that of their neighbours. The mosaic-picture of the German Mentality, which is the result of placing together such observation of small and great things, certainly does not tell you what percentage of the Germans are National Socialists, but it affords much deeper insights, and enables you to look at the world from the standpoint of the German man in the street. From the way in which he reacted to certain events, and by the knowledge why that was the case, you may conclude what his reactions will be in future.

There is no question of a pseudo-scientific experiment to constitute a kind of a comprehensive psychoanalysis of the average German. Nothing of that kind is possible. But we shall try to provide as clear a picture as possible of the attitude which the masses are taking in face of what National Socialism has produced.

The author has lived for more than fifty years in Germany. As a lawyer, merchant, and owner of a big estate he came into closest touch with all classes of the population and could observe develop-

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ments in Germany from within still at the time of the Nazi regime. The material suitable for inclusion in such a book is, naturally, only a fraction of that at his disposal. Therefore it can really be said, that the picture of the German mentality which is drawn here would be only deepened, but not changed by more intensive observation.—It is the author's greatest wish to help, by this contribution to the knowledge of Germany's mentality of to-day, in hastening the end of this Nazi disease and the creation of a lasting peace.

If one is searching for an explanation of the fact, that Germany has fallen into the power of National Socialism so completely, and, apparently, without any hope of recovery by itself, one may sum up the main reasons as follows: Because of his character, by a centuries-old political despotism, and by being educated to obedience, the average German has become a political being whose development has fallen far short of that of the Western democracies. This was the case long before the European war. The political and economical concussions of the great war, of the defeat, and of the time after the war disturbed the psychic balance of the politically crippled German masses so sharply, that the Hitler gang's unscrupulous, gigantic propaganda, appealing with the greatest cunning to their lowest instincts, was able to succeed in producing a genuine mass-psychosis. If you bear in mind, how all that genuine spiritual culture which had been developing for centuries in Germany was with unholy joy and the cruellest methods uprooted in the space of a few years, how all tolerance is now reviled as decadent, every kind of individualism ridiculed and oppressed, how the whole life of that people is now forcibly degraded, cut to a pattern, militarized and commanded by a corporal, if—besides that—you observe the methods of German home and foreign politics, founded on brutal force and evil hypocrisy, and eventually the wild barbarism shown in this war, you will understand, why we ask whether the German people can still be considered as civilized at all. It was not only wrong, but even dangerous, before the war to speak, through excessive prudence, only of "ideological differences" with Germany, which are natural between sane and normal human beings as well as peoples. It is a state of mental disease that now in Germany brutal force

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and the worst oppression of law and morals prevail in all spheres of life, and menace the whole world with the destruction of their civilization.

When, immediately after the great war, the world heard of the massacres in Bolshevik Russia it was seized with fear. At that time, in Germany also, there were similar feelings, although, even then, some whispers of criticism circulated about inexcusable cruelties perpetrated by the German army just returned from the war. The collective perception of the German people was still sound enough.—In the meantime we had to witness the rapidly increasing brutalization of Germany, and if one were to try and explain the vilest new war-outrages again by an indolent “*c’est la guerre*”, it is unfortunately established that, even after the end of the combat in Poland and elsewhere, the Nazi Germans are murdering, “liquidating,” and robbing in the conquered countries, by order of the State regardless of humanity and the law of nations. Nazi Germany was by no means ever a dam against Bolshevism; even before the new war it hardly functioned as a sluice; and now the miry floods of terrorism, barbarism, and rapidly developing National Bolshevism have risen so high, that Germany, at least, is on a level with Russia.

The underground plotting of Nazi organizations abroad and other secret destructive work of poisonous agitation among foreign peoples, the help given to every dangerous gangster organization—like the I.R.A., Arab and Afghan terrorists—and numerous other “attacks from within” made it plain, long before the new war started, that it was high time to remove the disease from the heart of Europe. This barbarism in the interior of Germany and the threat to her neighbours had long been very substantial things, and it was by no means only a question of a combat between mere ideologies, as Germany and others should like to persuade the world, in order to avoid the points in dispute. It was a ridiculous trick of dialectic also to speak of inadmissible interference in the inner affairs of another State, when it was a question of averting immediate danger to the culture of the world. Internal terrorism in one State, of course, can bring about this danger. Certain boundaries between the foreign policy and the inner affairs of a State in which every interference is “taboo” have, for a long time, ceased to exist. Distress is caused when a neighbour’s wife is threatened by her husband, even if the former does

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not expect his turn to be next. But here, moreover, this expectation was imminent, as experience has proved. The bloody reign of terror in Germany had practically made it necessary to intervene, long before the neighbouring States of Germany were, in fact, invaded. The intrinsic and decisive cause was the immense danger of the mind of the German rulers and the German people as proved by their actions. It is the German mentality which menaces the world. Perhaps one of the greatest dangers of the morbid Nazi mentality is the fact, that it is infectious in the highest degree. Not only the "fifth columns" in foreign countries, not only those who are fascists or conscious sympathizers and admirers of Nazism are taken ill. Those also, who—seemingly led by other motives, as an overdriven fear of spies, or mistrust towards the internal vigour of resistance against defeatism of their own people, or even by mere stupidity or self-sufficiency—are recommending Nazi methods by unnecessary oppression of democratic liberties, are unconsciously themselves infected. "*Principiis obsta*"! He only, and that people only, are proof against Nazism whose own democratic feeling, whose passion for liberty, whose respect of the rights of individuals are strong enough to resist the dangerous attempts of aping Nazi methods—even in order to fight against Nazism.

The small States of Europe, in their understandable anxiety, trying, spasmodically, to uphold their "neutrality", in spite of everything, had—or have—to tolerate the worst encroachments and to purchase peace, day by day, at an economic loss by exporting to Germany which, actually, is nothing else than tribute. In fact, there was never any hope of keeping out of the conflict, without sacrificing completely their independence. Only those who did not know the German mentality could have any doubt of this in advance. One might have thought, that in Europe at least every statesman had long known Nazi Germany's aims and methods. But evidently this was not at all the case. Otherwise most of the small States would not have forgotten, that the border was much too easily passed, beyond which all further compromises to Nazism meant the total undermining of their own democracy and inner resistance, and an uprooting of the internal values on which the civilization of a country is based. Paralysed by the basilisk's glance, they overlooked the fact, that some half-hearted measures could in no way grant effective protection against the imminent

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Nazi danger, but that a stout block of all those who regarded Hitler's sinister aims as the ruin of everything sacred to them, would have been able much more quickly to destroy the dragon and restore the liberty of the world. Astonishingly even a great part of statesmen in the "clear-headed France" was unable to understand the Nazi mentality, or were themselves infected by the poison.

For a long time also the attitude of the United States of America towards the war problem was unintelligible. No European democrat could understand ever, in his innermost heart, the complicated explanations of why 90 per cent of the population were "isolationists". In the United States of America they had impatiently criticized Great Britain, when it hesitated till the last moment to put an end to Germany's policy of robbery and oppression by the declaration of war. They had applauded when this happened. They lifted the arms embargo. But—was that all, that great country of liberty considered her duty in this war against the power of darkness? Did the fight against Nazism hold only a certain kind of sportive interest for the United States of America, where the sympathies certainly were wholly on the side of the Allies, but where they did not think their own vital interests to be at stake? We did not suspect, that the leading statesmen in the United States of America—with certain exceptions, it is true—were not well aware, that immediately after a victory of the forces of darkness in Europe dusk would fall in America, that then internal poison would do its work there, and that no armaments, however strong, could afford that country so good a protection as a living wall in Europe and the British fleet. For us, however, it remained a painful thought that the Man in the Street in this great land of liberty obviously did not perceive of his own accord, for a long time, that all internal affairs must be put aside at this dangerous time, and that the vital question was not the election of a new president, but the preservation of world civilization. Even now, it is not yet fully understood, apparently, that the point is not to keep the United States of America out of the war, under all circumstances, and their sons off the "European" battlefields, even if once, perhaps, a greater man power should become decisive, but to pledge them for the highest good of mankind, for a fight against the sinister mind of Nazism. In order to realize fully the immediate danger for herself, also

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America must learn, above all, the German mentality which shows itself in the aims of the Nazis as well as in the methods of achieving them.

It is the same mentality as concentrated in the Gestapo, the same methods as tried, at first, successfully, in the conquest of Germany itself. It is the poisoning from within by making use of ambitious political traitors, stupid wealthy snobs, exaggerated pacifists and—lately—Communists. Having first undermined and then paralysed a people's spiritual power of resistance, the oppression and extermination of all opponents, by any means and without any respect of moral and right, follows. It is always the same method in the home and foreign politics of the Nazis, in war and in "peace".

Those who have once fully appreciated the Nazi mind and Nazi methods are aware also that, in order to smash them, it is necessary to answer in the only way the brutal but not too tough Nazi mind will understand, even if it is contrary to personal feelings. That does not mean cruel "retaliation". But self-defence against a brutal aggressor refined in cruelty, who regards ethics as ridiculous and every restraint as weak stupidity, strongly demands the exertion not only of all one's energy, but the use, also, of any adequate means. No wanton and precipitate peace ought to sanction the German terror and render the further destruction of the civilized world possible. This war is the beginning of the cure of an infectious disease. It is a treatment in the interests of all, especially of Germany herself. The Nazi mentality must be exterminated.

Chapter 2

The Development of the German Mentality Before Hitler

The treatment of every disease presumes a knowledge of its development. The roots of a disease have to be laid bare, if they are to be deprived of their nutrition. To express it in another way: The history of the development of National Socialism in Germany should show us the means to remove its causes, to cure Germany's political mentality and to prevent a relapse.

Apart from technical progress, which in the new Germany has been idolized and frequently confused with culture, one must admit indeed the maintenance by many writers, that the actual level of "civilization" and mode of thinking of the Germany of 1940 remind us strongly of the portrait which Julius Caesar, two thousand years ago, gave of the then Germany. If you compare in detail the pictures painted by Tacitus and other authors of that time of the character of the old Germans, of their wild, irritable and adventurous temperament and the cunning and hypocritical attitude of those primitive tribes, with the views and methods used by the new Germany, inside her own boundaries and in its relations with other peoples—the similarity is astonishing. What is happening in Germany now, therefore, cannot be set aside simply as the work of a powerful but small group only; it corresponds in fact to the mentality of the German people of to-day. This was strikingly evident in the general feeling of relief in Germany, when in 1932-3 "the clock was put back". Nobody can doubt, unfortunately, the genuineness of that sentiment, who looked at things from inside, at that time, and who observed, how only a rather small group of genuine democrats suffered with grief and despair from the collapse of all liberties and of a policy of international reconciliation, whilst the jubilant masses and the

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so-called ruling classes in Germany were united in a feeling of liberation from the constitution of Weimar, "strange to the German nation". Irritability, the *furor teutonicus* bursting out always anew, a primitive sensibility connected with a total lack of understanding for the feelings of other men and peoples, the disinclination to consider seriously the arguments of others, or even to listen to them, the antipathy to settling matters of dispute by peaceful negotiation, the inner contempt for the "haberdashers" and a "people of shopkeepers", the nonchalance with which solemnly concluded treaties are torn up with varying excuses—because they were "blackmailed" or "surreptitiously" obtained, or because of "changed circumstances", above all, however, the blind worship of "heroism"—all this rests on certain national peculiarities. Their fundamentals we find described accordingly in old and new studies of the German people and see confirmed again and again in their history.

It is most interesting that even "Siegfried", the ideal hero of the German people, shows similar features. Furnished with an immense vigour, invulnerable, after having bathed in dragon's blood, provided with a cloak of invisibility, he is superior, naturally, to every adversary, invincible and practically unassailable. It therefore required no great courage but only a bigger portion of—let us say—impudence, when he challenged the weaker king Gunther, whose sister Chriemhild he was seeking in marriage at the time, to fight him for his, Gunther's, kingdom. He received the suitable answer by Hagen the Burgundian, who represents the Gallic mind: "That cannot be a prize which is already ours." Doesn't one think unconsciously of Hitler's proposal to Czechoslovakia, to guarantee the rest of this country under the small condition that it delivered to him the other half?—Gunther wants to gain Brunhild, and as he is not strong enough to stand the necessary trials, Siegfried is prepared to help him in a low piece of trickery. For it is nothing else than a mean fraud, that the heroic maiden, who only wants the strongest as her husband, is conquered for Gunther by Siegfried, hidden in his cloak of invisibility. The German hero, moreover, has to deprive her of her virginity, again hidden by his cloak of invisibility, on the very day of the double wedding, before he goes to Chriemhild.—This most tasteless action becomes the more piquant, as Brunhild is Siegfried's own betrothed, with whom he formerly changed

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rings. But it is even better. This man of power, who knowing that nobody can do him any harm may easily show himself courageous, does not lack other characteristics which would make him little suitable as an ideal figure for other peoples. Not only has he made Brunhild sad, but proud of his strange victory he robs her of her girdle as a trophy, and, in a typically German manner, he will not rest until he has told the whole story to his wife, and doesn't even think of the broken life of the other.

Naturally, from a literary standpoint you can raise professional objections to such an entertaining tale, the result of the compilation of the various Siegfried sagas. In any case as Hebbel has said about this idol of the German people: "He could not be separated from a dragon and dragons are to be killed." The important thing is, that the figure of Siegfried, this idol created by the national legend, the incarnation of the "highest" ideals, which the German people's soul could imagine, is nothing more than a phenomenon of immense vigour, without spirit and heart, and without any thought for the sentiments of others—the personification of the right of the strongest.

In the history of this people and their heroes, beginning with the Cimbri and Teutons and the other destroyers of Latin civilization, then the legendary figures of the early Middle Ages, then Frederick Barbarossa, then the Prussian Great Elector, then the "soldier-King" and his son, then Frederick II, then Bismarck, up to recent times, again and again are you aware of what is, perhaps, the most dangerous feature of the German national character, that irresistible inclination for bellicose adventures and for brute force. German historians, even the most famous ones, quite naïvely consider it their mission to glorify these displays of power. "The pen spoilt what the sword had won" was frequently quoted in Germany, when diplomatists were reproached for not knowing, how to utilize a German conquest won on the battlefield to the utmost and without any respect for the precepts of humanity; it should be noted, that the history of German diplomacy doesn't show many examples of such wise restraint. Incidentally, even these words, which originated in the time of Wilhelm II, are an example of the childish and dangerous passion of certain German philosophers and historians, treated in more detail elsewhere in this book, for expressing startling thoughts by putting the antithesis of known quotations or theories. In our

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case the quotation from Byron's *Childe Harold* was misused, "politics regained what arms had lost". The English origin of even that antithesis and its significant change, corresponding to the German mind, is highly piquant.

Especially expressive also is the observation, that in the second part of the nineteenth century, when the policy of power inaugurated by Bismarck had its first successes, the so-called "better circles" in what was formerly the country of "poets and thinkers" began at once to feel that honourable title to be a little awkward and no longer suiting at all to the new national sentiments, which were developing in quite another direction. They began to be half ashamed of the figure of a scientist quiet and remote from the world as a symbol of an only too short, cultural epoch of Germany aiming at spiritualization. Kant's gentle philosophy was set aside and his noble theory of the "categorical imperative" was replaced by Nietzsche's—moreover perverted—new wisdom of the "change of attitude towards old-established conceptions", and by the "right of the strongest". Instead of spiritual conquest, they preferred to make military and economic ones. But even in the economic competition in foreign countries, which became more and more accessible for German activities, they could not forgo the rough methods of Bismarck's cuirassier's boot. That fact, and not jealousy of the "successes" of the German merchants, formed the main reason for so much friction with other countries in those days of German expansion. The cruelty of the German methods of colonization is not forgotten, and it is especially significant, that one of the most evil figures of those bloody "colonizers", Karl Peters, is called a "hero of the German people" in the Third Reich.

If you would infer from such examples of recklessness, backwardness, and cruelty an innate and unchangeable inferiority of the German mind, that would be just as silly as, on the other hand, the arrogance of too many Germans, who have, on their own authority, promoted themselves into a new "selected people" or—to use their own expression—a "nation of lords". As, however, the "race theory"—invented by German pseudo-scientists for propaganda purposes and founded on falsifications and proved errors—must be emphatically rejected, together with all conclusions belonging to it, the question remains, how actually the curious German mentality, differing so fundamentally from that of all neighbouring peoples, is to be explained.

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If an irritable and obstinate temperament inclined to force and exaggeration and having a dangerous partiality for quarrels and bellicose adventures, besides cunning and a certain tendency to hypocrisy, struck the Roman authors in the case of the Germans of two thousand years ago, the predominance of those peculiarities may then have had its cause in certain unknown events and conditions of life of a long bygone period of the development of mankind. The fact, that similar features of character, together with certain other peculiarities of thinking and feeling, have until now distinguished Germans from their neighbours, has for reason their different historical and political development, which in Germany was much less suited than in Western Europe to change primitive characteristics. Especially the historical events of the last two centuries influenced the mentality of the Western neighbours of Germany in quite another direction.—The level indeed of culture and science in the Germany of two hundred and one hundred years ago, especially in the period of the so-called “cultural absolutism”, was scarcely lower than in the neighbouring countries. The educated class in Prussia was perhaps a little smaller. At the court of Berlin, it is true, they were all along directed more to military things than to science and arts, and at a time, when at Versailles and in Vienna, and also in London, literature and the fine arts were specially protected, the “soldier-King” Frederick Wilhelm I, economical, practical, and rude, knew no better than to make of the most learned member of his court a certain kind of royal jester for his Tobacco Parliament, whilst his artistic needs were satisfied by collecting a regiment of giants. Later also the interest in arts and science of the society at the Prussian court was concentrated mostly on the ballet. Not a few cases from those times are known of artists and scientists leaving “Berlin and the Prussian States”, because they did not feel themselves secure in a country where—as to-day, without legal procedure—you could be imprisoned or even beheaded, if you had incurred the displeasure of a high person by any expression.—There were, however, praiseworthy conditions also at the courts of certain German princes. One has only to mention Weimar. There, at the universities in those times, and elsewhere, a large number of most important men of science and arts were quietly working. The brilliant splendour of their names is working on in favour of another and better Germany and will continue in the future, when the names

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of the mighty ones of their and our epoch are long forgotten. One has only to mention a few of the great names from the various spheres of art and science, Leibniz, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Goethe, Herder, Schiller, Heine, Kant, Beethoven. Germany, in fact, was a country of "poets and thinkers" and this, probably, because it did not stand in the first rank of political powers in those times.

It was quite another matter with the political development. Whilst Great Britain enjoyed a constitution—resting on the self-determination of the people—and an administration and jurisdiction founded many generations back on personal freedom, whilst in France, 150 years before, the impulse to liberation had broken through in an immense explosion, whilst in America new democratic States were developing—in Germany serfdom and the despotism of small princes, bothered by no movements of the masses, were still in power. The landed gentry and the corps of officers and officials governed the German countries for centuries without resistance, and this was especially evident in Prussia, where the new period of military despotism inaugurated by the Great Elector was renewed by Frederick Wilhelm I and continued by Frederick "the Great". It is true, that the longing for liberty at the end of the eighteenth century was felt in Germany too, and nowhere has it, probably, found more beautiful and vigorous expression than in Schiller's *William Tell* and *Don Carlos*. It is true also, that Herder, Goethe, Kant and many others felt the breath of freedom of the great revolution in France. But it was always a few fine spirits in the nation only, who expressed that longing, very small circles of educated people, who felt it deeply. The German people, exhausted and impoverished by many wars, made weak efforts only for a century to set itself free from political tutelage and from the pressure of its many big and small despots.

The epoch of Napoleon at the beginning of the nineteenth century involved foreign rule and the heaviest oppression for Germany. It also brought from abroad, however, a certain democratization of the administration and a greater personal freedom of the individual, which the German people would scarcely have achieved or even vigorously demanded, on its own initiative. The abolition of serfdom, the emancipation of the Jews, the introduction of a certain self-administration of the boroughs,

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are achievements, which, partly directly, partly indirectly, resulted from the occupation of Germany by Napoleon. Had they not been imported from abroad, and had not the proximity of the "turbulent" French made the German princes inclined, to concede at least, those limited liberties to their subjects, in order to preserve their good will, these achievements would, probably, not have come till much later. Therefore—in spite of the anger arising from economic distress against the soldiers of Napoleon's garrisons, with their foreign language, most vigorously inspired, naturally, by the governments of the various German States—in the more liberal thinking circles of the educated people, among the artists and scientists of that time, especially in south and middle Germany, they remembered Napoleon not with hatred, but even with a certain gratitude, as the bringer of a freer legislation and administration.

After the wars of liberation in Germany, and above all in Prussia, naturally, the reaction of the princes against the small liberties reluctantly conceded to their peoples promptly began. It continued for many decades, during which the democratic ideas imported by the French were again by degrees suppressed. Some of Napoleon's reforms, however, were preserved in Germany, among them the so-called emancipation of the Jews, the re-internment of whom in the ghettos would have made too bad an impression, not only in Western Europe, but even in the Germany of those times, after so many of the Jews had given their lives in the wars of independence.—The right of free expression of opinions, however, was totally abolished in the course of events. You have only to remember the imprisonment for seven years of the great low German dialect author Fritz Reuter and of numerous other men, who had done nothing apart from expressing very modest liberal ideas, and who—without being tried—had to spend many years in prison. Eventually even a certain kind of "mutual insurance company for the oppression of spiritual and political liberty in Germany, Austria, and Russia", similar to the anti-comintern pact of our days, was effected between the three biggest absolute Powers of Europe.

When in 1848 under the influence of the events in France, a weak "revolution" broke out also in Germany, it very soon became evident, that among the broad masses of the German people the feeling for freedom had been suffocated, and that there

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was little inclination to sacrifice lives, health, and property for such an unpractical ideal, of which they had scarcely ever had a taste, and of which they could not form a clear idea. It had always been the policy of the ruling classes in Germany to keep the masses in political ignorance. It is true that compulsory attendance at school was introduced comparatively early; it is true, that the peasant and the workman's children learnt Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic and the sons of the middle-class Latin and Greek. Political education, however, and the rights of the citizen were restricted intentionally by the governments to a level which fell short of the development in Western Europe and in the new world. It is true that everyone could study at the university and become a priest or teacher. But the expense and length of study made it possible only for the chosen few. There were few sons of small tradesmen and peasants among them, and of children of the "fourth estate" there were none. The government took care by a most thorough selection, that only "politically reliable" men occupied the professorial chairs at the universities and schools. If, nevertheless, a political "black sheep" appeared among the professorial herd of white, they did not hesitate to press immediately for his elimination. The same system was energetically used in all the schools. And so it was, in fact, possible during the whole nineteenth century to direct the instruction in history and in all those branches of science, which have any connections with politics, in schools and universities in Germany in such a way, that German youth could not become "infected by dangerous ideas". The text-books were carefully selected according to political views, the lessons were thoroughly controlled, and it was seen to that all history was taught in a way, not corresponding, indeed, with truth, but so much the better for "educating a politically quiet people", proud of its rulers and their belligerent conquests. History lessons must by no means "degenerate" into giving a true insight into the development of mankind. No instruction was given about the political achievement of free peoples. In no sphere of history was there objective research and exposition. The innumerable German attacks, from a thousand years back right up to recent times, the conquest of Sillesia, the partitions of Poland, the annexations by Prussia of Hanover, Schleswig, Brunswick, Hesse, all this was falsified into German "heroic deeds". Weak and morally suspect German princes—especially

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Prussian ones—were changed into “heroes”, the history lessons were an enumeration only of wars and battles, with disparagement or omission of those lost, and the learning by heart of the times of the reign of the German princes. The great spirits of the nation played a very modest part in the lessons in comparison with the military leaders, and events which were not suitable for official historical “research” were hushed up. The history lessons were given in a way which, inevitably, was bound to create a state of political stupidity and, simultaneously, of self-sufficiency in youthful minds, and one is justified in saying that the whole German system of education could hardly create an educated, and never a civilized people.

The presumptuousness of that mentality, exceeding all bounds, expressed itself in the German anthem. “Germany above everything in the world.” Instead of the original idea of the composer, that the Fatherland should come before all other things in the world, the anthem had eventually got the meaning that Germany should dominate the whole world. The upstart, over-weening opinion of oneself and the artificially screwed-up arrogance of power resulted in the familiar elbowing tactics and in a mentality similar to the conduct of a flock of geese, which on the roads in autumn appear so immensely strong and important to themselves, that they don’t feel obliged to make way for a car. There is no doubt that this behaviour helped in the explosion of 1914.

This intentional education for an unpolitical and, at the same time, chauvinistic mind rested on a second, even more solid pillar. This was the army. The average German had few international connections. There were—until the last decades of the nineteenth century—no German possessions oversea, and only a rather small part of the population ever came into personal contact with the citizens of free countries. Even the travelling artisan usually confined his wanderings to Germany. The great institute of education and “cultivation” of the masses was the army, to which every able man had to belong for two to four years’ active service first, then in the reserve, the second and eventually the third reserve, as long as he was capable of bearing arms, and to which he was connected by ex-service associations until he died. All that had not been done by the schools, perhaps, was completed here, in order to form a “people in arms”, living

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and dying in the "spirit" of a German corporal and lacking any will of its own.

A careful selection of the body of officers and of the higher officials completed the work. In administration, especially, personal proficiency was less the deciding factor than political opinions. When the Prussian minister of justice, following an old tradition, received those young officials, who had passed their second professional examination in law with distinction, he never forgot to mention, that distinction in knowledge and special efficiency meant much less for the Prussian State than "political reliability". Officers and high officials were chosen almost exclusively from the families of the lords of the manors and from the sons of officers and high officials, among whom the nobility enjoyed a special preference. A terrible nepotism and favouritism predominated in those circles, but, on the other hand, a strongly homogeneous, however narrow-minded, spirit, founded on similar birth, education, and interests. Not without great difficulties, and very rarely, could an outsider, who was not predestined by great riches or by special connections, succeed in achieving a higher position in that hierarchy. Sons of people from the middle classes were very seldom promoted to professional military officers, sons of workmen never. Officials, teachers, lawyers, and merchants in a fair way of business took the highest pride in being connected with the army as officers of the reserve, in making a parade of their officer's uniforms on the emperor's birthday and in being allowed to participate in the birthday dinner at the officers' mess. For, a man only started to be a human being, so to speak, when he was an officer in the reserve, and a shop-keeper was not worthy of this rank.—The army stood above everything. The professional military officer was a superior Being. You remember the story of the cobbler Vogt, who made the whole world laugh as "Captain von Coepenick". Dressed in the uniform of a military officer, which he had bought in an old clothes store, he stopped a patrol in the middle of Berlin, then occupied with it the town hall of the suburb of Coepenick and arrested the mayor and the town clerk, apparently on the orders of superiors. Nobody had the courage to oppose that imperfectly shaved gentleman, because he was dressed in a captain's worn-out uniform.

There was a special "officer's honour" which—under the

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penalty of being dismissed from the army—obliged officers and even reserve officers, to ask for and to give “satisfaction” by a duel for any insult by a man of rank. Insults from a man not “capable of giving satisfaction” were to be immediately expiated with the sword. So, until shortly before the Great War, not a few cases occurred, when drunken officers struck down civilians with their swords on the spot—without serious interference by the higher authorities. For the prestige of the officers corps demanded that the officer should be “covered” under all circumstances. The respect for an officer was so deep in the blood of the people, that no serious open opposition was ever made against such excesses. Special military courts, which were held in camera, had to take care that nothing should leak out, and that no civil court could meddle with these things, expose an officer’s excesses in an undesirable way, or even decide in favour of a subordinate against his superior.

It is almost inconceivable for a non-German, how deeply militarism had penetrated the German people, how everything was pervaded by its spirit. An army of corporals, educated for unconditional obedience and drilled by a barrack-room education and in a typical Prussian perversion of history, occupied, after their dismissal from active military service, all the minor posts of the civil service, filling every office with their well-known “smart and dashing tone” and impressing immensely the public, relations, and the people of the reserved beerhouse benches, where they set the tone. The peasant boy who, on leave, lounged about and in his gay uniform turned the heads of the village beauties, roused the envy of the country lads, who could scarcely wait till they were recruited too. When, as a lance-corporal or even sergeant of the reserve, he returned to his home village after years of active service, with the stiff bearing of an old soldier, he contributed, deliberately and unconsciously, to the preservation of the “old Prussian mind” by fixing his gaily coloured soldier-picture on the wall of the best room, by playing his part in the public-house, in the ex-servicemen’s associations, and by entering the village council.

When the successful Franco-German war of 1870 and the enforced “unification” of the individual German States into a “German Empire” under the Prussian king as German Emperor seemed to have justified this military despotism, there was no

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longer any serious opposition to the sinister spirit of Prussian militarism in Bismarck's Germany. This politically so "well educated" people did not demand to decide its fate themselves or even to share the responsibility seriously. Until the Great War they were satisfied at first with a certain kind of representation of the guilds and other professions, later with "constitutions," which actually left all the power in the hands of the princes and the ruling classes. The so-called "house of representatives" in Prussia was elected, until the Great War, by three different classes of electors, and the value of the votes depended on the income tax, which the voters paid, so that the vote of one single industrial magnate counted as much as the votes of thousands of his mill-hands together. Moreover, that excellent electoral franchise had to be exercised publicly. You can imagine what that meant, for instance, in a country constituency, and what an agricultural labourer had to expect who did not poll as the squire wanted.—Apart from that house of representatives "elected by the people", there was in Prussia, provided with the same prerogatives, a "house of lords" consisting partly of hereditary members of the nobility, partly of those elected by various public organizations, and partly nominated by the king. As a third factor of legislation, above both "houses", stood the Prussian king. That "constitution" which Bismarck had invented did not grant actually any political rights at all to the average "electors", as you see. The "parliaments" of the other single States were constituted according to similar systems. Even for the borough councils which—in consequence of the far-reaching powers of the State—had only little influence, the right to vote was organized so, that every "danger" of an opposition inconvenient to the government was almost excluded.

When in 1871 the "German Reich" was founded, the new constitution introduced for the "Reichstag"—the new German "parliament"—the "most liberal electoral franchise of the world", as Bismarck expressed it, i.e. universal, equal and secret suffrage. But nobody will believe that a statesman like Bismarck, so devoted with all his heart to the absolute rule of the king of Prussia, could and would in fact create a liberal political constitution. So the "Reichstag" remained until the Great War nothing else but a "talking shop with a beautiful façade", which was bound to "obey", if it didn't want to be "turned out of doors by a lieutenant with ten men", as was roughly but correctly

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expressed later by one of the best-known East Prussian squires, Baron Oldenburg-Januschau. For, in the new "Empire" the governments of the single States with their own strange "parliaments"—see above—continued, and a great part of the most important tasks of a State was reserved for them. Moreover, the "Reichstag" was condemned to weakness by the fact that for every act of legislation the consent of the so-called "Bundesrat" was necessary, a body invented by Bismarck, consisting exclusively of representatives of the princes, who designed and instructed them without any co-operation on the part of the "parliaments" of their States. The proportion of the votes in the "Bundesrat" was regulated so "skilfully", that, in effect, the king of Prussia had the most important decisions in his hands alone. But—as a German proverb says—"a double seam holds better." It was therefore stipulated by the Bismarck constitution "for the sake of caution", that especially important decisions, as, for instance, a declaration of war, were reserved for the German Emperor, i.e.—in consequence of the personal union—the King of Prussia alone.

You are aware, how very slowly and how late anything like a citizen's political right had developed in Germany, and how stunted and small, under the Emperor, those political rights actually remained right to the last. How little Bismarck must have trusted the political judgment of his Germans! No wonder that the citizen who had no influence in any case showed such extremely small interest in government, and that the people, accustomed to obedience, in spite of its excellent "right to vote", according to its habit was prepared to do just as the government wished, to oppose which would have been useless.

Outwardly the Empire developed in an astonishing measure during the fifty years of peace which followed the Franco-German war of 1870-1. Prosperity, the extension of industry, the acquisition of colonies, the building of a large merchant fleet, the creation of an enormous army and of a strong navy, characterize the rise to power. Nevertheless, behind that splendid façade perils were lurking, and one has to admire Bismarck's foreseeing mind, when he perceived, already at the time of greatest splendour, that his work, forcibly put together, might one day break in pieces again. Possibly—even probably—such sinister forebodings arose particularly from the uneasiness with which this giant was bound to look at Wilhelm the II's dilettante, overweening opinion of

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himself, when this young man summoned up the "courage" to put him aside, and to take on the responsibility himself. Perhaps, however, in the seclusion of the Saxon forest, melancholy and justified doubts were arising in Bismarck's mind, already, as to whether he had indeed done a service to Germany by enforcing his "unity". The annexations of Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse, the oppression of the Poles, Danes, and Alsatians in the conquered provinces, the rather forcibly performed inclusion of the internally opposed small South German States into the "Reich" had left behind much resentment. Even when the prosperity of a long period of peace had made the most vehement feelings ebb by degrees, there were until the Great War, besides all the incorporated Poles, Danes, and Alsatians, still firm "Welfs," "Hesses," and many South Germans—not only in the beer cellars of Munich—who earnestly hated the "Prussian pigs". They had disregarded the good advice of the Prince Consort of Britain's Great Queen, to "Germanize Prussia" instead of "Prussianizing Germany". Again solidity and inner strength were no longer the case in Prussia itself, and the old "Prussian mind", on which they prided themselves so very much, had gradually become something quite different from plainness and modesty. The sons of newly rich merchants and manufacturers had entered the officers corps. But they didn't improve them by new ideas. They did not bring into these circles the "free mind of a vigorously aspiring body of merchants connected with the outer world". Rather did their luxurious habits serve to augment, during the years of peace, increasing contracting of debts by the less well-to-do officers, and to spread gluttony and certain other evils. The conceit of the officers swelled every day. Brothers and cousins, who were not on active military service, felt themselves more reserve officers than merchants in their factories and offices. They "organized" their factories more and more in a military way and an epoch of self-sufficiency began, in which every small merchant was called a "chief", a more important one a "director" or "general director", every chairman a "president".—In the country, especially in Prussia, the old feudalism of the owners of the big estates prevailed unchanged and unrestricted. There were only a few among them with liberal principles. The agricultural labourer, now as before, was politically almost without any rights, in effect. His lawfully guaranteed ability of free movement was

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rendered as difficult as possible by artificial tricks, in order to avoid migration into the towns. The gap between the squires and their inspectors and workmen was almost broader even than the social distance between the manufacturers and their mill-hands.

These leading classes represented Prussianism in its proper form, as has been described by Heinrich Mann in his wonderful novel of the epoch of Wilhelm II, *Der Untertan* (the subject). You ought not to forget, above all, the mixture of extreme nationalism and practical acquisitiveness which was embodied in the armament industry and in other big manufacturers. They knew much too well, how to use their extreme nationalist activities, contrary to the real interests of the State, in order to advance their social positions and their profits. Those circles, which were the financial backers of the "naval" and "colonial" societies, and the extreme nationalistic circles of the reserve officer—college-teachers have contributed, directly and indirectly, more than most people can imagine, to the chauvinistic fascination which dominated the Germany of 1914. Their watchword was "the day"—when the war should begin. A well-known foreigner, who long before the Great War was a guest at a great annual dinner of military officers, reported the significant fact, that—when their mood became animated—the officers and reserve officers suddenly sprang up from their seats roaring like demons, "we want war—war—war!" That was an outburst of the ideas, which were developed by the German military author General von Bernhardi, culminating in the conclusion that Germany needed a war for its expansion—especially as regards colonies. These, after all, are the same ideas which were proclaimed in the not yet abridged editions of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, and which are at the bottom of all his speeches about the necessary "living space" of Germany—world domination.

Deeper and deeper became the gap between the actual rulers and the masses of the population. The gigantic increase of industry had compressed incessantly growing masses of labourers into the big towns, and brought about eventually, in spite of everything, a certain political movement in the crowds, as was to be seen by the increasing number of socialist seats in the "Reichstag" and by the lists of members of the trade unions. These masses, however, did not signify "political peril", and the perpetual hysterical

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anxiety of Wilhelm II regarding an imminent revolution was totally unfounded. The masses were much more interested in tariff questions than in the attainment of political power. The average German, if economically satisfied, had no serious objections to the usual political restrictions. On the contrary, he tolerated only too willingly the tutelage which spared him the trouble and responsibility of thinking for himself. Even the worst abuses of militarism and nationalism could not seriously disturb the mass feeling of devoted subordination and obedience, which was inoculated so deeply by education and drilling. Therefore no opposition arose even among the workmen against the Great War. They still indeed believed almost everything that was proclaimed by the authorities as a historical and political truth, and it is significant of the mentality of the German socialists of 1914 that a member of the social democratic party of the "Reichstag"—Frank was his name—was one of the first volunteers to fall.

It is a fact as astonishing as it is true, that in Germany, even now, only very few are aware, that a war—though not a world war—was not unwelcome at all to the German Emperor and his closest circle in 1914. Only a few in Germany have heard until now of that "now or never", which Wilhelm II wrote with his own hand on the draft of the note by which Germany granted full liberty of action to Austria and promised unconditional military help against the Serbs. Very few Germans either have had cognizance, until now, of the many symptoms indicating, how Wilhelm II and the responsible German politicians of that time considered the probability of unloosing by their activities a real World War, when they under-estimated the many warnings of the then German ambassador in London, that Great Britain would actively intervene, as frivolously as Hitler disregarded Chamberlain's solemn declaration in 1939.—You can scarcely reproach the author of this book with too strong a bias in favour of Wilhelm II. As he, however, knows the mentality of the Germans only too well, and as Wilhelm II is also a German, you ought, perhaps, to attach a certain value to his opinion, that the subtle question, whether it was by determination—*dolus eventualis*—or by carelessness, that Wilhelm caused the Great War, is to be answered, after all, in the latter sense. For Wilhelm II and the leading men of 1914 in Germany probably failed to appreciate, in deed, that foreign countries were not

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only offended by the incessant threatening with the mailed fist and all the other boasting talk, but that they eventually took the menaces seriously, and that they were indeed afraid that Germany would, one day, carry into effect its threat. Wilhelm and his advisers, observing in Germany again and again the yielding of the masses, as soon as they were seriously rebuked, pushed to megalomania by their boundless power in their own country and by the perpetual sight of the immense masses of their soldiers and their fleet—albeit the latter was created more out of vanity, perhaps, than as an instrument for a seriously intended attack—they could hardly imagine that the attack on neutral Belgium would provoke the resistance of nearly the whole world. There again appears the gloomy similarity with 1939.

If in Germany an owner of a big estate forced a small neighbour by economic means to sell him his farm and to become the new owner's foreman, or if a big manufacturer, newspaper publisher, or owner of a great business house bought out a small competitor and made him an employee, they really didn't "mean any harm". From their haughty point of view those people couldn't see a big difference, whether the small farmer or craftsman prolonged a troublesome but independent existence, or whether he lost his poorish independence and became, instead of it, an employee "free of all cares". In exactly the same way the German rulers of 1914 thought it only natural that the then Austria wanted to get rid, once and for all, of that disagreeable small neighbour Serbia. It was the same mentality which appears now again when Germany, camouflaging her own lust of aggrandizement by calling it a "struggle for living space" is obviously unable even to understand that her small neighbours do not share her own clumsy and egotistic opinion, that it is not really so bad for them to lose their independence and to become instead of that subjects of a glorious greater Germany, "free of all cares".

The German people, politically ignorant and misled, has been convinced until now that its rulers of 1914 did not want a war, and did not even cause it through carelessness. Much more in 1914 did everybody appreciate the authoritatively pronounced dogma that insidious enemies had forced the war on inoffensive Michel. The historic crime, however, was scarcely lessened by that blindness. For it was an historic crime that the German people had tolerated for more than a hundred years being stupefied and

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held in tutelage to so high a degree that, entangled in a net of historic phrases, it finally "stumbled" into the Great War, as the familiar phrase has it. It remains an historic crime of the Germans, that they too obediently allowed this mentality to be drummed into their heads, and that they subjected themselves to an education of political servility even during periods when opposition was much less dangerous than now.

That criminal indolence began after the German wars of independence, when—thirty years after France had gained the rights of man by the great revolution—the German people tolerated even the smallest liberties in their country to be suppressed again by the reactionary governments of the princes, liberties which had been introduced or promised under French influence. That indolence became obvious again in 1848. It was an historic crime, that the German people suffered for a further sixty years the anachronistic, feudal system of domination by a caste of high officials, generals, and squires, which existed until the Great War. It is a fact, that every people has the government that it deserves, and that it is responsible—at least historically—for the crimes of its government. You cannot say that the German people—in contrast to its Western neighbours—had never been able to get rid of the Prussian semi-absolutism, because the latter's means to power had been too strong. Neither the reaction after 1815 nor the defeat of the revolution of 1848 would have been possible, if the German people had indeed vigorously resisted. If, actually, a strong will for liberation had existed in the people, if they had been resolved to put an end, once and for all, to political oppression, it would have been achieved in Germany, as it had been achieved long ago in France. The German revolution of 1848 had already succeeded to a certain extent. The resistance of the king of Prussia was so weak at first that a full victory of democracy was beyond doubt, if the weakness of the German people had not denied the necessary help to the men who wanted to bring them political freedom. They had to die in vain, because the German people was too indolent to bring about the victory of liberty. A victory for democracy then would have changed the whole fate of Germany, and the international development of Europe would have taken quite another and, probably, much better and more peaceful course. The stupid political indifference of the Germans did not want it.

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This state of mind remained unchanged until 1914. Naturally, even in this period, there were high-minded men in Germany. The longing for freedom was burning even then in many hearts, which felt that—in spite of temporary power and prosperity—a country must come to a bad end which, under the unintellectual domination of militarism, feudalism, and semi-absolutism, was pursuing, abroad and at home, a policy of mere power, dictated only by the ambitious and egotistic interests of powerful single groups in contrast to every free development. The vicious circle, however, of an education of the people to subordination on the one hand, and to a perilous policy of power and militarism on the other, was never interrupted by an outburst of temperament on the part of the masses. When, in the summer of 1914, the situation into which the German people had been led by the system of crippling all free thinking and acting and of holding the masses in absolute dependence, became finally evident, it was too late to break the chains and to lead Germany back from the abyss of the Great War. That never before had one serious attempt been made by the masses, let alone by the so-called parliament, unconscious of their responsibility, to influence that policy, that they obediently and stupidly allowed themselves to be led into the European War—that is the historic crime of the Germans. Nevertheless, the much greater crime of those who had built up that system of force, who had maintained it anachronistically for a century, and had, finally, misused it, so that the Great War became unavoidable, is none the less because of that. It is significant, likewise of the mind of the German people and of its leadership, that on Hitler's instruction August 3, 1939, was "celebrated" in Germany as the twenty-fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War. No clearer evidence is needed of the disaster, which a hundred years' stupefying and education in chauvinism was bound to create in a people's mentality. For that happened in a generation which had lived to see the Great War with all its cruelties and then lost it, which then for fourteen years could decide its own fate in democratic liberty, and then sacrificed its freedom deliberately, in a stupid fascination, and ran behind a roaring, swaggering "leader" who gave all sorts of promises and finally lured his people into a new war of conquest.

This "armed nation" did its utmost in the Great War, like its adversaries. The fact, however, is likewise established that, finally,

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it was not equal to the might and the inexhaustible reserves of material and men of its enemies, that it was properly beaten, militarily and economically, and that all the talk of a stabbing in the back has nothing at all to do with the truth. No "socialist intrigues" caused the German defeat of 1918. It is astonishing, on the contrary, and can be explained only by the education to political servility and to full obedience, how rare and small—in spite of all the wants and actual starvation of which so many died—the riots were which occurred occasionally in German munition factories and dockyards during the Great War. Not earlier than just before the end of the Great War, when obviously there was no longer any hope of averting defeat, did those riots take more serious form. They are not to blame, however, for the loss of the war, and there can be no doubt that the revolution in Germany of 1918 was a consequence of the loss of the war and not vice versa. The military drill, the deeply inoculated respect for an army officer's uniform and for authority, the feeling of subordination towards every superior lasted until the end of the war. False information about the war brought it about, that even in the spring of 1918 the Germans still believed in a victory, and yet quite a short time before the end of the war they believed in a so-called "peace by negotiation". Not before the total breakdown of the Western front were the delusions also broken down on which the then German "world philosophy" had rested.

The reaction of the sudden collapse of the colossus with feet of clay which had been deified for half a century in Germany was a dreadful one, naturally, and it was astonishing for everybody who had to look at those things from within that this spiritual catastrophe did not involve much greater shocks and destruction of life and property. At the least, all the idols had fallen which the German people had faithfully venerated for such a long time. The nimbus of the "Hohenzollern" and of the imperial demi-god was destroyed, and broken was the power of militarism of whose meaning for the German people all attempts at explanation can only give a limited comprehension. The might of the ruling classes, the officials, the squires, and the "captains of industry" had vanished. The whole edifice of magnificent swaggering with which, after all, the German people had been so well pleased had collapsed. Finished and done with. What now?

It is the task of this book to explain the mentality in Nazi

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Germany. Therefore the continually changing and contradictory development during the years after the Great War can be touched on here only in so far, as it is still significant for the understanding of the German mentality of to-day and for the history of the German mental disease. Though the temptation is great to examine more minutely the forming of intrigues by conflicting political and economic groups and private interests and that open and secret struggle of respectable mediocrity against reckless brutality and hypocritical malignity—we must withstand it, as these matters are no discharges of a typical German mentality. We have to confine ourselves to the attempt at providing the reader with an idea of the impressions and effects of that intervening republican and democratic epoch on the German mentality.

The circles, which after the last war were called upon to build up a genuine democracy in Germany, were not equal to such a task. No wonder. That people had never before learnt anything about responsible political independence. It had been accustomed all along to accept events willingly, and to allow its fate to be dictated from above. Now, when the former "masters" had crept into all the mouseholes they could find, now, that under most difficult conditions a new State was to be built up out of chaos, there were no experienced democratic statesmen and officials who might have been able to put things straight in an impoverished country, with the handicap of a returning army, defeated and brutalized, unaccustomed to all civilian moral and order. No wonder that they did not know how to command, their ancestors, like themselves, had been drilled to obey and nothing else. No wonder that often the democratic rulers set about things in the wrong way, that, afraid they could no longer control the revolution and that the chaos might grow too great, they choose, after a short time, the seemingly lesser evil of readmitting the old groups trained in leading and administration, or even by sending for their help. These, mostly, were only too readily prepared to "accept the position as a fact", and to return to their posts. Even in leading places in the ministerial departments the former directors were soon sitting again as "advisers" of the new ministers. It is true that—from a superficial point of view—much material loss was prevented in that way. Doubtless a longer, probably even bloodier, revolution with a still greater loss of national property would have been unavoidable, if they had not kept—or quickly fetched

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back—the old “skilled” officials. At the first glance it seemed to be a lucky stroke that something worse had been avoided. But they fell a prey to Scylla by trying to avoid the whirlpool of Charybdis. For in cutting short the revolution which never forced its way to the roots of the old feudal order, in this compromise with the former ruling classes, lay the seeds of a much too quick regeneration of nationalistic and chauvinistic powers and for the undermining of the German democracy just developing. If, after 1918, democracy had acted with half the thoroughness that Hitler did later on, a Nazi State would never have emerged.

Often, especially in Germany, the revolution of 1918 is thought to be the actual cause of National Socialism.—The cause was not the revolution, which was unavoidable after the loss of the Great War, but the weakness of the democratic governments, the lack of the necessary political and administrative routine on the part of the new rulers, and—last but not least—the mentality of the German people, not equal to the new liberty, and their political immaturity.

Democratic politicians not accustomed to command in that way which was, after all, absolutely necessary in Germany for the time being, occupied the ministerial chairs. But only in a few departments did they succeed, by degrees, in freeing themselves from the influence of their “advisers”, the councillors of the former government who had been recalled, and the far too many subalterns of former times. Only a few could force their way through the underwood of an officialdom which, consciously and unconsciously, was repugnant to all liberal ideas, and make the new democratic fundamentals actually respected. Bureaucracy—at first naturally very polite and submissive, part of it even seriously bent on helping the new rulers—observed their weakness only too quickly, and began, at once, first secretly, then by degrees more and more openly, to joke about the new masters; at first to admire, most devotedly, their “modern” ideas, then to point out “obediently” the “difficulties and dangers of such radical changes”; first to “smooth away difficulties”, then, by the by, to turn down embarrassing orders administratively, or—more correctly expressed—to commit sabotage. Occasionally also, with well-acted sorrow, his Excellency was manœuvred into a certain folly. Not without pleasure did they let him make a fool

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of himself a little in parliament, before they came to his help. Many of the new rulers felt a certain inferiority, because they did not master the forms of society so well as their advisers of the old officialdom. Many allowed themselves, not unwillingly, to be introduced into the circles of bankers, big manufacturers and owners of estates who were in close contact with the high officials of former times. Some were dazzled by money and routine, began to confuse the outward forms and the real contents of such relations, and allowed themselves, more or less unconsciously, to be misused as very "useful" instruments, in order to avert "much too abrupt and perilous transformations". At the time of the great upheaval also unclean elements had come into power, of course, here and there, and bribery, nepotism, and favouritism played their none too small parts from 1918 to 1932, even if their extent cannot be compared at all with what has meanwhile become a matter of course with the Nazis.

All this, however, was a part only, and perhaps not even the worst part, of the difficulties which stood in the way of the men who, with genuine devotion, though unfortunately not with the necessary skill and vigour indispensable for such a task, were trying to erect a new Germany, an honest home of liberty and democracy.—There were at first hard times for the country after the Great War. For years the sons of the peasants and the agricultural workers had been absent, and many had not returned after the war to the country, but had stuck to the industrial centres. The fields were neglected and exhausted. They had been without fertilizers, livestock without sufficient food, for years. The farmers demanded increased prices for their products, to which the industrial workers were strongly opposed.—Industry was almost in an even worse position. For years they had produced war materials only. The machines were worn out by use and antiquated. Relations with foreign countries were destroyed, the foreign markets lost during the war. In consequence of the separation of parts of the country and the creation of new customs boundaries by the peace treaties other difficulties were created.—The whole economic organization had to be completely changed. During the war they had made good profits in "paper" money. New "banknotes" had been printed and could be spent. But the sanguine hope that a conquered enemy would pay all that had not been fulfilled. Now they were conquered themselves, and all

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that was needed for reconstruction had to be paid for in gold. So many wheels came to a standstill.

By the demobilization of the army and of the innumerable factories which had worked to supply it during the war an enormous proletariat had come into existence, an army of millions of workless and desperate men, composed of the most various elements. In spite of the newly created public insurance against unemployment and of many other social measures, those masses were a great danger to quiet development and a problem, which could not be solved quickly and completely enough in the period of transition. Things, that during the war had become a matter of course, were now suddenly looked on as crimes again; that puzzled the men. There were children, brutalized during the years of war without the discipline of their fathers who had gone to the front. There were women who had been working in munition factories and now had to carry on their own household again with the small allowance of an unemployed man. Above all, there were many proletarianized sons of the impoverished families of military officers and officials who, after their dismissal from the army, could no longer find their usual place at the food trough of the State. All these formed dangerous elements of unrest. Wage movements of the industrial and agricultural workers brought about always new strikes, and even by its own followers a government was fought, from which the workers now, as the old order was definitely broken down, were demanding—sillily but quite understandably—the immediate introduction of the golden age.

You have seen similar phenomena in other countries. They could be overcome with energy by politically educated, clear-thinking peoples. But the Germans were not politically educated, and individual thinking was a very unaccustomed and disagreeably tiring matter for them. The German mill hands could not and did not even want to understand that, just at the beginning of their democratic freedom, they had to make sacrifices. "You could just as well keep the old government. Think yourself? Dear me! The government was paid to do that! Under the old regime you were not obliged to think." That was the essence of their political perceptions.

There were riots. Communistic gangs appeared. In some parts of Southern Germany and in Brunswick the government was

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temporarily usurped by radical groups which misused their power. It had to be proceeded against by the military with the help of volunteers who succeeded rather quickly in restoring order. But then the fear of a repetition of the communistic intermezzo released such a vehement reaction of the frightened middle-class citizens, that the ground was prepared in the best possible way for any nationalistic counter movement. The then beginning, unscrupulous agitation of Hitler's adherents against democracy—notwithstanding the fact that democracy itself was the strongest adversary of Communism—was able to take root most deeply and quickly in those circles. In fact, the danger of the Communist revolution was removed with the quashing of the riot in Bavaria. Many participants in that movement had only done as others did, and most of them were definitely cured of Communism after having personally looked at their "successes" in Bavaria.

More perilous for democracy than the Communists were the extreme Nationalists, many of whom came from the so-called "better classes". They were adventurers, thrown out of their normal career by the war, who behaved most violently, were full of the deepest hatred against the democratic order, and strove with all means at their disposal to regain by force the lost political power of their class. After the Great War so-called "Free Corps" had been formed, in order to fight the Communists in Germany. When this object was attained and those who, in fact, had intended only to restore good order had returned to their normal civilian life, many adventurers, ill-bred and unfinished elements remained together, and, because temporarily there was nothing in Germany against which they could fight, they went abroad like modern mercenaries, "fighting against Bolshevism." Those new *lansquenets* among whom there were a few real idealists exercised by their adventurousness a certain influence, especially on the fancy of youth growing up, and, by previous relations with many circles of former military officers and officials, on the nobility, the landed proprietors, and manufacturers who all were adversaries of the new republic. They poisoned themselves every day anew with hatred against democracy and its adherents.

It was a strange fatality, that the policy of the then victorious Powers for many years unconsciously facilitated the play of the nationalistic and destructive elements in Germany which, by egotism, stupidity, and an instinctive aversion to the whole

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democratic mind, opposed with all their might, under the cloak of patriotism, the consolidation of a free German Republic. It is understandable that the representatives of France and Belgium, especially, which had been exposed to the barbarity of the German occupation for years looked with bitterness at Germany where no enemy had set foot, and that they always bore in mind the devastated towns of their own countries. But when they demanded in that mood the fulfilment of claims which exceeded the economic power of Germany, that was—however comprehensible—nevertheless very impolitic. When Poincaré in the summer of 1920 at Spa, and a little later at Genoa, smashed the efforts of Rathenau to obtain alleviation for Germany and to secure thereby a lasting peaceful arrangement—Stinnes was the winner, and Hitler! If Poincaré had been less harsh, if the then victorious Powers had met Rathenau's wish for reconciliation on a grand scale, if they had helped, quickly and vigorously, the forces for good which then had the power in Germany, a genuine democracy could have been saved, the rapid growth of national fanatics could have been stopped, and Europe could have been spared National Socialism.—Providence decided otherwise.

The "rigid clinging to extorted conditions of peace" was an incomparable means of propaganda for all the nationalistic baiters in Germany who then became aware of the immense propagandist value of the fact that—by staying in mouseholes during the revolution—they had been excused from the necessity of themselves signing the "ignominious peace treaty of Versailles". They used that fact for a first-class, gigantic baiting against all those who had then had the reasonable courage to put their signature to the peace treaty, and who had laboured hard to obtain alleviation by agreement, instead of banging their fists bombastically on the table, like Stinnes, and offering a hopeless resistance. The baiting did not confine itself to speeches. Rathenau had to fall by the shots of fanatical nationalists, as Erzberger had fallen.

More and more the Nationalists made themselves felt. The resistance against the "policy of fulfilment" took stronger and stronger form. The government was composed of brave, even intelligent men, who were well able to carry on a proper rule, under normal circumstances. They could not, however, call forth the vigour and inner superiority, sternly and energetically to stand in the way of the harassing which was supported by Stinnes and

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other big manufacturers, and to continue the prudent policy of the murdered Rathenau, in spite of Poincaré's implacable disposition. Even democratic and socialist ministers were afraid of being branded as "unpatriotic cowards". They preferred, in their misunderstood patriotism, to be reproached with dishonesty and malevolence by the allied commissions which had to control the delivery and destruction of German arms, and fully to destroy the victorious Powers' last remains of faith, for the sake of some ridiculous old guns, than to carry through inflexibly the obligations once incurred, in spite of the resistance of the opposing Nationalists. Even they could not free themselves fully from the remains of an inoculated, undemocratic mentality. The new German parliament was so absorbed by the unaccustomed democratic forms, that it almost forgot the strong mind and the real contents of a genuine democracy. The party leaders, most of them former secretaries of the unions of employers or employees, were little inclined to risk their own popularity by backing a foreign policy which would have been bound to seem a weak one. For the better informed the fatal consequences became more and more obvious of a system which for a century had kept the German people artificially in political ignorance, almost under tutelage, and which had estranged the best brains from the political leadership of the nation. Now the new men of the government lacked the unshakable will and the indispensable strength of action, founded on experience, tradition, and common sense, against the crowds which were caught much too easily by every instigation camouflaged with a patriotic cloak. So they didn't dare defy public feeling, and to make use of the legal means of power against the new chauvinism, by the energetic application of which those prominent before the war would have retreated, probably, into their hiding places again. Instead of energetically fighting the artificially inflamed Nationalism in their own country, the government, backed by the advice of an incompetent president of the Imperial Bank and yielding to the pressure of the fanatics, preferred to organize half officially the resistance against the fulfilment of the obligations entered into at the peace treaty, although it was obvious that both forcible or passive resistance were senseless in view of the imminent occupation of the Rhineland. Now one thing brought about another. The German resistance was followed by the French occupation of the Rhineland,

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this by German acts of sabotage, these by executions and other retaliation from the French side. Then came the inflation and the collapse of resistance.

If now, after nearly twenty years—and what sort of years!—you look coolly at those events, the actual associations become clearly visible, corresponding to the German idiom “you think you will push, but you are pushed yourself”. Behind the nationalistic chiefs of Germany, who pushed an inexperienced and much too compliant democratic government into a senseless policy of resistance against the victorious Powers and, eventually, into the destruction of the whole public and private economy of Germany, by means of a criminal inflation, stood—the great manufacturers. They were the big profiteers who with their typical slyness knew how to put the adventurous spirit of the chauvinists, like a horse, to their business carriage, stupidly believing, on the other hand, that they could control the horse as they wished. At first matters went on very well. National feeling was satisfied by the “brave” actions of those incited, partly well-meaning, however not less dangerous adventurers in the Rhineland, and at the same time—they paid their liabilities with cheap printed paper. The manufacturing magnates, well informed in advance, were filling their pockets in a manner never imagined before.

The procedure itself was really simple. By credits founded on bills of exchange which were wilfully granted by the banks everything that you could get in any way at home and abroad was bought. The price was without importance, if it could be paid in “paper marks”; for, by the time the bank’s bill of exchange fell due, the value of the “paper marks” had fallen so low that it could be paid almost “out of your waistcoat pocket”. If, however, by chance the fall of the paper mark had not been low enough, the bank had only to prolong the bill, and the next time it was a still better stroke of business. In the meantime you had bought with the borrowed “money” machines, raw materials, houses, in brief all that was offered for sale. On the other hand you had also made deliveries to foreign countries and so obtained gold and credits in foreign exchanges abroad. You bought also with “paper money” on the German stock exchanges shares of foreign companies and foreign funds or at least German “real values”. The shares obtained could be used again as a pledge at the German banks, which gave credit up to 75 per cent of the daily quotation

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of the exchanges, so that you only had to deposit 25 per cent. After a short time, when the quotation of the shares had "risen" corresponding to the steady fall of the "paper mark"—you could either sell your shares and pocket your profit, or get a higher credit from the bank on the pledged securities, in order to repeat therewith on a larger scale the same business a second time, and so on. The interest which had to be paid to the banks was of no importance under such circumstances, and, as the private banks rediscounted their bills at the Imperial Bank which printed the money, the ring was closed.

That went on for years. Gradually everyone got to know, and eventually there wasn't a greengrocer in Germany who did not speculate with shares. The whole country was intoxicated until the bubble finally burst. With typical German thoroughness the swindle had been carried through to the last, i.e. until the purchasing power of the "paper mark" had reached zero. It seems to-day to be a fairy tale, that in October 1923 you received for one U.S.A. dollar four billions and two hundred milliards of "paper marks". The joke circulated in Berlin that an American who wished to change one dollar at a German bank had to wait for hours, and when he eventually became impatient, the chairman appeared with his fur and top-hat, ready to hand over the keys of the bank. In order to make the matter easier, he was going to transfer the whole bank for the dollar.

For the big men the business had meanwhile become uninteresting. They had feathered their nests, and the statutes of that time, restricting the possession of foreign currencies, had so many gaps through which a cunning manufacturer could slip that there was scarcely one of those gentlemen who had not made use of the opportunity to provide the necessary bank deposits in foreign countries and to make himself "independent" of the fate of the German mark, as the phrase had it. All the "well informed" had changed places in time, before the so-called stabilization of the mark "broke out". They had already begun the initiation of a new big business by lending the newly created "gold marks" against an annual interest of from 18 to 36 per cent. Not only did private persons have to pay such interest in the time following the stabilization, but even the boroughs which had to lend temporarily the urgently needed means for the relief of the workless and for other tasks, because their paper floods had

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suddenly become worthless and the changing of taxes into gold took a certain time.

The "inflation" with all its consequences had not only severely hurt innumerable foreign creditors, it had also fully undermined the nerves of the masses and destroyed the whole German middle class. Whilst the "big" people and certain cunning speculators had accumulated immense fortunes, the workman had suffered and gone hungry for years because of the rising cost of living—this in spite of increased wages. But—looking at the matter superficially—he had not had direct visible "losses", because even before he had possessed nothing. The German middle class, on the other hand, was totally impoverished. Its savings, its funds had become worthless, and even the magnificent bubble companies, in the shares of which the small shopkeepers and tradesmen had done their little speculations, had burst. The worst hurt were those who should have been best "protected" by the law the minors. Their property which had to be invested in public funds was completely lost, and the later statutes of restoration could repair only a small part of their losses.

The destruction of the middle class which, though without political influence, had by their contentment and patriotic obedience formerly been a most important factor of peace, was of far-reaching political importance in the times following. Those people could not see through the intrinsic causes of their misfortune, which were too cunningly hidden by the Stinnes' and their gangs. The fury of the people was artfully turned against "the democracy". "Democracy" had "robbed the German citizen of his property", "left in the lurch" the German youth, which had "shed its blood" in the Free Corps and in the sabotage troops on the Rhine and on the Ruhr. Democracy had "yielded in cowardly fashion" to Poincaré and the French. For—as the murdered Rathenau and every clear-sighted person had foreseen—the occupation of the Rhineland, the so-called "wound in the West", must finally lead to hemorrhage, and passive resistance was bound to break down, as soon as the last gold had vanished from the Reich treasury. There was nothing left but to resume the "policy of fulfilment". Two things, however, were achieved by the senseless self-destruction of the so-called "Ruhr fight"—Germany's wealth was concentrated now in a few hands and the middle class was undermined. Large new strata had

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become proletarians and were ripe for political instigation.

Rathenau was dead. Stresemann had replaced him. Peaceful-looking years followed. The reparation figures, in the meantime recognized by the victorious Powers themselves as impossible, were reduced, by degrees, to tolerable dimensions, and many useless clauses of the Versailles Treaty were abolished. A slow economic recovery began in Germany, in consequence of Briand's and Stresemann's policy of reconciliation. Credits from foreign countries streamed in. The wheels were turning again.—The successful profiteers of the inflation and the industrial magnates, however, had not sufficiently appreciated that this time it was a matter of liabilities in dollars, pounds, and guilders, and no longer "mark" credits, which could not be quickly enough changed into "real values", and during the inflation had repaid themselves almost automatically. So they did not gradually and cautiously reconstruct the economy by means of the new loans. Instead of that the borrowed money was lavished on immense and perilous new investments, partly even misused for big speculations in stocks.

When the boom in America collapsed in 1929 and the stream of gold into Europe dried up, that naturally could not be without effect in Germany also. The reaction then felt in Germany had nothing to do at all with the Versailles Treaty and the "policy of fulfilment". The achievements in prosecuting the policy of fulfilment did not ruin Germany. They were even financed by the foreign countries themselves, and the German payments on the reparation account were smaller than the credits for Germany from abroad. It was only an attempt on the part of the real culprits—the big manufacturers *à la* Stinnes and the German bankers of the same quality—to turn people's eyes away from their own light-hearted foolishness and their speculations, when they ascribed the German economic difficulties after 1929 to the policy of reconciliation. These people had always been good propagandists, although it was mostly at the expense of truth!—A new coalition of the big manufacturers with the chauvinists—this time with Hitler—was in progress. As long as Stresemann was at the helm, they acted rather cautiously towards the government. He knew the great manufacturers from his own development, and they believed—whether accurately is difficult to decide—that it was his aim to gain time for Germany's recovery, in order to bring about a new "German" peace. They had, however, no

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proper confidence even in Stresemann. He was too adroit a diplomatist both in home and in foreign politics. He had too fast friends also amongst the Liberals and Democrats. In any case it seemed to be profitable to "secure this Hitler" who—for his propaganda and his storm troops—always needed money, and with whom they were on common ground in so many matters. Nationalism as well as the hatred of democracy and all that smelt of socialism was common. The latter was the main thing for the manufacturers of armaments and the other industrial magnates to whom democracy's policy of international reconciliation and friendly disposition towards the workers was everywhere in their way. They wanted to become "masters in their own houses" again and, simultaneously, to obtain new armament orders from the State. Add to this a hysterical fear of Communism, against which they were prepared to make an alliance even with the devil himself, and against which they believed they had found an incomparable confederate—in Hitler! Yes certainly!—The magnificent idea of making an alliance with Hitler in order to defend Western European civilization and the world's existing economic order against Bolshevism—an idea due to their deep knowledge of men and of wise foresight, indeed—was not confined, incidentally, to GERMAN capitalists only. There were many arrogant snobs in other countries also who believed they could smile haughtily at the early warnings of "nervous pessimists", that Hitler and Stalin might be seen gloriously united one day.—"You only had to harness this Hitler to your carriage, though you had to go to great expense in doing this." His manners and his style were not especially delicate, it was true. They consoled themselves, however, with the thought that this wild conduct was nothing else but boasting, after all. By degrees, they supposed, he would become almost fit for society. In any case he was "serviceable, immensely serviceable!"

Stresemann was ill. His end came earlier than they had expected. By his death the policy of fulfilment also received a mortal blow. Without him the men in the government were no longer at all equal to the roaring gale of Nazism. They were mediocre minds, without a clear and deep insight into the latest political and economic associations, without real perception of the immediate necessities and without sufficient energy to exploit all the existing

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possibilities to maintain democracy. It seems scarcely credible, that at this time of imminent revolution the responsible Minister for Home Affairs, Bracht, a member of the ultra-montane party, instead of devoting his attention to keeping down the dangerous activities of the Nazis, could find nothing more urgent to do than to publish his famous "gusset decree", ordering all bathing costumes at a certain place to be reinforced by a kind of gusset. That was, it seems, the main concern of his Excellency.

There was no clear perception of the imminent danger, and again and again the lack of that vigour became evident which was absolutely indispensable for the fight against the unscrupulous actions and propaganda of the Nazis. The vehemence of the Nazi baiting surpassed everything that had been experienced before. Here indeed a superior mind was necessary, a statesman of great size, to bring together and rouse the masses for the great aims of a free democracy, and to liberate them from a poisoned demagogic propaganda. It should be a man capable, at the same time, of making it plain to foreign countries that in their own interests it was high time to work together as closely as possible with all democratic Powers in Germany and to give them every economic and political help, in order to check the Nazi propaganda with its aims so dangerous for the peace of the world.

Such a man, however, did not exist in Germany, neither in the person of the old Field-Marshal von Hindenburg nor in the governments of Bruening, von Papen, Hugenberg, etc., nor within the parties in parliament. And the army? General von Schleicher—inconsiderate, brutal, intriguing, and ambitious, trusted by Hindenburg and chief of the "Reichswehr" who had then the greatest power in Germany wanted—much more than Stresemann—rearmament, which was being secretly prepared in the factories and for which he temporarily welcomed also the military drill of Hitler's private army under the command of Roehm. The Republic meant nothing for him, and he was anything else but a resolute democrat. For him it was one and the same, whether a constitutional chancellor led the government, whether the ultra-montane Bruening or the man of many parties von Papen was at the helm, who had come to power by an open violation of the constitution. Like the great manufacturers also Schleicher was ogling Hitler, in the erroneous opinion, he would be able either to direct him through Hinden-

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burg, or to overthrow him again by Papen, until it was too late for both alternatives. Protected and financially backed by the big manufacturers, untroubled by the weak government, whose temporary "measures" without decisive action could only produce excellent material for Hitler's baiting propaganda, driven on by the more and more swelling masses of the discontented, Nazism by its fanatical and immense agitation couldn't fail to infect, by degrees, the whole German population with its small power of resistance, caused by political malnutrition and the fevers of the Great War, the revolution, and the inflation. The crowds, deeply disappointed in their exaggerated hopes for immediate fruits from the democratic Republic, were united by one feeling: Embitterment. The discontented masses, simultaneously excited and tired by the unaccustomed, perpetual, political fights, were feeling one instinctive requirement—to do in public and in private what was ordered by superiors, without having to think and worry. The time was ripe, and so there happened what was bound to happen.

Chapter 3

The Big Baiting—Intolerance the Foundation of Nazism

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You must allow that Hitler by his admirable demagogic tactics actually succeeded in utilizing fully the most primitive instincts of his public, and in catering for the tastes of the crowd with an astonishingly subtle certainty. The unbridled baiting in his propaganda campaign under the watchword "Awake, Germany!" far surpassed anything experienced before. In the whole world one has become acquainted, now, by degrees, with the hysterical verbosity of the Goebbel's propaganda, and you have learnt to estimate the seditious language of the Nazi verbal gymnasts at its true value. Then, however, these wild speeches were something new, and their unprecedented vileness—far exceeding still the excesses of the wireless Nazi propaganda in foreign languages of to-day—produced an enormous effect upon all the young and older rowdies and the politically uneducated masses throughout Germany. The "drumming", as he himself called his propaganda, was simplified, it is true, by the fact that his audience were already assembled with the wish to roar out their fury together. Accordingly you could openly libel everything at the meetings—the Government and Political System, the Capitalists and the Marxists, the Democrats, the Communists and Bolsheviks, the Jews and their friends, the Freemasons and the Ultra-montanists, so that every kind of private hatred could be satisfied simultaneously. Above all, naturally, the campaign was directed against the government of that time. "It is the government's fault", as you know, always and everywhere, especially in the opinion of those who are discontented, because formerly they belonged to the ruling classes themselves, as did the derailed adventurers who formed the "intellectual" part of Hitler's original followers. In the beer-cellar meetings at Munich, where Hitler thoroughly

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tried out his propaganda first, a method of agitation against the "system government" was developed by degrees, on the one side so full of inconsistent and chimerical promises of golden days—if only the victory were first won—and so unscrupulous in its slanderous attacks, that gradually a greater and greater part of the weakened body of the population was caught by the mass psychosis.

"Against the whole system" was the watchword. Actually there was no system at all, and this fact, probably, was one of the main causes of the German misery. Hitler's demagogic talk about the pretended "system period" during the years after the Great War is absolutely incorrect and absurd. In his famous "fourteen years" from 1918 to 1932 almost all kinds of political tendencies had held the reins temporarily. When Hitler came to power, for instance, the "German National" party of Hugenburg was at the helm, a strong conservative and anti-socialist group, which was appointed by an infraction of the constitution by Hindenburg with Schleicher's assistance and Hitler's own approval. The only "system" which had prevailed indeed, until then, whilst governments of various tendencies were in office, was the constitution of Weimar. It guaranteed the rights of the majority and of free expression of opinion, and of this Hitler and his followers could not complain, of course. For, without that liberal constitution, their boundless inciting propaganda and the thriving of the Nazi movement would have not been possible at all. How gloriously did the weakness of the "system governments" advance just at this point to meet the requirements of Nazi propaganda! Hitler's guardsmen, inclined to every outrage, could "express their opinions" unmolested—or better, pander to their pugnacity—in beer-cellar brawls, by roaring, by throwing beer glasses, and fighting with broken chair-legs. Nearly every instigation to outrages at political meetings remained unpunished, in consequence of the then prevailing, misunderstood political "freedom". Blood-thirsty speeches could be made with impunity, "fighting songs", inciting to political homicide, could be sung at processions, and you could revile the government and its single members in public in a manner which cannot be reproduced. A spirit of hooliganism governed the Nazi meetings. The baiting of single persons was the worst, whereby it was convenient for both orators and writers that, according to the German jurisdiction of that time, even intentionally insulting treatment of private matters in public and in the Press could not be punished severely

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enough, and therefore could hardly be prevented. High claims for damages, by awarding which a British jury can energetically counteract such low conduct, were not recognized in Germany, and even if a court, after long and most painful discussions, fined the slanderer—what did he care? The newspaper edition and the reputation of the “intrepid” editor had grown by that kind of propaganda and—“dirt sticks”. It is almost impossible to imagine what an amount of calumny and actual instigation to murder against political adversaries was produced at that time. “If you will not be my brother, I will smash your skull.” In many cases, after such “preparation” by the Press, the slandered one was found dead somewhere in the streets; the culprits remained “unknown”.

You must not seek for logic where propaganda is in question. There is, however, a logical reason why really this weakness of the “system governments” was so repugnant to Hitler and his gang, notwithstanding its usefulness for their own rise. The actual cause, however unconscious for the masses, was their common, instinctive hatred of everything that smacked of tolerance. Tolerance is the flower of cultivated individualism, and a general lack of culture is the characteristic of Nazism. As we have to learn still at other places, the “new world philosophy,” the various “new orders”, the totalitarianism, and all the other “new” principles of this “young” nation are nothing else, in fact, than a relapse into the barbarism of past centuries, a repetition, in a modernized form, of habits and perceptions of primitive tribes, all this owing to a want of spiritual education. The most essential principle of Nazism is intolerance, that unconscious, primitive disinclination of wild and uncivilized crowds for all heterogeneous things. If you follow that thought through to its conclusion, you will find from this standpoint the explanation of a great part of the otherwise hardly understandable, clumsy and primitive Nazi mass mentality. “Liberalism” is the spiritual arch-enemy of every Nazi, because its fundamental idea is—tolerance. Hitler is an embittered adversary of all Internationalism, because internationalism means tolerance towards foreign nations and their citizens. Democracy, Individualism, Free Masonry, they are all founded on tolerance; therefore Nazism is their sworn adversary. The imbecile theory of a German “Ruling Race” which, in order to achieve its own *Lebensraum*, claims the “right” to confiscate the living space of others, the expulsion of the Jews, the fight against religion—what else is all this but intolerance?

## *Chapter 4*

# The Jews

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It was by his appeal to the primitive instinct of intolerance that Hitler succeeded in inciting the decayed masses. There was for them no more certain and more attractive allurements than his grand Jew baiting.

One of the most effective means used by an agitator, in order to force the masses to his will and make them his bondsmen, is to rouse their common hatred and to direct it against a common object under his own leadership. This was explained by Freud, particularly, and there was a good reason why the Nazis burnt the works of this penetrating searcher of souls who has also pointed out clear-sightedly other underlying connections of their outrages.—Apart from "system and government", something still more concrete had to be found by Hitler, against which the fury of the masses could be directed under his leadership. This was the Jews.

In order to realize the fundamentals and reasons for the success of Hitler's Jew baiting, which is so extremely informative when diagnosing the German mentality, the historical development must be entered into a little more fully.

The general emancipation of the Jews in Germany did not take place before the time of Napoleon. This fact did not deter them from sharing their responsibility immediately afterwards during the German wars of independence. Many of them who had volunteered then died in these wars, and many returned with the newly created "Iron Cross" which in those times was not bestowed so easily. Their brave conduct had won them much sympathy which eased their entry into the civil life. In the centuries, during which they had been crowded into the "ghettos", the Jews were practically excluded from every task demanding bodily ability. Farming had been quite impossible and the oppor-

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tunities for handicraft had been very small. Many had turned towards the spiritual professions, and, apart from a highly developed study of Jewish theology and traditionally practised medicine, they had produced well-known philosophers, among whom Moses Mendelssohn was the model of Lessing's "Nathan the Sage". For most of them, however, nothing had been left over except trading, and their commercial ability had, therefore, developed intensively. The poorer ones had wandered with their packs as hawkers, the rich made money transactions. When the barriers were opened, these customary professions were particularly further developed, of course. The spiritually agile sons of the ghetto scholars turned to the learned professions, and, as liberalism and tolerance then still prevailed at the universities and in the circles of the learned who were at the same time resisting Metternich's reaction, people did not shut out the striving newcomers. It is astonishing, how many important men of learning came from Jewry at that time. This is the more noteworthy as, in spite of the scientific liberalism, things were not made too easy for them. Outward difficulties, however, have always been the best incentive for efficient people towards even greater performances. It is amazing indeed, what the Jews have produced since 1815 in all spheres of intellectual and artistic life in Germany, the more so considering under what conditions most of these people had lived before, and in how short a time they had adapted themselves to spiritual freedom. You can fill whole lists with the names of important German Jewish authors and artists, doctors, philosophers, lawyers, sociologists, scientific chemists, and technologists of the nineteenth and twentieth century. No wonder that just those circles, in which spiritual proximity was of more importance than bodily similarity, opened themselves to them, that personal and family connections also developed with them in the university circles, and that an actual amalgamation resulted, which certainly did not turn out to the disadvantage of the German people.

Many Jews then became professional men. You may imagine that also in these scientific professions it was not made very easy for them. They had to use all their efforts to develop a greater efficiency and more assiduity than others, if they wanted to get on. The fact that, nevertheless, they succeeded, proves that they possessed the necessary ability. The majority of Jews, however,



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remained in commerce, naturally. Many could develop their business into well-known private banks, warehouses and factories. They infiltrated all branches of commerce, and it is to be understood, that the energy of these people, who were struggling out of bondage and for whom the freshly gained liberty of motion was something new which made them happy, meant uncomfortable competition for those who were accustomed to carry on their craft in the old jackboots. Many Christian business men, however, grew stronger by the competition, which was all the more bearable, because, following the law of inertia, townsmen and countrymen, naturally, preferred to carry on their business with well-known citizens, whom they were used to meeting in the public-houses and to whom they were often even related. Those who were pushing forward did not in fact become anti-semites. Occasionally they associated themselves with the new competitors, and, apart from business connections, numerous links of friendship and relationship were also made with the Jews in the circles of business men in the course of a century.

Those incapable, however, of rousing themselves to energetic and honest competition felt uncomfortably annoyed in their sleepy rest and began to be angry with their new competitors. The incompetent merchant whose business was deteriorating and who saw the indefatigable Jew making headway began grumbling, instead of reproaching himself. The solicitor who saw part of his clients deserting to his Jewish colleague looked grudgingly at the industrious man who brooded over his documents till late hours. The doctor who was accustomed to visit his patients by carriage bore ill-will towards a Jewish newcomer who modestly trod his boots down at the heel and attracted some patients, if he was able. Handicraft which had scarcely known any competition till then was disturbed by the new rival. At the universities small anti-semitic clusters of disappointed competitors flocked together—secretly at first—on seeing professorial chairs, which they had regarded as reserved for them, occupied by Jewish outsiders. If such a man too was conspicuous by his complexion and by a Jewish name, if furthermore, perhaps, he opposed a colleague with unkind irony in the tactless over-eagerness of a scientific conflict of opinion, it was only too easy to criticize insidiously the “Jewish impudence” of the intruder, and to instil the poison

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of antisemitism into the sensitive minds of juvenile students by carefully interspersed, subtle remarks. One single example may show, what curious phenomena occurred eventually: A friend of the author, a famous master of charming music and a man of fashion, had the most unfortunate ambition, which you so often find among artists, to aspire to things quite unsuited to his talents. Whilst his wonderful songs moved the hearts of mankind, he was striving to compose great operas, which really did not correspond to his gifts. He succeeded, eventually, in getting one of his operas—long since forgotten—performed at a provincial theatre. The critics were polite, as was due to such a famous name, but rejected his work, and, as a number of the most important German music critics were Jews, this highly-talented artist and noble man started to have totally confused ideas, that the Jews wanted to decry him as a composer of operas. The music critics, the theatre directors, the artists even, and the financiers indispensable for securing the necessary money for the performance of his work, all had united, pretendedly, in a certain secret alliance against him. It was impossible to talk him out of this opinion. He died with this maniacal idea, and he certainly contributed greatly to the dissemination of antisemitism in German musical circles.

The competitive struggle was responsible for rousing, at the end of the nineteenth century, an antisemitic movement in Germany. Older German readers will still remember the "famous", antisemitic agitators of that time, Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Ahlwardt, Bartels and Graf Reventlow. It was a time in which—in contrast to the boom in the big industries—farmers and smaller business men did not do well. Whilst then a scandalous method of taxation made the owners of the big estates almost free of tax, the small peasant groaned under the heavy contributions he had to make. In the small country towns, especially in Hesse, where there were hardly any factories, handicraft and small traders suffered again from the lowering of the purchasing power of the peasants. Auctions and forced sales increased. Many a farm had to be sold below its value, and sometimes a Jewish creditor was the purchaser, or a land jobber—perhaps also a Jew—who by reselling appeared to make, or actually did make, a big profit.—The impoverished former owner, however, remained in the village. There he had his relations with whom he was working now

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as a labourer. The resentment at the loss of his inherited property and at his disgrace ran deep in his blood and in that of his relations also. It was not rare for more than one such case to happen in the same or in a neighbouring village, and if, by chance, just two Jewish business men had carried through forced sales, the whole fury in the primitive heads of the peasants was roused against the "Jews". The tradesmen in the small towns who, apart from this, were not very well disposed towards their competitors joined bravely, thinking it was in their own interests, in the baiting, and one said: "Well, now you have the reward you deserve, cousin; why have you bought on credit from the Jew, who is now turning you out of your farm?" Anger was often directed, simultaneously, against a Jewish solicitor, who was acting on the creditor's behalf. His rival laughed up his sleeve, when the peasants and tradesmen talked great antisemitic twaddle, and no longer brought their legal work to the Jewish competitor. Doctor and veterinary surgeon were glad, when the choice was made not according to efficiency but religion. In short, the fire spread more and more. An antisemitic parliamentary party was founded and electoral and propaganda meetings took place. Even violence was attempted, the legend of Jewish "ritual murders"—that Jews slaughtered Christian children at Easter, using the blood for their unleavened bread—was whispered around, and the centuries-old compilation of Jewish philosophers, the so-called "Talmud," was denounced as a secret Jewish law, by which the State and Christian morals were endangered.

After some time, however, a vigorous counteraction began. A "league for combating antisemitism" was formed. At meetings and in popular pamphlets the inner instability of the antisemitic baiting was shown. The accusations about ritual murders were refuted by well-known scientists, and it was demonstrated that there was little mystery and nothing dangerous in the whole "Talmud". This work of enlightenment was not without success. The educated people in Germany soon began to be ashamed of their own intolerance. They quite saw that it was unjust to reproach the Jews with a development which they had produced themselves by penning them up together in the ghettos for centuries. They quite saw also that they should not strive for renewed oppression of the Jews but a fresh start on their

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own part. Many Jews also began to perceive that in their own interests it might be useful, not to strive too much for success, regardless of others, but to serve their customers with additional care and skill. The government also intervened. Even Bismarck had soon shaken off his original, instinctive aversion—quite natural in accordance with his self-conscious, brutal Teutonism—to the intelligent but often somewhat depressed behaviour of the Jews. He had quickly remarked that these people would soon by themselves lose the eggshells of their inferiority complex, and that with their diligence and their desire to get on they would form a factor of special usefulness for the State. So they saw to it that violence and lawless baiting were brought before the courts and proceeded against with the necessary energy.

The antisemitism of the nineties was a movement on a mere religious basis. Only a few had as yet come upon the thought of "racial" antisemitism. Religion then was still so strongly rooted in the German people that scarcely anyone chanced to think, that one could look upon a Catholic or an Evangelical Christian as Jew, because he or his ancestors had formerly been Jews. At best a social prejudice against the "baptized" could sometimes—although more and more rarely—be remarked. In general also the ruling classes, officialdom, military officers, and the owners of the big estates were not opposed to marriages with social and economic equals of Jewish extraction, and—partly in consequence of such so-called mixed marriages—Jews and Christians of Jewish origin were not so rare amongst the owners of big estates and the high officials. Also in peasant circles, incidentally, more and more farmers of Jewish race could be found in the course of years. But—no wonder, considering their historical development—in the professional distribution of the Jews the percentage of merchants and of members of the learned professions preponderated, especially because a rather large number of farmers and officials of Jewish extraction had become Christians. Only in the corps of military officers on active service could Jews not be found. It is true that no one was opposed to an officer being helped financially by marrying a girl of the wealthy Jewish aristocracy; those ladies were received with all friendliness. There was some reluctance, however, to accept her brother also as a comrade, and, as the military mind had become strange to the

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Jews in the course of long development, they did not urge to be admitted to the body of military officers, whose smart social tone did not suit them anyhow.

The fact that at every quick change of circumstances a new-comer falls much too easily into extremes showed itself here also. Among the *arrivés* of Jewish extraction there were not a few who too eagerly adopted the arrogant Prussian mentality, and among the authors and learned men also, sprung from Jewry, were some, who proved too receptive of the "vigorous" ideas of the rising Nietzscheism. Incidentally also this proves how little mentality and race are connected, and that historic development and education alone are the decisive factors as regards mentality.—Besides the group of Zionists who, disinclined on principle to any assimilation, were striving for a politically independent Jewish State in Palestine, one must say that in general before the Great War the Jews in Germany shared the political mentality of their particular social groups, and little was changed in this respect till the beginning of Nazi domination. All political factions were represented among the German Jews, from extreme Toryism to Communism, however the inclination to Liberalism, for which they had their emancipation and progress to thank, was predominating. A separate German Jewish mentality, differing on principle, did not develop till the German masses were caught by Nazism with its antisemitic tendencies.

The antisemitic tide of the nineties eventually ebbed. Even in Hesse the floods had dispersed simultaneously with the growing prosperity at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the small university towns—the mentality of which had always been symptomatic in Germany and which had been especially heavily infected by antisemitism—the relations between the high academic dignitaries, no matter from whence descended or of which religion they were, became more and more adjusted, and many Jews were counted among the best-known university scholars in Germany. The student youth of Germany gradually lost their prejudices all the more, as with the increasing comfort of the population the rising generation of students recruited itself less exclusively from privileged circles.—During the Great War and in the first years following, antisemitism was no longer to be remarked at all. The Jews had fulfilled their duty in the field and at home. Many

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of them had fallen, were wounded, had distinguished themselves and been promoted to officers. If a few war profiteers had been Jews the percentage was not exceedingly high.

No "Jewish question" existed in Germany before Hitler. That in many places a disproportionally great number of the members of the learned professions were Jews, as in numerous big towns of other countries, was, of course, no argument for a "remedy". The fact that these doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc., were earning their living proves, on the contrary, that no anti-semitic feelings prohibited the bulk of the public from entrusting their most intimate cares and most important affairs to these advisers. They obviously thought them to be efficient and trustworthy, and they approached them following their own free choice. If Jewish businesses flourished, if some Jewish publishers succeeded in starting great newspapers, although everybody knew quite well, that "Mosse" and "Ullstein" were of Jewish extraction, you just must have a mind educated to the philosophy of a "change of attitude towards old-established conceptions" to conclude that the "soul of the German people" had demanded the elimination of the Jews from finance or from the Press. Should it not have been the "souls" only of certain competitors? A normal brain would have drawn the conclusion from the flourishing of these enterprises, that the public was quite content with them.—Indeed if, after the Great War, there were still some anachronistic remainders of the past antisemitic epoch, they were confined to the smallest groups of those who for some personal reasons were angry with "the Jews", or envious of them out of professional motives. The fact again that according to later Nazi "discoveries", apart from the 500,000 Germans of Jewish religion, there were in Germany still some millions Christians of Jewish "race" and "mongrels", proves best that the process of mixing, in operation no longer than a hundred years—a very short period, in the development of mankind—had made extraordinarily great progress in Germany. In many of these families, till the application of the new Nazi "proof of ancestry", none of the persons concerned nor their relations even knew that they had a Jewish ancestor.

For a demagogue like Hitler who wanted to excite the passions

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of the crowds against a common adversary, in order to weld them together and bind them to himself by this means, there was no better slogan than: "Down with the Jews!" The idea of kindling the here and there still glowing spark of antisemitism was a magnificent chance for this unscrupulous agitator. Here was something strange at which you could point with your finger, against which primitive intolerance could be instigated. Here was a visible object on which fury could be turned.—In the beginning of Hitler's Jew baiting the caustic joke in Germany was popular: "It is the fault of the cyclists and of the Jews in every case!" Indeed, for things also which had nothing at all to do with religion or race the Jews were held responsible, on principle, by the Hitler propaganda, and if anybody denounced a Jew or "the Jews" for any crime, no evidence of their innocence could help them. The quotation of Lessing's *Nathan* proved effectual: "That does not matter, the Jew must be burnt."

In the baiting speeches against the "system government" the assertion suddenly appeared that the whole government was "judaized". "Fighting Songs" and "Speaking Choruses" against the "Jewish Republic" were commonplace. As many Jews had been Liberals and Democrats, among the democratic politicians of the time following the Great War there also were some Jews. Walter Rathenau, the advocate of the policy of reconciliation at Spa and Genoa, had been a Jew. Was there a better argument for the demagogues than to point out that this "representative of world Jewry" had intentionally undermined resistance in the Ruhr and, apart from this, that the inflation was his fault?—The facts that Rathenau was murdered by Nazi fanatics before the occupation of the Ruhr district, that the senseless resistance to the fulfilment of the peace treaty and the inflation had not preceded his death, and that the breakdown of resistance as well as of the German currency had only proved the righteousness of Rathenau's policy, were not prejudicial to the efficacy of this poisoned propaganda, drummed year after year into the ears of the German masses. The observation, however, that the German masses in their ignorance were so susceptible to that nonsense, that they could be misled and baited in such a clumsy way, and that Hitler and the members of his gang had calculated their level so extremely correctly, forms the most interesting side of the whole matter.

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Then the Hitler-Goebbels propaganda discovered that the Jews had been sharks and profiteers during the Great War. No statistic proof that the numbers of the Jewish soldiers at the front as well as the percentage of Jews hurt, fallen, and distinguished in the Great War, also that their share of the taxes collected at this time conformed to their proportion of the population, could help at all against the fouler and fouler calumnies and the abusive words unceasingly repeated more and more loudly. It did not matter; the Jews must be burnt.

In order to perceive the whole baseness—and also the efficiency—of this propaganda and thereby the mentality of the German masses to whom it was addressed you must know, that the names of the Jews fallen in the Great War were scratched off the monuments, their tombstones torn down, and Jews expelled from all ex-servicemen's associations. All this happened long before the actual pogroms, which will have to be dealt with later. One example only of the filth then produced by the *Stuermer*, the newspaper of Hitler's most intimate friend, the "Gauleiter" Streicher, may show to what a height the antisemitic baiting had grown in 1933, and to what kind of sadistic excesses against single persons it was leading. It is this same Streicher, responsible for numberless murders, whose much too evident currency crimes and embezzlements of money blackmailed from Jews led to his temporary imprisonment after a quarrel with Goering—whom he had reproached with the same crimes. He was soon released, however, and reinstated in his situation as "leader of the Franks", obviously because he "knew" too much.—The *Stuermer* first described in detail and at ease, with all disgusting particulars, how a Jewish cattle dealer, who was reproached with having had intercourse with an "Aryan" girl, was assaulted one night, castrated like a pig, and found the next morning lying in a trench near a high road. Then the newspaper affirmed with sadistic pleasure, that the "operation" was carried through "by an expert", and that the "parts removed, wrapped up in a sheet of newspaper, were put in the man's waistcoat pocket". These were the consequences of Hitler's Jew baiting, and this is only one solitary example, and not even the worst, of the dirt produced week after week for seven years. Many other "newspapers" with such contents are circulating now in Germany with impunity—and they are finding readers.



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The full importance of Hitler's speculation on the mentality of his countrymen, however, first became evident, when the "economic exploitation" of antisemitism began. Here the success of the method was directly magnificent.

They began with the farmers, who were especially discontented with the then government. In fact they were in a hard case, when the inflation had ceased, as they had to pay high prices for all manufactured goods, whilst the prices of their own farm products were artificially kept low, in the interests of the industrial workers, and this to such a degree, that a so-called "price scissors" were created. It had come even to refusals by farmers to pay their taxes, to forced sales of farms, to open revolts of peasants, among the creditors of whom were also Jews, naturally. Nothing was easier than to direct the whole fury of the village peasants against "the Jews". It was so convenient, and, at the same time, witty, if a speaker at a political meeting, instead of discussing abstract and tedious economic theories, could call "Isidor" to account for the whole policy of the government and "Cohn" for the ruin of the farmers. This was especially effective, if the speaker could point out that, forty years before, the father of Mr. Headstrong, whose farm was now up for forced sale had been summoned by Cohn's father, and that then the great "Ahlwardt" had warned the farmer against the Jewish tradesmen. The young Headstrong had forgotten that warning and now he had himself become the "pitiful victim of the Jews". Smirking applause from the present "Aryan" tradesmen and enthusiastic cheers from the peasants who—themselves perhaps debtors of a Jewish merchant—were just searching for an excuse to get out of payment. The idea was magnificent: Simply to prohibit a Jewish creditor from urging his claim by threatening that in that case he would lose not only his customers and his money, but would also be ill-treated. At that very moment, perhaps, the farmer Headstrong, the "modest absence" of whom the speaker had just praised, was sitting in his pretended vampire's back room, talking over how the creditor could help his debtor in avoiding ruin in the interest of both.—In the meantime some participators at the meeting were whispering to the "famous speaker", informing him that the neighbouring big estate was the property of the banker Meyer from Berlin. Perhaps the gentleman knew whether Meyer was also a Jew. He must have a lot of money; for he had bought the totally

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devastated estate from the heirs of the late squire, then had built quite new stables and artisans' dwellings and also erected a new dairy which was now delivering special milk and cream to Berlin. Thereby, of course, he realized his products most profitably—much better than the other farmers—and one must grant him this point—the farm was now in excellent order. Naturally he could also pay his workmen better wages, and therefore did not need to complain—like the other farmers—of labour shortage. In any case, however, the speaker must give his word not to reveal who had spoken to him about Meyer; for “one did not wish to risk any inconvenience”.—The well-digested result of this “information” turned up again in a new speech in another district in something like the following form: “The usurer Meyer has now had the typically Jewish impudence to ape a German squire. What is Isidor doing? First he lent money to the former squire at an usurious interest; then he artificially enforced the sale of the old family estate, and put the fine estate with the manor house, the many new buildings, and the famous live stock into his dirty Jew bag for a ridiculously low price. The old squire even had to erect a new dairy on the devilish advice of this Jewish vampire, before he was bound to shoot himself, out of grief and need, because he recognized too late his mistake in dealing with Jews. He could not bear to see the property inherited from his ancestors in Jewish hands. How long will it take, till the Jew has also destroyed this splendid German estate by his maladministration, and how soon will the new workmen's dwellings which the former squire built present a sight like that to which the Jew is accustomed in his home in Poland!”—Hearty applause!

Many a Jewish landowner who was completely proscribed because of such agitators had to undersell his property to some Nazi party leader, and not a few who could not quickly enough separate themselves from the ground where they had become indigenous were driven from house and home or slain by 1933. For—let it be understood—all these events happened BEFORE the pogroms of 1938 and are mentioned here only, in order to render a clear idea of the subtlety of Hitler's internal propaganda and of the mentality of those who were pleased by that baiting for years and—did not get tired of it.

The worst of this Jew baiting took place in the small and middle-sized towns. Here was the best ground for the seed of Hitler's

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business antisemitism. Of the gossip and jealousy in a small German town one can scarcely form a true perception in another country—in spite of Dickens Pickwickians. If anywhere relics of the old antisemitic movement were alive, it was here. If a Jewish merchant or professional man lived there, there were two possibilities. Either he was not an habitu  of the private bar; then, in his absence, you could run down the “Jewish sly boots” quite unhampered, after Hitler had revived antisemitism. Or he was a member of the beer-table society; then his rivals soon found some “staunch German men” who no longer wished to “sit at the same table” with the “impudent Jew”. Sometimes it was a solicitor who banished his Jewish colleague from the “society” and saw to it that the citizens feared economic disadvantages, if it was seen “so openly” in court that they were represented and advised by a Jew. The patients of a Jewish doctor were bound to withdraw, willy-nilly, and antisemitic baiting became the best means of propaganda for Aryan professional men.

By degrees this method of combing out was transferred to the big towns too. But it is noteworthy that at the beginning, in spite of all, many were true to their Jewish doctors and solicitors, so that the Aryan colleagues, whose appetite was whetted and who now well realized how their “businesses” would flourish, if they could remove the Jewish competition by one stroke, became more and more energetic helpers of the antisemitic baiting, and formed a most valuable addition to Hitler’s followers.

Hitler’s propaganda promised heaps of money. “The Jews must be turned out of the learned professions first. There must be room for the young party members struggling upwards!”

What prospects opening for all lawyers, for whom so many posts, such as solicitors, barristers, notaries, syndics, judges, and officials in the public services would now be available! One only had to “join the party” at once, in order to be among the first snatching at the posts now falling vacant. What chances for all the doctors, dentists, veterinary surgeons, when the Jews had to abandon their practices! Only to “join the party”, quickly! The engineers and technicians, the architects, the artists, the teachers, the professors: “Join! Join!”

Look at these professional men, what a useful addition to the party, filling the tills! But why the learned professions only? The Jews, naturally, had to be turned out of all branches

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of business. No undertaking ought to employ a Jew in the future!

Miss Bigalke told her fiancé: "Yesterday my brother joined the party. He is settled now. Immediately after his examination he will get his appointment. As soon as the 'party' is at the helm, all Jewish doctors will lose their positions in the hospitals. Naturally, the very same will happen in business life. With your firm Mr. Cohn, the confidential clerk, will certainly be turned out. That would be a post for you! Oh Adolf, then we could get married!—But you should join the party at once! Join! Join!"

"The Jews must be turned out of the banks, the warehouses, the factories. Our watchword is: No Aryan can be expected to work together with a Jew! How many well-paid posts will thereby become vacant! You have only to join the party. Just walk in! Join! Join!"

"The Jewish competition in commerce must be completely eliminated. Do not buy from Jews! The party cannot, on principle, allow any Jewish influence in business life, it cannot permit Aryan employees to be under the influence of Jewish employers, or parts of Germany's raw materials to be manufactured in Jewish undertakings, or German money to flow into the pockets of Jewish profiteers. Every Jewish undertaking must therefore be closed, as soon as the party comes into office."

What an opportunity, now, to "acquire" Jewish businesses ridiculously cheaply, and to eliminate once, and for all, every competition! "Only think, Emily, if I could obtain that splendid undertaking of Cohn's, with its magnificent patents, its new machines, with all its connections abroad! And if I could, at the same time, eliminate the competition, what profits we would make! I alone could dictate the prices in the future!" "Yes, but then you must first join the party. And why not? Meyers and Schulzes have been members all along. If you do not join in now, Cohn's factory will be snatched up by another, perhaps." "That is right, Emily. So, let us join! Join!"

Every advertising expert grew pale with envy at the success of the Nazi propaganda of antisemitism. This rousing of the lowest greed—splendidly camouflaged by the most hypocritical of all Nazi phrases that "the common interest must prevail over private interests"—proved, by degrees, the strongest pillar of the whole

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Hitler propaganda, corresponding exactly to the real character of the party: "Always strong against the weak!"

Certainly it would have been better, if many Jews had learned to a still higher degree the lesson from the antisemitic period of the nineties, that restraint in public life, correctness and deference to others in business, and avoidance of all show of wealth in private life were dictates of prudence for them. Certainly, many were considerably wanting in tact, restraint, and foreseeing prudence, and thereby made the business of Hitler's instigators easier to fanatize the masses by shouting that the government and the country's economy were being judaized and corrupted by Jews. By showing the dirty background of the Nazi baiting, however, and by observing its effect on the low instincts of the crowds, one of the darkest sides of the German mentality and the superficiality of German civilization are unveiled. *Grattez l'Allemand—pardon le Russe. . . .*

Moreover, for another reason to look at the Nazi Jew baiting is of importance to everybody, who from his knowledge of the German mentality wishes to draw his conclusions. The "magnificent" results in Germany caused the Nazis to make Jew baiting one of the principal means, by which the fifth columns could make their attacks from within in foreign countries. This concerns especially Eastern Europe, where the same conditions which made the instigation of antisemitic instincts in Germany possible prevail to an even higher degree. It was a glorious means for Hitler's fifth column to goad the mass instincts in the less civilized countries of Eastern Europe to hatred against the Jews, in order to start disunion and uneasiness, and to use these again as means of inciting the populations against their democratic governments turned towards the West. As long as these peoples looked on Western civilization as something higher, they were ashamed of feelings of intolerance. Now, when a "highly civilized" people like the Germans proclaimed race hatred, and showed that the extinction of its citizens of foreign race and the confiscation of their property was justified "scientifically and morally", this restraint was beginning to relax. Look at Rumania after its degradation. But even in Western Europe antisemitism was everywhere in the arsenal of the fifth columns, and the weed could grow in all those circles, where the ground was barren and not fertilized by genuine civilization—in the circles predestined for

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the activities of the fifth columns. In the meantime people may perhaps have learnt through the indiscriminate enslavement of the "racially inferior" Czechs and Poles, the "Nordic" Danes and Norwegians and the "kindred" Dutch and Flemings, what is the genuine aim of Hitler's "scientific" race theory and of his "moral" race hatred. Antisemitism and its brutal and refined methods reveal best the foundations of Nazi mentality.

## Chapter 5

# The New Uniform—Boasting and Appeal to the Herd Instinct

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With a second means of propaganda Hitler scored a bull. He presented the Germans anew with—the uniform!

It is difficult for a foreigner to understand of what immense importance the uniform was for the extension of Nazism in Germany. It was always incomprehensible to Germans how British army officers and soldiers in peace time liked to wear civilian clothes, when not on duty. For, in Germany it was the finest thing, even if not on duty, to flaunt in an uniform as stiff and gay-coloured as possible. The uniform was adored in civilian life. You must fix your sceptical eyes on this Prussian ideal, if you want to see one of the most decisive factors of Hitler's success.

The German frame of mind towards the uniform and its wearers could be studied best during the Wilhelminian epoch in the small university towns, where conditions reveal so much of the thoughts and feelings of almost all classes of the German people, where you can observe the microcosm of the leading spirits of the university, the students, the military, the landed proprietors of country and town, and the small tradesmen. During the "evening stroll" in the main street there met, before the Great War, the students, the young military officers, and the upright and horizontal ladies of the different classes. If a student in the colours of his "corps", covered with many scars, sprung, perhaps, from one of the most aristocratic and wealthy families of the country, well-known to the whole town and looked at by all citizens—and how much more by their daughters!—as the embodiment of the highest earthly happiness, walked up and down for a few moments with a lieutenant of the local garrison of the same age—the uniform of the officer claimed the right of the side of honour naturally. If a professor, a man perhaps of international reputation of whom

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the whole town was proud, walked through the streets with a lieutenant—the officer marched on the side of honour. Even if the professor was the father of the lieutenant, or was deaf in his right ear—that could not change this holy arrangement: The uniform of an army officer always held precedence. When on the Emperor's birthday the people of rank met for the banquet in the officers' mess, the highest dignitaries of the town, the mayor, the university professors, and the officials did not wear their robes of office or dress-suits, but presented themselves in their uniforms of "lieutenants in the reserve". A Prussian minister of trade, named Moeller, a man of more than sixty years, was "distinguished" one day by Wilhelm II through the "promotion to a lieutenant of the reserve".—Even the non-commissioned officer wore his uniform, when not on duty. He was, perhaps, still more proud of his gay-coloured cloth, and the hearts of the parlourmaids and cooks flew to him. The salary was only small, but the doors of kitchens and larders and of the maids' bedrooms opened willingly. And the ministering spirits who had not the luck to own a smart N.C.O. laid claim to at least a private. Even if his uniform lacked stripes, nevertheless, the buttons shone, and even if the companion to the Sunday dance could not claim a military salute from others, how smartly he gave the military salute himself!

It had to be a uniform, if not military, then, at least, that of a postman or a constable. The irresistible attraction of a uniform meant much more than just the pleasure in the gay colours. It was one of the results of the centuries-old education of militarism and "subordination" to all that represented the State. Here were the true roots of "Prussianism", i.e. the feeling that the State was almighty, that everybody who represented its omnipotence even in the smallest degree was a higher being, the common civilian, however, almost nothing. The familiar picture of the Prussian postal official, who did not "serve" but with a snort "dispatched" the patiently waiting public, is significant of the "subjects'" resigned and inherent humility towards the omnipotent uniform and all those who were allowed to wear it. Here the contrast became obvious between the sentiment deeply inrooted in the average German, that he must first prove his right to exist by legitimizing himself as a public servant—if possible by an uniform—and the democratic conviction on the other hand, that the State is an organization only created in the interests of its indi-



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vidual citizens. Here is to be seen at the same time, that the totalitarian conception of the State corresponded already to the inner feelings of the German masses long before Hitler.

It was one of the tactical mistakes of the Democratic Republic that, for want of appreciation of deep-rooted sentiments, it removed uniforms—and titles—much too quickly from its offices. This did not give the crowds any feeling of pride in the new democratic liberties, for which they were not educated and which they did not understand. On the contrary, like the former wearers of the uniforms themselves, the people mourned the old symbol of the sergeant's spirit, and often even for the sergeant's tone which ran in their blood. The Germans had too long been "superiors" and "subjects", and their deepest yearning was—and remained—the uniform.

Hitler made masterly use of that deeply rooted instinct by creating his uniformed and militarized pretorian guards. That was an idea—a more effectual one could not be found. It was a real revelation. Even in the remotest villages the new gay-coloured uniforms of the Hitler guards suddenly emerged. The author will never forget his surprise, when returning from his hunting one morning he suddenly remarked an agricultural labourer in the new S.A. uniform. People did not at all look at the gay-coloured warrior with amusement, but with highly serious admiration. The new uniform, at once, had the usual effect of fascinating the minds of both sexes. Moreover, when a few days later the new "storm leader"—the milker at a neighbouring estate—appeared in the village in a kind of army captain's uniform, and it became known, that now in the new Hitler guards any man could become an "officer"—and that without any preceding uncomfortable examination of his knowledge—that there was actual military drilling and commanding, and afterwards hard drinking on immense quantities of beer which the intimidated estate-owners and inn-keepers had to provide willy-nilly, there was no end to the enthusiasm indeed. Everywhere in the towns and villages the S.A. men gathered several times a week for military exercises followed by drinking: "Your health, storm leader!" How splendidly that sounded, just as in the officers' mess! How all the girls' hearts warmed towards the new Hitler warriors! How many new paradises were opened in the kitchens and bedrooms of the maids! Most magnificent, however, was that in the Hitler guards the

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barriers were removed which had formerly separated the N.C.O.s and privates from the Olympic heights of the officers.

How could anybody still withstand this man, who at the very beginning had realized the highest ambition of which a German man had ever dreamt, the renaissance of the uniform? What were, against such a deed, all the so-called "democratic achievements" and civilian liberties? "To Hell with liberty! Hand over the uniform!" So they literally shouted. It is no exaggeration. Inconceivable but—German!

The tremendous clamour at the meetings and even the free beer were not the decisive factors, but the renaissance of the uniform, invented by Hitler himself, was really decisive. To be commanded again, was fine indeed, and the marching tread of the regulation boots. The uniform, beloved and holy, in its full old Prussian beauty!

At Hitler's mass meetings, to the "jagged" melodies of the military band, "personally conducted by the famous storm leader Fuhse!", the Hitler guards in their uniforms marched into the halls in equal step and—what luck!—at the head of his troop one's own brother or fiancé. Commands, Prussian rigour! Forgotten the everlasting, tedious talks about democracy in the former political meetings of the post-war period. Forgotten those lectures forcing one to laborious thinking, about the causes of the Great War, or about the new democratic constitution, the League of Nations, the economic difficulties of Germany, and so on—all things which one could not change, all the same. How everything sounded quite different with Hitler! Almost as if one had not lost the war! It had only been a stab in the back! It was the fault of the united Jews and servants of Jews, of the Liberals, the Freemasons, the Marxists and—then of course—the Communists. They had all assassinated the German army! But all that would now be quite changed. How? The leader alone would decide that. He had written the famous book where all these matters were dealt with quite precisely, once for all, and irrevocably. About these matters there were no more long debates, but one had simply to obey, as in the old Prussian times. "Very good, storm leader!" How simple, how magnificently simple! To command and to obey! The old times were revived.—You must not take all this as a joke. The Germans believed in all this which was always being impressed on them with immense bombast. They

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were not conquered at all, they were assassinated! If the horror of the war had made itself felt immediately and personally, especially to the women, if the enemy had marched into Berlin—the collapse would not have been forgotten so quickly. If “might” then had been brought home to them in their own country, the only “right” understandable to Germans—they would not have shaken off the remembrance so easily. But as it was, they felt outwitted but not conquered, and therefore not obliged to keep to the “treacherous” peace conditions, although they were signed. And by whom were they signed? Not by the old ancestral leaders! No, by the Marxists, Freemasons and Jews, who had secretly inflicted “the stab with a dagger!”

In the purged “Reichstag”, from which were removed in advance all honest adversaries of the Nazis—with the exception of a few opponents slyly admitted, in order to have somebody who could be “snubbed”—matters developed similarly. There was frantic enthusiasm, when Hitler, immediately after he had taken the power into his hands, roughly answered the modest question of such an “opponent” about the new government’s politics, that all would be seen—as soon as he began to rule. That was just the point for Hitler AND for the German people! For him, because he was greedy to achieve the might, for the German people, because it wanted to be led, and that by this man, who was so totally according to their hearts. He promised everybody just what he wanted. To the workmen in the towns and in the country better wages and sound dwellings, to the farmers high and stable prices for their products, to the business men prosperity and plenty of money for trading, to the manufacturers abolition of strikes, to the dismissed officers a new army and, in addition, distinctions and uniforms to their hearts’ content. How all that was to be executed, was Hitler’s secret; he did not explain, and nobody wished him to do so. They, probably, felt in the inmost recesses of their hearts, that there were no practical ways of creating such general bliss. The former governments had plodded enough, had not achieved it, and had not failed to explain always, why they could not. That was the great thing about Hitler, that—in spite of the paradise he promised—it was not necessary to rack one’s own brains as to the ways leading to that wonderland, in fact that one ought not to do so. It was just one of the patent solutions of Nazism, that one simply

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told untimely interrogators kindly to mind their own business and not ask about things which did not concern them and which the leader alone would "command" in time. Whilst every democratic people would have revolted, if asked to tolerate such foolish answers, the Germans welcomed such a sergeant's spirit, and derided the curious ones, who had "asked stupid questions".

It sounds so fantastically that a national movement in which millions of human beings were caught up could be incited in such a way. In fact, it was possible only in a politically primitive people like the Germans, educated to obedience and the herd instinct, and lost to all sense of perspective by the war and all the troubles of the post-war period. It is true, that the severest crime was that of Hitler's big capitalist and other backers of the former ruling classes, who, egotistic and blind, had allowed themselves to be made the tools of a national impostor, whom they had themselves elevated with the erroneous idea that they could lead him later by the nose. It is true also that the weakness of the democratic governments must bear its share of guilt. The deepest cause of Germany's disaster, when Hitler seized power, is to be found, in spite of all, in the herd instinct of the German masses, of which the adoration of the almighty State—represented by its servants and their uniforms—is the most characteristic feature. Naturally also among other peoples are men of similar political mental inertia. In Germany, however, they exist in a rather greater proportion than in any other part of Western Europe. This observation forces itself upon the mind of everybody who has lived long enough in Germany and other countries to observe the dissimilarity.

## Chapter 6

# The “Abyss of Communism”

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There was nothing more in Germany to stand vigorously in the way of the mire floods of the dullest, boasting clap-trap, by which the Hitler guards and the betrayed masses were united. What could the so-called “Iron Front” do, which in 1932 was hastily collected from the most various groups, and at the last moment, against Hitler’s fanatical crowds. With the democratic idea, that majority and not force must decide, and disinclined to every bloodshed, one was in fact defenceless against the brutal power of the Hitler adherents. Some beer-cellar fights only helped to prove anew the “heroic courage” and the superior crudity of the Hitler guards and to bring across many irresolute to the camp of the stronger battalions.

So the victory was already won, when Hitler enacted his last great bluff, by which he pretended to snatch back Germany from the “abyss of Communism”, from an abyss, before which—at that time at least—she did not stand at all. In fact there had been no real communistic danger in Germany for a long time, and there could be no doubt that the power of the law was able and prepared to strike down a communistic riot at once, if, in spite of all, such a thing had happened. To this they were resolved and also strong enough under all the various governments of the post-war time, since the overthrow of the Communist revolt ten years before. If the governments were weak against the Nazis, they were not against the Communists, to fight whom, if they had indeed tried a serious riot, the socialist trade unions would have been prepared, at once, apart from an adequate police force and from military help in case of need.

The number of genuine Communists in the Germany of 1932 has long been over-estimated in consequence of Nazi propaganda.

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There were, naturally, in the great industrial centres some convinced adherents of Communism who had formed a real conception of it. Most of the registered members of the German party of Communists were not at all clear about what they wished, and the differences between the ideas of Stalin and Trotsky were probably intelligible only to a very small fraction of German "Communists". "Moscow, the Red Front, Communism and Bolshevism" scarcely meant anything in 1932 to the great masses, except a social wonderland, the abolition of unemployment, increased wages, no more housing shortage, in short, social improvements which were striven for likewise by the socialists and many reasonable people of every political persuasion. The fewer political notions these "Communists" possessed, the more noisily they conducted themselves. Indeed, all this misunderstood "Communism" meant nothing more than that the reforms did not proceed quickly enough in the opinion of those people who were living in hunger and need, and that especially the younger ones, who had never known regular work but only scanty unemployment pay, thought, they could replace ideas by clamour. These men in 1932 arranged noisy processions, raised their fists, and shouted "Hail Moscow", had occasional fights with the Nazis, and their orators tried to outdo the claptrap of their political competitors. In spite of occasional illegal strikes, there were no real mass riots, however, and the rumours spread by the Nazis, in the winter of 1932 and spring of 1933, about an imminent communistic revolution were nothing but magnificent propaganda in order to produce mass anxiety. In fact, only a small number among the ranks of the Nazis themselves then believed in actual imminent danger of a communistic revolution. Certainly Hitler and those nearest him did not believe in that "peril". Even if you suppose that, at that time, Hitler had not yet progressed as far in his merely opportunist development as to have a presentiment of his own future connection with Stalin, if he was actually still an adversary of Communism, nevertheless the coincidence of the legend of an imminent Communist riot with Goering's Reichstag fire proves only too clearly the purpose of this combination.

The author in those days made some personal observations on how totally unfounded the rumours of a pretendedly imminent communistic mass riot were, which the Nazis had spread, partly by misuse of the public administration. He had known by his

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own observations for more than ten years a great agricultural enterprise near Berlin which the Nazis characterized as a "breeding-place" of Communism, whereas in truth there were no Communists at all. On that famous night before the Reichstag fire the owner of the estate who happened to be in Berlin received a telephone report from his wife to say, that the sub-prefect had ordered watchmen to be set up, at once, as Communist gangs were marching up, in order to set fire to the estate and the neighbouring farms. The owner was convinced in advance that nothing was true of that alarming notification. But, as he could not refuse obedience to the orders of the sub-prefect, he arranged by phone for a junior superintendent and a craftsman, armed with two guns, to patrol the yard during the night. The senior superintendent of the estate—who really ought to have known too, if there were indeed any danger, had also gone to Berlin that evening, by chance, in order to keep an appointment with a friend.—Naturally nothing happened at all, and both the watchmen, having raised their spirits by means of the necessary alcoholic liquids, and after having tottered along the yard during the night in the best of moods, went to sleep fully satisfied.—After the alarming phone call the author's friend had set out, at once, for the restaurant in Berlin where the senior superintendent of the estate had his appointment, in order to send him back to the estate. Neither on the district line nor in the underground nor in the streets of Berlin was any unrest to be remarked. In the big beer house near the Frederick Street railway station the normal pleasant evening activity prevailed. The superintendent was quite taken aback and used a very strong agricultural expression, when he was informed of the "Communist peril". In spite of this he, naturally, returned to the estate at once. The owner's wife drove to Berlin the same night by car. The whole way along the main road from Hambourg to Berlin nothing strange was remarked and no "Communist gangs", as announced by the sub-prefect, were to be seen.

The Communism from which Germany was "saved" by Hitler "five minutes before midnight", this "abyss", brilliantly illuminated by the grand display of the Reichstag fireworks executed by the pyrotechnist Goering, was nothing more, indeed, than a magnificent, but typical Nazi display. The trifle of having to hang the innocuous, half-imbecile van der Lubbe, who was needed as the

## The "Abyss of Communism"

central figure in the tragi-comedy, disturbed the actors very little. For he was indeed hanged, and the whispers of his being smuggled away to South America shows a very small knowledge of the Nazi mentality, which does not allow a "potential traitor" to live. It is significant, that one of the highest judges in the criminal courts of Germany then remarked bitterly to the author, that he wished, after the disappearance of the Nazi regime, to be entrusted with the new trial on the "resumption of the proceedings with regard to the Reichstag fire". This gala performance, however, not only had its effect on the instigated public opinion, but served to remove the last weak opposition of Hindenburg to the delivery of the power to Hitler, and the last hesitations of Schleicher. Whilst von Papen's sardonic smiling interregnum completed the surrender of power, whilst Hitler's fanatical guards in their own way were seeing to it that "no noisy opposition disturbed the unanimous manifestation of the will of the German people", foreign countries looked on too apathetically. Even France, although invited by the clear-sighted Pilsudski to a joint invasion, declined and thereby provoked all the dangers which could then have been avoided by resolute action.



## Chapter 7

# The Great Nazi Riddle—The German Brand of 1932

“However could that happen?  
How could that come to pass?”

UZARSKI

For a true conception of the National Socialist “move” as Hitler christened his undertaking, in order arrogantly to emphasize its “difference on principle” from all other systems, you should, according to Nazi regulations, have read *Mein Kampf*, the Nazi bible, by the purchase of which “a confession of faith” and “world philosophy” are delivered into the bargain, all complete, with no extra charge, for the low price of 8.50 Reichsmark. For a full understanding of the “move”, however, you need besides to have the necessary German perception, in the opinion of experts a psychopathic one. Indeed, this mentality is indispensable to a genuine “understanding” of the move. With regret, but in accordance with the truth, one must, however, confirm that the majority of the happy possessors of Hitler’s book have not victoriously read through this “struggle”, but instead have contented themselves with the spiritual ability alone. But he who has really fought his way through, and has not turned away shuddering, can say that he is indeed a genuine National Socialist. By digesting all this he has stood the crucial test of Nazi mentality, the essential presumptions of which are semi-civilization, intolerance, and fanaticism. For, only a semi-civilized being can overlook the innumerable historical, philosophical, biological, and other faults, distortions, and errors of the book which are pronounced with such intolerable arrogance. Only a

## The Great Nazi Riddle

wild fanatic can manage to swallow the hatred and intolerance of this book without the greatest disgust. A totally uncritical reader only will not stumble over the numberless contradictions between the book and other utterances and actions of the author since his "seizure of power".

We must content ourselves with a definition of the mentality a reader must have, in order to be satisfied by the reading of *Mein Kampf*. With the contents of the book we are not concerned, except, where necessary, in judging the German mentality. But it may be mentioned that it is, probably, a fault of all those who were occupied critically with Hitler's disclosures to take these and his book much too seriously. Probably you would get to the bottom of his philosophy much more easily, if with Hitler's announcements you simply tried the old children's trick of putting in the antithesis. Perhaps this half-educated man has indeed tried quite simply to change all normal moral values, in a tragi-comical misconception of his favourite philosopher Nietzsche.

When you remember to-day that Hitler at the beginning of his chancellorship proclaimed as the first and chief point of his programme "we will neither lie nor swindle", only a person in possession of a purely Nazi mentality can understand that these words contain nothing but the "truth"—let it be understood as Hitler meant it, i.e. by completely changing the normal meaning of the words, and the meaning is: "We will never say the truth and always swindle." If, whenever Hitler speaks of his "peace contributions"—for instance on rearmament, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the sabotage of the League of Nations and, later on, at the assaults on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg—you put in the words "preparation for, provocation, and starting of, war", where he speaks of the "protection of small nations", and of his "respect for the rights and convictions of others" you put in "enslaving" and "disrespect", if, whenever Hitler mentions the "liberty" of the Germans themselves, you replace this word by "oppression"—whether religion or press, expression of opinions, or only thoughts are in question—if you always replace the word "right" by "force," and if where Hitler talks of "insurmountable contrasts"—for instance between Nazism and Bolshevism—the words "conformity on principle" are substituted—you at once

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have the simple truth before your eyes. If you turn round the hypocritical dogma of his party "the general interest goes before private interests", at once you perceive the real slogan of the gangster organization, united under Hitler's leadership to plunder Germany and the enslaved small neighbouring nations. But that the Nazi "changing of all moral conceptions" might be understood by even the broadest circles, the German wireless through which Goebbels presents the world with his propaganda introduced in 1933 "Act faithfully and honestly" as the new interval signal!

Perhaps one day a very learned *Anti-Kampf* will be written which, apart from criticism, would also examine the origin of Hitler's ideas. That is not so easy, as Hitler himself says little about it, and by this primitive play on the ignorance of his readers has achieved just the effect he intended, i.e. that the masses took his "manifestations" as magic inspirations, or, at least, as the original inventions of one favoured by God. Actually not one of the theories pronounced by Hitler is new. Most of them are derived from the extreme nationalistic German historiographers Lagarde and Treitschke, the antisemitic literary historian Adolf Bartels, the one-sided art historian Frantz, who first formed the idea of a "new German culture", then pronounced by Wagner, from the expansionistic German military writer von Bernhardi, the inventor of the total warfare and his worthy successor Banse—besides, naturally, of Nietzsche's philosophy of might, and the mystical Rosenberg. But many other sources can be found without difficulty from which he drew like a plagiarist; frequently, it is true, the original meaning was turned round. Hitler himself pronounces a little incautiously—and recommends the idea for imitation—that he always appropriated from the works he "studied" only what suited his own ideas, and this naïve admission is one of the few true words of this man. A scientific elucidation of which thoughts out of works used by Hitler—turned topsy-turvy and torn from their original connections—underlie the *Kampf* ideas, would present interesting disclosures, when judging not only the Hitler bible, but also Hitler's personality and the character of some of his collaborators. From the synchronization also of various subsequent alterations in the book with contemporary events, many historically interesting, and—from a purely artistic point of view—many bitterly amusing results could be derived. Incidentally, you would

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find that the idea of the "fellowship of the community"—*Volks-gemeinschaft*—which plays such a great part in the Hitler propaganda, has its origin in the books of the "Jewish" author Berthold Auerbach.—As to the Nazi—"methods", however, there is certainly nothing new in it. The possibility of repeating the barbarism of Attila and Dschingis in the twentieth century was proved already by the Bolsheviks, and even the applicability of these methods on peoples of middle Europe with an only superficial civilization was shown by Mussolini. Only the German thoroughness, with which these methods were developed to the summit of hideousness, is Hitler's own work.

Having carefully studied Hitler's book, the question of the spiritual import remains unsolved, a question which involuntarily and perpetually arises in view of the enormous extension of the "move". You might be forced, perhaps—especially now, when the Hitler bible by its innumerable contradictions of other utterances and actions of its author has lost even its value as a reliable guide to his own "moves"—to acquiesce in the confusing conclusion: There is nothing spiritual in the Hitler move at all!

In one of the first American films, which made Nazism their subject, mass-meetings of Nazi organizations are pictured very particularly and in a manner true to life. It is characteristic of the difference between the American and the German mentality that the American having participated in such a mass meeting with all its ostentations, display of music, flags, enthusiasm, and boasting remarks, at once, how "fantastic and empty" all this is. In that film a "Hitler youth", when asked about the essence of National Socialism, answers: "Heil Hitler!" and "very well" says the inspecting party functionary seriously.

The German people's patent answer to the question "What does National Socialism mean?" is, indeed, as in that film: "Heil Hitler!"

This answer marks the uncritical, total devotion to this man by whom they feel themselves carried away and whom they deify. They do not demand a clear-sighted explanation of the spiritual side of the "move", because they see in Hitler's brutal will of might, in his rude oppression of any individualism, in his intolerance the embodiment of their own feelings which they think to be sound and vigorous. This "sentimental" explanation of the mass psychosis of the German people is the decisive one;

## The German Mentality

there is no merely "spiritual" definition. You have to visualize the fact, that this people with their abnormal and morbid mentality succumbed to the spiritually empty, but sentimentally adequate, propaganda of a queer new Messiah.

Uzarski, Germany's best modern, but, unfortunately, much too little-known, grotesque-humorous author whose Christian name, into the bargain, is Adolf—has exposed the whole wretchedness of the German post-war mentality in his novels with a sharp pen but a warm heart. His witty works, feared and hated by the Nazis, were too strong a brew for an "educated" pedant and too intellectual for the average German reader whose sentimental insipidity is ridiculed in the quotation introducing this chapter. Nobody has ever conceived and pictured more artistically than he the mind of many Germans in the post-war period, that specific German brand, made up of sentimentality, servility, herd instinct, half education, cunning, vulgarity, envy, chauvinism and—boasting, which is so quite another thing than the corresponding Czech blend, with which you become acquainted in the "brave Schwejk soldier".

The indigestible German brand of 1932 formed an ideally fertile soil, on which the disease of Nazism could grow luxuriantly. Here the greatest weakness of this theory, its absolute spiritual emptiness, became its greatest strength, because these people, always following their feelings and never using their brains, caught in the snares of wild propaganda, did not see through the emptiness of the so-called "move" at all.

This lack of spiritual pretensions was by no means confined to the lower classes. The author remembers vividly a conversation he had at that time with one of the greatest German industrialists whom he had known for many years. When the conversation turned on general matters, this industrial magnate suddenly took from a secret drawer in his writing-table the drawing of a fist in which many strings came together, and it became evident that in his enthusiasm for Hitler, he had drawn with his own illustrious hand this symbol of the "leader principle". He admitted in the following conversation that he knew almost nothing of the Nazi theories—apart from the "leader principle" and the fight against Communism—and that he had only once been present at a mass-meeting.

The German people in all their ranks was just in the right

## The Great Nazi Riddle

receptive frame of mind for Hitler and the strange "apostles" of his theories.

You might think that the "spiritual side of the move" was contained in the "aims" pronounced in high and mighty words by Hitler and his propagandists, i.e. in three main pillars on which the Third Reich should rest: Spiritual and cultural renaissance, inner and external regeneration, fight against Communism and reconstruction of the German economic system. These were great aims, indeed, helping to fascinate a torn and desperate people, feeling their own insufficiency and longing for a strong hand. You ought not, however, to fall a victim to the same mistake, as did the uncritical German masses who did not realize that it is the easiest thing in the world to pronounce ideals for which everybody longs. The mere proclaiming of aims, so generally aspired to and so undefined, without a clear explanation of the means by which they are to be attained, is nothing more than empty talk and not at all the basis of a political movement. Genuine ideas and clear plans were lacking—quite apart from the fact that these ideals had quite a different meaning in the Nazi sense to what you were bound to suppose following the normal definition of the words.—If all that was proclaimed in bragging speeches by Hitler and his agitators for many years could be effected by talk alone, the Germans now would be dwelling in paradise. Unfortunately you cannot even say, however, that the Nazis confined themselves to talk. They spared no deeds. Only their actions did not prove of any use in attaining the ideals so magnificently pronounced—at least if you understand them in the normal sense. What finally appeared as the actual core, was worse than bluff, was—to be brief, it was just what the world abroad, looking at the matters unaffected by the German mass-psychosis, has learnt for seven years to call the evil of Nazism.

It would be superficial and stupid, naturally, simply to cast in the teeth of Hitler and his gangsters that it was their intention to ruin Germany. Certainly, like other usurpers, they would have been quite content, apart from the furtherance of their own egotistic aims and from care for their own welfare, to be of use to Germany also, in so far as they understood it. To Hitler himself in his folly and, perhaps, to a few of the others you may even concede that they indeed believed themselves called to "save" Germany, at the expense of the rest of the world and by the destruc-

## The German Mentality

tion of civilization including that of Germany. This, of course, is no excuse. Here, at least, it is evident that the end could not justify the means.—The achievements of the Third Reich, however, in religion and culture, economy, politics, law, and administration must be looked at more particularly, because in that way not only the emptiness but also the perniciousness of the whole Nazi theory will best become evident. An examination of this kind also affords us some understanding of the mentality of the artists, scientists, judges, and economists who practice under such conditions of work and living and who have taken part in bringing about that order. As they form the leading ranks of the Germans, their mentality may also give us an insight into the mind and feelings of the German people.

## Chapter 8

# The New Nazi Art

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"The days of the individual artist and thinker have gone in Germany. Art", following the programme of the N.S.D.A.P., "has to appertain to the community in its origin, in the choice of its subjects and objects, in expression and aim."

By this and similar bombastic and obscure talk of Hitler<sup>1</sup> and other Nazi "connoisseurs" nothing else is meant than a most evil discipline of types, according to the definitions of Dr. Goebbels who by the way, in so far as his propaganda work leaves him the necessary time for it, has to work as the senior art sergeant-major of his master. Goebbels whom popular wit not yet quite silent in Germany has raised to the rank of a "Buck of Babelsberg"—in consideration of his numerous relations with lady film stars in the studios there—has explained the genuine comprehension of art still more "exactly". Various Nazi experts on art have also taken more or less honest pains to point out to a public of dilettanti, listening open-mouthed and stupefied, what they want to be understood as Nazi art:

"In the depths of their German souls" these gentlemen pretend to "feel that in the Nordic Aryan antique Hellenism has revived. Naturally not that of the degenerated, intellectual period of Socrates and Plato, but that of an earlier heroic epoch."

If they "feel" that, you cannot do anything about it. But they are also bringing about a most monstrous connection between art and politics, misunderstanding, exaggerating, and distorting the theory of a "new German culture," which was pronounced by Frantz and Wagner in the middle of the nineteenth century.

"The will to power, heroism, and activism have to dominate

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chap. 16, page 201.



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German art in the future, and serve the new German people of labourers and soldiers. Even in the arts Nietzsche's theory has to prevail, that the right of the strongest alone can be acknowledged, and Hitler is the embodiment of that ideal. The warrior of totalitarian German art can only be victorious, or perish. Therefore the German artist can submit only to the criterion of his highest war—pardon! art lord—Adolf Hitler, and of the art directors appointed by the leader. He cannot have anything in common with the democrats, with their longing for happiness and peace, self-administration, and other individual creations. The judgment of anyone holding different opinions, above all that of international democratic critics, cannot touch him."

Arrogant words? Unintelligible, stupid talk? Naturally! But also most dangerous! For, in Nazi Germany an authority, appointed according to the "leader principle", decides who may work at all as an artist and how he must do so. A stranger whose way of thinking is not tuned to the totalitarian pitch will ask, whence exactly the "Buck of Babelsberg" derives his qualifications for reducing to type the artistic production of a whole people; besides the fact that it is an extraordinarily inferior type, on the level of "strength through joy"! For non-totalitarian artists and dilettanti the much too simple explanation is by no means sufficient that the totalitarian leader of a people is also the legitimate national art dictator, and that, consequently, he can also appoint an art sergeant-major, like the commander of a company. A totally undisciplined foreign artist or critic does not recognize the right of even the greatest artist to regulate the artistic creation of others, quite apart from the fact that every genuine artist would decline, as the worst blasphemy, the office of dictating and reducing to type the creations of others. Only a typical low-thinker could "dictate", that no artist in Germany is permitted to work who has not proved his legitimization in advance by the necessary "Aryan" ancestors, according to directions, and that the light of publicity ought not to shine on any work of art which does not correspond to the directions of the "Buck of Babelsberg".

Force and art are contrasts. A "regulation by a board of art"—*contradictio in adjecto*—which is able to forbid every artistic creation not suiting standardization on the Goebbels level, is bound to lead to a complete torpor. Outside Germany it is an

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axiom that no genuine art can exist without the individual liberty of an artist to express his own ideas in his works. In the whole non-totalitarian world the dogma prevails unchanged that in the realm of art all human beings, without regard to their origin, can meet in free competition, where ability alone is decisive. Nazi Germany alone holds another opinion, and this is where we can judge the mentality of the Germans, in so far as their relations to art are in question. The artistic connections of a people are so many-sided, and the temperament of artists and artistic dilettanti is so much more vivid than that of the average human being, that, unfortunately, we are bound to draw far-reaching conclusions concerning their whole mentality from the attitude and "good conduct" of German artists and the German art public. Certainly every opposition to the ideas of the Nazi State is most dangerous; but it would have been comparatively easy in the province of art. You can notice, however, very little opposition in Germany, apart from a few praiseworthy exceptions. In this important province of human life the decay which Nazism has caused by its enforced conformity to type is easily perceptible to everyone interested.

Where is a work of art, created according to the regulations of the German "board of culture", which could stand the test of time? You have seen nothing of Nazi art which could face objective criticism. It is significant that in music, for instance, only works of the past were cautiously released for performances abroad. But also in the other spheres of art one refers foreign countries only to the German works of art created in the past by artists, whose grandmothers are not even certainly established, to works of art which have been produced in liberty and without the tutelage of Goebbels's board of art. That, however, is no test of Nazi art principles, but of their contrary. Of Nazi art products a greater public has so far learnt to know only the generally visible buildings and about those—politeness obliges the critic to be silent.

We may dismiss with a smile the involuntary irony of the German "cultural authorities" removing valuable works of art from their galleries—because they are pretendedly of strange conception—and selling them abroad, in order to provide foreign currency. If those works are no longer visible to German eyes, they will cheer other people instead. However, it is painful to think of the fate of genuine German artists who are no longer

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permitted to work in their homeland, and bound at first to fight for a new chance abroad. You could simply call this the vicissitudes of an artist's destiny, if the resigned smile were not embittered by the thought, that this senseless expulsion from Germany was executed in favour of "artists" submitting to an unnatural, unartistic yoke for cash, waiting only to settle down in the places vacated by such means. The worst, however, is that this new German "cultural authority", itself created by the right of might and carrying through its decisions by force, prohibits, by the oppression of the indispensable artistic freedom, the creation of works of art, which cannot be born, because their potential creators are not allowed to stir their minds and hands, nor even to leave the country.

## Chapter 9

# Nazi World Philosophy and Nazi Science—Religion—The Mentality of the Learned in the Third Empire

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It is an intolerable thought for any man of learning in a free country, that a scientist can be forced to give up his profession because he is a Freemason, Liberal, "Marxist", or because he is of non-Aryan extraction. When, a hundred years ago, seven professors of the University at Goettingen preferred to lose their positions and their daily bread rather than submit to political pressure, Germany's scholars were proud and declared themselves at one with them. *Tempora mutantur* . . . Germany's Nazi universities have shown an even worse hypocrisy than those German "intellectual heroes" who published their fatal manifesto during the Great War. That declaration could still be excused, perhaps, by national emotion; but those to-day working as university teachers in Germany are unworthy of the name of professor. For *profiteri* means profess indeed, and there are the words of one of those beautiful old student songs from Germany's past forming simultaneously the motto of this book:

"Who, knowing the truth doesn't speak it out,  
That is, indeed, a contemptible lout."

Which professor in the Third Reich is able to call himself still a professor of the truth? He has just sworn unconditional devotion to the Nazi State and its leader. He has vowed to carry on his work "in the spirit of Nazism". And—apart from this—he is so thoroughly controlled, that he has to fulfil these obligations, even if he does not consider the enforced oath of loyalty as binding. A scientist's excuse that he had not perceived clearly the hypocrisy which he had to serve by directing his educational and research work according to the Nazi mind, cannot be admitted.

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For that means, indeed, prostitution of the highest and holiest principle of science, the service of truth, free of all presumptions and all constraint. Nobody can fulfil this service with blinkers before his eyes or with a muzzle. The highly important relations between science and State should help to put the administration on the right way. There is, however, no greater dishonesty for a university teacher than permitting himself to be led by a bridle, to be forced to hide his free scientific conviction from his pupils, or even consciously to teach them falsehoods, and to educate them in fundamentals which forbid all individual and independent thinking. What hypocrisy the teachers of science in Germany commit every day, who—no matter under what pressure—explain the opposite of that, which doubtless all among them have recognized as true, whose intellectual level is above that allowed a Nazi teacher! Their moral niveau, indeed, is bound to remain within those limits, because otherwise they would not have been prepared for such intellectual shoddiness.

The totalitarian State which already excludes by its definition all free, unhampered scientific research forbids it expressly in Germany, and sees to it that this prohibition is observed. Everyone who wants to work in one of its institutes, or be an independent scientist, and publish the results he has obtained, can do so only, if they are not in opposition to the axioms which have the approbation of the State. In which direction teaching and investigation have to go in the Third Reich can be intimated by a few examples only in the frame of this book; they will be sufficient, however, to provide a collective impression.

The whole philosophy is built up, according to regulations, on Nietzsche's theories, made coarser by the Nazis. They form, together with the Hitler bible, Alfred Rosenberg's *Mythos*, and the new race theory, the fundamentals of the whole philosophical education in the Third Reich. The German "world philosophy" points out the right of the strong against the weak, the negation of all individualism, the education for a new "heroic epoch," all that resting on a mystic Rosenbergian and Ludendorffian "nature religion" and on the fiction of a Hellenism, revived in the new Nordic German totalitarian empire. When you point out such a "world philosophy" is totally unintelligible nonsense, you will receive the very simple answer in Nazi Germany that a non-German is *a priori* psychically unable to perceive correctly its

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fundamentals which cannot be explained, but must be felt. That objection is unanswerable. In fact nobody free from the Nazi psychosis can follow the trains of thought of these people. The peculiar combination of such obscure conceptions, however, is so ambiguous that, with the help of well-sounding professorial rhetoric, philosophical talk sufficient for the requirements of university teachers and students in Nazi Germany can be thereby produced. For a stranger, it is true, this new German "changing of old values" remains almost unintelligible. In accordance with Nietzsche's immensely informative definition you should change again into their opposite all the Nazi theories claiming to rest on his words. Then you would find that the whole Nazi philosophy is only an attempt in the grandest style, but very cheap indeed, to confuse according to their own aims all normal and reasonable axioms, making use of some odd and overstrained thoughts of a great but sick philosopher. The well-known German inclination towards foggy, mystically sounding, theories and towards every kind of extravagance made it possible for the Nazis to pronounce, in harmony with their politics, the new official "world philosophy" which, in fact, removes and turns into their contrary the noblest ideas of mankind—religion, impartial justice, and the natural sympathy with the poor and weak. You only have to change this round again, in accordance with another less philosophically sounding but very practical German idiom—"turned round it will become a shoe"—if you want to find your way back to the conceptions which seem reasonable and moral to the whole non-Nazi world. Hitler himself, as we will learn still in other places, has developed most practically and with a remarkable geniality on a grand scale the "changing of old values" into a "turning round of all words".

You ask in vain what kind of conscience a German professor must have who manages to teach the Nazi theories instead of humanism, and to defend the new "world philosophy" against Kant's "categorical imperative", or even—to unite both. It cannot be too easy for a university teacher who still possesses a remnant of self-respect, to offer his pupils, instead of the bread of genuine science, hollow and hypocritical words, which they have to learn by heart, because it is impossible to understand nonsense.

The same world philosophy reduced to type has to be knocked into German youth at all places of learning, beginning with the

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primary and technical schools. Here the educational effect, resulting in boasting and intolerance, is even worse, because from the primitive brains of school children and apprentices who are bound to make this sort of creed their own almost no criticism can be expected. The matter and the plans of instruction in all branches of learning are to the last detail in accordance with the Nazi theories of deification of the leader and a false heroism, hatred against everything "foreign in breed", oppression of any individual inclination, and all independent thinking. From the third year of life until old age this "education is deepened and freshened up" by party arrangements of all kinds. A great organization of spies takes care that nobody kicks against the pricks. The control even penetrates the family bedrooms, and the leader of the public youth organization recommended the parents to "strengthen the minds of three-year-olds by nailing on the wall above their children's beds a sword or an old pistol".

The general level of education, however, is depressed more and more. Since 1933 attendance at school has been shortened by a year and study at the universities by a further year, because the relief of the labour shortage, caused by rearmament, was naturally much more important than education. Since then the war has produced a further shortening of school attendance, so that the future student will have the knowledge of a fourth-form boy. The interest of the German people in the mere intellectual sciences has become smaller and smaller under the regime of the Nazis and the interest in technical matters has replaced it. The former, perhaps somewhat pedantic but profound, classical education at grammar schools and universities is replaced more and more by marching with the Swastika colours and by military drilling of the pupils to the loss of all spiritual values. For, Hitlerism and intellectual matters are poles apart. He who to-day is studying at the German universities wants nothing more than to learn, what, unfortunately, must be known, to pass the examination, and to earn one's living as an officer, lawyer or physician. The requirements of the examination are made accordingly. Since Hitler as the infallible pope of German knowledge has pronounced *ex cathedra* that not positive knowledge and the ability to think individually but the correct "world philosophy" is the concern of a Nordic "lord", learning is much less a desideratum at German schools and universities than "forming charac-

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ters" in the Nazi sense, i.e. education to "unconditional submission to the leader and the totalitarian State".

The education of "character" in Nazi Germany is just the contrary of what is understood by that in other countries. Instead of individualism—education to type, instead of an independent mind—hypocritical submission, instead of liberty—boasting and herd-instinct, instead of honour—arrogance, instead of justice—intolerance, oppression and the right of the strongest. In fact the test of his "reliability" alone, which every candidate has to prove by a certificate of a party organization, before he may be admitted to any examination, confirms already that he lacks the ability of an honest scientist. But apart from that principal point, already before the new war no serious study at all was possible, in consequence of all the demands of the party organization on a student's time and energy.—If even the necessary special knowledge cannot be acquired, certainly still less will the most needed cultural education be obtained. More reasonable students made bitter complaints that they were tired and hindered in their studies by the enforced work for the party, that they were forced to play the hypocrite, and not allowed to utter one independent thought, that the mistrust of everybody and anybody had become intolerable, even among the intellectual workers. A member of an examination board of long standing told the author bitterly that, in spite of the drastic lowering of the standard, many candidates were no longer even equal to the most modest requirements. The examination was more and more brought down to a formality, because every candidate could prove by a certain test that he was prohibited from devoting himself to his study by his work for the party. In that case he naturally had to be passed, even if he did not know anything at all. So you can almost imagine what kind of "scientifically educated man" is now leaving the German universities having passed the "Great State examination". In international science Germany is represented more and more exclusively by those men who, expelled by the Nazis, found admission in foreign countries. But the development is a bad one for the German people itself on whom the new half-educated and half-prepared, but "politically reliable" doctors, lawyers, etc., are let loose.

Precisely as in philosophy, all fundamentals of Christian theology are shaken by Nazism. The interference with the practice of religion and the condition of the Christian churches



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will likewise be briefly discussed in this connection, in order to enable the reader to draw his own conclusions as to the mentality of the Germans.

As Rosenberg's "myth of the twentieth century" claims to be a new religion, and as Hitler himself demands and enjoys adoration, the German faculties of divinity ought to dispute with those of philosophy for the privilege of treating the new "world philosophy" as their speciality. What kind of "Christian theology", however, must that be, which is taught to-day in the German faculties by professors who have sworn the Nazi oath of allegiance and who have constrained themselves to a theory, which is pure heresy and the exact opposite of the Christian faith. Besides Hitler's deification, besides the defamation of Christ by the Nazis, how will these professors of Christian theology compound, for instance, with the "administrative killing" of a hundred thousand insanes? Knowing that the so-called "places of education" in the Third Reich are absolutely unable to educate Christian priests, "the Evangelical Confessional Church," of which Pastor Niemöller of Dahlem is the most prominent member, had arranged their own courses of instruction and examination boards for young theologians. These were forcibly dissolved by the Nazis. Niemöller's own fate is known to the world; Hitler's personal guilt in this case is to be discussed later. Niemöller's fellow-sufferer, the well-known Pastor Schneider, "died" thirty years old in the camp at Buchenwald. Hundreds of other Evangelical and Catholic priests, especially *also* from Czechoslovakia and Poland, are pining away in the concentration camps. How many others were secretly murdered and how many priests after their dismissal perished from the consequences of the ill treatment they suffered in the camps, cannot be ascertained. The state of mind of those priests is indescribable whose salaries were stopped till they were prepared to betray their vows. Into what dilemma of conscience these men were forced, having the choice only between hunger and distress to their families, and the fulfilment of demands which, according to their strong conviction, would mean idolatry of Hitler!

On the martyrdom of those who have died or are still imprisoned in the concentration camps, and of many others suffering now for their faith, on the brave maintenance of the confessional communities which, in spite of enormous difficulties still exist in Germany the hope rests of reviving the Evangelical Church

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after the destruction of Nazism. There are, however, false ideas outside Germany about the extent the "Confessional Church" still has. The actual extent of the Evangelical faith itself in Nazi Germany is likewise frequently over-estimated. In order to procure a correct knowledge of the religious mentality of the masses one has to mention that there is a numerically not very strong remnant only of such congregations and of steadfast clergymen. The majority even of those who have not yet formally declared their retirement from protestantism are not members of a church which can still with justice claim this name. Most of those who traditionally or for other, more or less external, reasons still call themselves protestants are members of congregations which have scarcely anything in common with Christianity. He who wishes to find out the actual position of the Germans towards the Christian faith, must exclude fully from his calculations the millions of members of the so-called "church of German Christians" as well as the adherents of all the congregations which—less hypocritically—name their faith a "religion of nature" or something similar.

The Nazis have not quite so well succeeded in interfering with the Catholic Church in Germany because of the stronger organization of its hierarchy and of the terms of the concordat concluded by Hitler and, at least officially, not yet dissolved. In spite of all the infringements, especially against the Catholic orders, in spite of inconceivable baiting, monstrous proceedings against monks and nuns, and the instigation of the fury of the masses against bishops and priests, and in spite of a strong pressure on the population, during the first six years of Nazi domination, to retire from the church, Catholicism has stood seemingly much firmer than its Evangelical brother, although the number of withdrawals also from the Catholic Church comes to millions. But, whilst the Evangelical "Confessional Church" represents a concentration of such Evangelical Christians who by their faith are strong opposers of Nazism, there are in the Catholic Church, besides faithful Christians, still all those who, for traditional or other external reasons, did not retire. Apparently the position also of many German Catholic priests towards Nazism is another one than that of the Evangelical "confessional" pastors. In the autumn of 1939 first newspaper reports were published concerning the unmasking of some Catholic missionaries in South Africa who

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had been induced to spread Nazi propaganda material. Later it became known that Hitler was endeavouring, following Mussolini's crafty example, to win over again by certain concessions the German Catholic Hierarchy, and to misuse, simultaneously, certain Catholic priests for his political actions abroad. In the autumn of 1940 "Father Odo", a former German army officer and a scion of a family of former German princes—Duke Charles Alexander of Wurttemberg was his original name—was said to be sent to America as Hitler's secret emissary. Just before the outbreak of the war this man had still been a strong opposer of the pagan philosophy of the Nazis. He had even succeeded in securing a gift of several thousand pounds from Lord Baldwin's Refugee fund to help German Catholics persecuted by the Nazis. Here is a typical example of the forgetfulness of so many Germans succumbing much too easily their nationalistic feelings, and of the unfortunate accessibility of German clergymen—Catholics as well as the fickle Evangelical pastors outside the "Confessional Church"—for the allurements of Nazism. The "Fuehrer" had only to assure that he was still a good Catholic who never had renounced his Catholic faith, and that the Catholic Church would be given the apostolic mission of rechristianizing the world—especially Russia, as soon as, after having finished with England, Hitler would have liberated Europe from bolshevism—and forgotten were paganism, religious persecution, and the martyrdom of faithful Christians including the fresh tortures of Catholic priests in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium. Even the still existing Hitler-Stalin pact could not hamper the wishful thinking of these militant clergymen and their adherents.—It is difficult to concentrate in a few sentences this mass of refined perfidy and contradictions of the Nazi rulers disclosing their complete indifference towards the moral and spiritual values of religion. They destruct intentionally genuine religiosity and persecute its faithful servants, to remove thereby one of the strongest obstacles of "totalitarianism"—and, on the other hand, they misuse suborned, ambitious clergymen, in order to beguile the minds in Germany and abroad. Even more difficult is it, of course, to understand the mental dullness of those falling into this network.

Besides the philosophers and theologians the professors of history, of literature and history of art, of biology and medicine too were bound almost to compete for the honour of lecturing,

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occasionally at least, on the new Nazi world philosophy in which they are all, more or less, interested. One quality, however,—formerly rare among “professors”—is indispensable in every German lecturer. Above all, he ought to be a perfect turncoat. He must be able to revoke in the next term all that he had taught during the preceding one. Nevertheless, it may be necessary, perhaps, in view of the complexity of the new opportunistic world philosophy which has to penetrate the whole life of every single German to erect a special new professorship at every German University, and to fill it with an expert of—psychiatry! But, unfortunately, what is brought about in the whole of German science by the Nazis is much too serious for it to be turned into ridicule.

Some special branches of science have been most seriously affected.

In history the publication of any work is, of course, excluded which is opposed to the Nazi distortion of information. This, quite simply, turns everything topsy-turvy, in order to mark Germany as a country of heroes and the Germans as a chosen people of lords, selected for world domination. As far as Hitler himself presents the infallible results of his own historical explorations, they are, naturally, to be pronounced without any restriction by teachers of history, however heavy the sacrifices demanded of historians scientifically educated in the former way. The deplorably adaptable “science” of history in the Third Reich has attained most remarkable results already on this basis. It changed Charlemagne, for instance, into a narrow-minded, cruel oppressor, and the Saxon chief Widukind into a representative of German culture, a bright and beautiful figure.—A free explanation of the new and newest history of the world is, naturally, not at all in question. Can you imagine what would become of an author and his work who undertook the task of pointing out the truth about Hitler, his gang, and his system in a State where the smallest attempt at opposition against the system carries you immediately into a concentration camp? The very thought even must seem inconceivable to a German “investigator” of to-day. Therefore one is bound to remember that such liberty existed and was exercised in the Republic of Weimar until 1932, and that in free countries free investigation and teaching are still in existence. Therefore one is bound to point out that for a member of the spiritual community of all genuine investigators, even if living

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in Germany, there was no other way of saving his reputation than that of immediate resignation, as soon as he was robbed of his scientific liberty.

Besides the historians biological science in Germany had to humiliate itself most. The faculties had to acquiesce, when totally unqualified Nazis were forced on them as new "professors" who now pronounce as exact scientific results of their investigation the nonsense of a race theory which they have made up from mere nothing. To make available a "scientific" argument for Hitler's main aim—the conquest of the world and the degradation of all other inhabitants of the earth into slaves of the German superior race—that was the intrinsic task for which the new "German science of race investigation" was especially invented. The word "hack" which Wilhelm II used haughtily to signify Bismarck's relation to his grandfather would well suit those scientific helpers of Hitler. The new "science" has succeeded to such a high degree that now it is able, by fingering only the skulls of two people doubtless brothers, to declare one an Aryan fellow-countrymen and the other a Jew. But they can do even more, if the Nazi political opportunism demands it. For instance: Finns and Hungarians are of "non-aryan" race. As to the Finns, this formed a first-class argument for Hitler's declining to intervene with Stalin in favour of them during the honeymoon of the German-Russian entente. As to the dear Hungarian friends, however, where political interest ran in another direction, a difference of race was never mentioned.—German biology has managed to supply the scientific arguments for the prohibition of Jewish Aryan mixed marriages by claiming the issue of such marriages to be inferior—contrary to all actual experience, as many important men have sprung from such unions. At the same time, however, that new science has declared mixed marriages between Germans and semitic Arabs or Mongols as unobjectionable on principle, obviously, because one did not want then to offend these peoples for political reasons. But the Czechs and Poles are "inferior races", now, according to the new scientific revelations, a new sort of brutes, like the Jews. The "Nordic German people of lords", therefore, is not only morally justified, but even obliged for ethnological reasons to make these peoples subservient and to drive them out of their homeland. It may be interesting to learn the biological argument for the enslaving of the Danish and

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Norwegian Nordic race brothers and of the Dutch and Belgian neighbours by the Germans!—The practical main advantage of the Nazi race investigation was again its usefulness in “proving” the spiritual inferiority of the Jews, for the purpose of “justifying” their extermination. A “decomposing mind” was first invented by the new German race investigators as a peculiarity of the Jews, whilst, in fact, this definition signifies a symptom of nervousness and hysteria which, likewise appears in all races and which is clearly demonstrable in the case of Hitler himself. The task of defaming the “Jewish brains” was especially difficult as unfortunately in nearly all the branches of science there is a rather great number of well-known and successful learned men of Jewish extraction. But with typical Nazi honesty and thoroughness they made up their mind to eliminate this fact, once and for all, by forbidding the name of a Jewish author or investigator in the Third Reich ever to be mentioned. You can use their works, naturally, but never mention them. They have pushed this new Nazistic scientific hide-and-seek to such an extreme that Freud’s whole theory of psychoanalysis—so extremely disagreeable to the Nazis especially in view of the author’s injurious character analysis of the beloved leader himself—was hushed up for a long time. When that was no longer possible, they finally decided to pronounce that a totally unknown German investigator had made sensational discoveries about dreams and sub-consciousness. They even invented a new name for the “German” theory of sub-consciousness which, unfortunately, was previously discovered by Freud.

There is scarcely one hidden scientific field of enquiry where the violence of the Nazis has not done much damage by distortion of the truth. The history of literature, like that of biology, is bound, now as before, to “prove” the inferiority and dangerousness of the Jewish race out of the fatal “protocols of the wise men of Zion,” although this falsification has for long been unmasked by the science of other countries. Gustav Freytag, one of the most important German representatives of historic novels, has to be claimed by Hitler’s most obedient Nazi literary scholars as a harbinger of Nazism, whilst on the contrary he had chosen as his ideals, individualism, liberalism, and tolerance especially towards the Jews, and notwithstanding—an especially fine irony—he has delivered in his famous novel *The Lost Manu-*

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*script* a characteristic explanation of typical Hitlerian mania. The Nazi literature investigators have to proclaim the greatest Low-German poet, Fritz Reuter, as a forerunner of nazism, whilst in fact Reuter, because of his true democratic opinions, was imprisoned for seven years, and has even devoted one of his novels to *this time of his life*. An amusing example of the astonishing untruthfulness of this branch of the Nazi "sciences" is the case of Theodor Fontane also who became transformed into a hero of antisemitism, yet he published on his seventieth birthday a poem expressing undoubtedly his contempt of such intolerance. These, however, are only a few of the "small blunders" pronounced by the Nazi professors of literature with the true German "timbre of moral earnestness" which has now replaced the "decomposing irony of the liberalizing and Jewish kindred", international celebrities formerly "disfiguring" the German professorial chairs.

In medical ethics also Hitler's race theory has left its sad traces. To all the public and private clinics of Germany the admission of Jewish patients was forbidden suddenly in 1938, and numerous human beings were sentenced to death thereby. All the Jewish doctors were eliminated, and a small number of Jewish "attendants of sick"—for Jewish patients only, of course—were allowed. Now you may picture to yourselves the feelings of the Jewish invalids—and of their relatives—whom no clinic admitted, whilst no such Jewish "official" lived near. They could decide, either to die helpless, or to call a Nazi doctor who could not send them to a clinic, even if he wanted, and of whom one was aware that the Nazi "ethics" had taught him every Jew had to be "exterminated" as soon as possible. That was one of the "small means" used for the "extinction of the Jewish vermin."

Please do not reply that no doctor could reconcile such an action with his conscience. The mentality of the German doctors has developed and been unmasked under the Nazi regime in a way that no human being, let alone a doctor, can imagine outside Germany. The argument for the elimination of the Jewish doctors, dentists, and veterinary surgeons, that the body of no German fellow-countrymen ought to be entrusted to a Jewish doctor and the treatment of no German cow to a Jewish veterinary surgeon originated in the members of these professions themselves. Naturally one cannot argue about personal feelings. But, presum-

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ably, nobody had formerly entrusted himself to a Jewish doctor if he had an aversion to such. In fact it was nothing else than the barefaced "business" antisemitism of the German professional men, in order to obtain the practice of their Jewish colleagues, that they destroyed the rudimentary liberty of everybody to choose his doctor—or lawyer—on whom to bestow his confidence. But the destruction of that liberty even wasn't enough. They wanted to steal the practices which the Jewish doctors had acquired by years of work and which now should not simply disperse. Therefore they also needed the consultation rooms and houses of those Jews. Without any compensation all the Jewish professional men had to clear the way for the advancing Nazi aspirants. They had to pretend even to be thankful, if those gentlemen were prepared to take over their premises, when they were forbidden not only to work but even to dwell in the same houses with "Aryans". They had to be happy, if they received a few marks from their "successors" for their instruments, books and furniture. For, a "purchase of a practice from a Jew" was prohibited by "professional honour" not only, but by the new law. The "practice" was a windfall to the "Aryan successor". The shamelessness of the hypocrisy became evident, when, immediately after the beginning of the war, frankly a shortage of doctors and other professional men was felt in Germany. Then publications were made by the German general consuls in the neutral States the "race theory to be suspended", so to speak, for those professions. *The emigrated Jewish doctors were invited to return to Germany, in order to serve in their profession.* A normal person would have been of the opinion that just in war-time one ought not to let loose those so immensely dangerous Jewish doctors on the injured Aryan soldiers, and that just in war-time one ought not to tolerate the decomposition which such brutes were bound by their nature to spread. This great achievement of the Nazis shows in its cynical opportunism, quite undoubtedly, that the race theory is not even taken seriously by its inventors themselves. After the completion of their robbery the rejoicing Aryan "colleagues" had no objections if their victims had offered themselves as sacrifice a second time.

By the treatment of the thousands of Jewish professional men, brought about by means of the "race theory" by their German colleagues, the moral insanity of the so-called "educated men"



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in Germany appears quite unmistakably. This is the group, the mind of which is so especially significant for the judgment of a people's mentality. For it was the same thing in all the learned professions—lawyers, patent agents, engineers, architects, journalists, and artists. Thousands of German professional men have feathered their nests shamelessly by the booty taken from their expelled Jewish colleagues: "Eleve toi, que je m'assieds!" Even with such university professors and academicians who were not personally interested in the elimination of the Jews who often had worked together, closely and confidentially, with the dishonoured ones—among whom were many bearers of famous names—was there very seldom more than a deploring shrug of the shoulders and a friendly, yet most cautious, word of sympathy. No strong protest, no declaration of solidarity, no resignation of angered colleagues! At the most a lukewarm recommendation of a former colleague, in order to give him access to a small university abroad. The fearfulness and fawning submissiveness at the universities went to such an extreme that a certificate of their doctorate even was denied to professional men who had been forced to flee from Germany leaving behind all their goods and chattels. Everybody was afraid of the reproach of being a "friend of the Jews", and only very few underwent actual dangers to their positions and their families, in order to help, with noble intrepidity, a colleague hit by undeserved misfortune. What dissimilarity with the mentality of the learned professions in other countries, which admitted so many of the expelled Germans! What a difference in the non-German universities which opened their doors for so many expelled German scholars and thereby did a kind service not only to those men, but to the science of their own countries and of the world! What a difference in the level of civilization! But how correct also Hitler's speculation on the commercial smartness of the learned professions of his own country!

## Chapter 10

# Nazi Jurisdiction—Judges and Law

There is no other intellectual sphere, where Nazism has done more damage, than in that of law. For here the State interferes immediately in the life of even the least of the inhabitants of the country. Nothing is more significant for a people's mentality than the administration of justice. It is true, when you see what monstrosities have happened in Germany, especially since the beginning of this war, you have to ask whether you should not confine yourself simply to the statement that there is no longer anything like law in a people which, behind the front, is murdering, robbing, penning up together and removing as slaves human beings from their own country and from the conquered districts, shooting them like animals, if they are no longer able to work, or if they sink under their burdens on the way; in a State which expels the inhabitants of whole towns from their homes and hunts them into the woods. For it is not Hitler alone or the company around him who have to share the responsibility; hundreds of sub-leaders give the orders, thousands order the execution, and tens of thousands carry these orders out; then there are hundreds of thousands who assist, and millions derive private profit directly and indirectly. You might ask what use it would be to show the details of the destruction of those fundamentals of law which—as in all civilized States—were respected formerly in Germany also; whether one should not be satisfied with confirming summarily that the former German law has sunk into a bloody and stinking mud. But the compilation in the White Book of the British Government of many examples of terrific cruelty, the many descriptions of the conditions in conquered Poland and in Czechoslovakia, and of the pogroms in Germany, the depositions of refugees who were

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able to escape from the Gestapo—all these are results only. They cannot render superfluous a review showing the decay in the Third Reich of the system of law itself, of the administration of justice, and of the people's feeling for right, making plain how the "legislation" of Nazi Germany is humiliated, becoming an instrument for the oppression even of the smallest human liberty and for the execution of the most shameless injustice. Nothing can produce a clearer impression of the genuine Nazi Mentality than a look at the subtle and refined details and methods of their "law" system, especially created for the oppression of freedom and of every resistance. When you see how jealous is the public opinion in the British Commonwealth of the rights of man, how in these countries the Man in the Street is interested in seeing that certain restrictions of his civilian liberties which are unavoidable during a war do not exceed the necessary bounds, you will become aware, that from this striking contrast of Nazi "law" a citizen of a free country can best obtain an idea of the German civilian mentality of to-day. Besides this, it may be quite useful to show once more what the loss of the rights of man would mean.

When the Nazi ideas about their intended changes in the law first became known, no lawyer and almost nobody in Germany who had the slightest idea of law took them seriously. They thought, all that was only propaganda which could not have originated in a jurist's brain, and which seemed to flow from any hedge lawyer and to be for any querulous person. How beautiful it must have sounded in the ears of anyone who had been sentenced by a court, or had lost proceedings, when he was told that the whole "law of the Jew Republic" would have to be repealed, as it was "Roman" and "foreign to German sentiments". How ridiculous, on the other hand, were those tirades to every lawyer knowing that no Roman criminal law ever existed in Germany, and that already in 1900—i.e. twenty years before the hated German Republic came into existence—a new civil code was introduced in Germany, a systematic compilation by German professors and lawyers, taking many years and preceded by a careful examination by the German Reichstag and its committees, likewise extending over many years. The legislature of the Wilhelmian period was one of the really valuable achievements of that epoch. "Roman law of a strange nature" all this is now

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suddenly called. The fact is that all the old German legal traditions in any way suitable for adaption had been embodied in the civilian code and the likewise codified "commercial law".

The laughter, however, changed into frightened astonishment, when soon after the "seizure of power" by the Nazis it became evident that in the province of law matters were getting serious. What people were these, who were beginning, wantonly, superficially, and stupidly to pull up by the roots laws sacred to every German lawyer? Nobody had heard of them before, except at noisy public meetings or antisemitic beatings at elections. A totally unknown German clerk of the court suddenly became a Prussian Minister of Justice, a man who never had studied the law who lacked all qualifications as a law-giver, who could have no idea of the depth of juridical problems and who knew only the outward forms. He had introduced himself by a pamphlet on "National Socialist reforms in criminal law" which made strikingly evident his total ignorance of the achievements of the international science of criminal law and of present problems; the author's primitive, medieval conceptions of right and punishment were evident. This pamphlet first made known the intended barbarous racial statutes which have contributed so much in excluding Germany from the society of civilized States. Such a man was the new "Prussian Minister of Justice". Incidentally this office was not, as in the democratic States, of political importance only, but the new man's administrative authority empowered him to appoint and remove justices, public prosecutors, barristers, solicitors, and public notaries, without much ceremony, and gave him the greatest influence over the application, interpretation, and changing of the statutes. Into the most important positions of his office also were appointed personalities, who until then had showed no juridical skill, but—by their political baiting—their entire unsuitability for any high office calling for the impartial administration of justice.

It is not easy to understand how judges and lawyers educated in the conceptions of austere law were at all prepared to stay in office under the regime of such people. Apart from a few party fanatics and from such who thought themselves neglected formerly and were now "scenting the morning air", many may have been of the opinion that they could prohibit the worst caprices by "holding out", whilst the bulk were such "upright"

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lawyers, that they crawled simply in order to earn enough to keep their own and their families' bodies and souls together. But even this crawling was easy for nobody. It demanded sacrifices of staunchness, which could be made only by a man who had never felt a breath of the high feelings of genuine law and real justice.—Not a few of the more decent judges soon retired, embittered by the new justice, where the administration had not already cautiously removed them in the meantime, as the statute forbidding the removal of judges was, naturally, cancelled. The judges remaining in office were thoroughly "drilled" as National Socialists. This new kind of drilling of judges and public prosecutors was not merely political; it aimed, above all, at dinning into those old lawyers, that they must forget completely and quickly their antiquated juridical conceptions—as, for instance, that all human beings are equal in law, that judicial decisions are made without respect of persons, that no sentence is to be given to favour or to harm anybody—they had to forget this in favour of the new Nazi fundamentals of law in which the rising generation of German lawyers is now educated. The diminution of the total intellectual level in the new Germany was preceded by a strong rejuvenescence of the body of judges; studies were abbreviated and finishing education cut down. From the fact that they considered the superficial education of a secretary sufficient for appointment as Minister of Justice and as independent legislator even, in view of the first-class Nazi character of the man, you will have a foretaste of the commanding, intellectual stature of the judges in modern Germany. About the moral value of the judges, who after having learnt differently remained in their offices, and of the young generation of lawyers educated already in the dogmas of Nazi law the reader may judge himself after the following description of the Nazi law revolution. For "by their fruits shall ye know them".

As we shall see, first all the improvements were abolished by the new rulers which—especially in the sphere of criminal law, where the highest possessions of mankind, life, honour, liberty, and existence are at stake—had been developed in the course of centuries in Germany, as in all civilized countries, for the accused's protection. You would think that even if all those precautions were abolished, if you returned to the clumsy, rubberlike definitions of medieval criminal law, and if

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you placed such immense power and responsibility in the hands of a judge, that then, at least, this all-powerful judge ought to be a thoroughly educated, carefully chosen, mature personality of generally recognized authority. For, in the new Germany, where no court of assizes with a jury in the British sense exists, formed of independent citizens, various special courts with assessors, who are elected according to merely political views, are judges over life and liberty—as far as the government, the party, and the Gestapo do not see to it themselves “administratively”. You might think that, therefore, a very worthy and independent body of professional judges who could prohibit too despotic decisions of the not very learned assessors was the more necessary. o you might think. For that, however, the presumption is lacking, that genuine law was at all wanted in the new Germany. That this is not wanted, became evident even to the most confident, when the special court which tried Pastor Niemoeller was so “short-sighted” as not to sentence him to dishonourable imprisonment, and when, at once, the decision was “corrected” by the administration, so that this steadfast man was thrown into a concentration camp. What will you think about a judge who has to put up with such an affront without protest, if he wants to remain in office! Cases are common in which acquitted defendants are “received” by the Gestapo at the doors of the courts for “further treatment”. What would a High Court judge say in Great Britain about such infringements? How, above all, would the public react in a democratic State? Incidentally one can be certain that a defendant must have been in a state of primitive innocence, if he is acquitted by a German court in a case which had the slightest connection with politics. For, as there is no judge in Germany who does not wear the “party badge” on his robe, the opinions of the courts according to instructions are unquestioned, and the abolition of such ridiculous axioms as, for instance, that it be better to acquit ten guilty than to sentence one innocent, is made absolutely sure. What people must they be who are prepared to judge in Germany under such circumstances?

Not before you have had a look at the “achievements” of the new Nazi law itself, however, will you really know what is to be thought of the men who have created that sort of “justice”, and of those who lend themselves to apply it. Then you may be able also to judge correctly the mentality of a people to whom their

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legislators and administrators of the law—this *summum bonum* of culture of all civilized peoples—can offer such a conglomeration of injustice, cruelty, and fanaticism, corresponding to their “race sentiment”, and who tolerate this “new justice”.

“Justice is, what is useful for the State.

The Leader and the party have to decide what is useful for the State.”

All Nazi law is subject to these supreme principles. For a lawyer any further word is superfluous. He is aware at the first glance, that under this dogma in Germany all has sunk to the depths, what since the times of Solon, i.e. for about 2,500 years, has been one of the most valued cultural possessions of the whole world, the written law itself namely, and that thereby all is destroyed that is meant by the words “justice and impartiality”. Laymen also will see the whole weight of the sacrilege of culture by the review which follows.

Great Britain shares the sentence “my country right or wrong!”—That means the resolution of every citizen—not of the court!—to help his country, when the hour of danger has struck, under all circumstances and without any question, with all he possesses, with his life and property. The German principle applies first of all to the law courts and has quite another meaning. The second part which contains a binding principle for the courts has resulted in making law the application of every decree of the leader and of the leading party officers. More indeed: All the general conceptions which the leader or his sub-leaders of the party” have anywhere expressed in their speeches or demonstrations have to be regarded in Nazi Germany as fundamentals of law, and therefore they have to be applied like statutes by the courts. Even more: All law which has not been created by the Nazis themselves after they seized power, i.e. all the law created earlier than 1933—and that is, naturally, the greater part of the written law—has to be applied only, in so far as the decision made is in conformity with all that is expressed in the party programme, in Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, and in all the speeches, manifestations, and decrees of the leader and the sub-leaders of the party.

Everybody who realizes that is bound to be aware that thereby

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the foundation of every civilized State, the two-thousand-years-old dogma "*justitia fundamentum regnorum*" (justice is the foundation of the State), has been abolished in Germany, and that the door is open for every kind of arbitrariness. The leader's will is the only law.

It would be quite erroneous to think that this is only a high-sounding phrase. No, it is a fact. All that in thousands of years has been achieved in the world, in order to secure justice, is abolished in Germany. The naked "*sic volo sic jubeo*" (that is my will and order) is "law". Moreover, the insecurity is still grotesquely increased by the fact that, in consequence of the unceasing, opportunistic changes of the Nazi dogmas, even the most intelligent Nazi judge can scarcely prove what the "*sic volo sic jubeo*" really means at the moment. A Communist defendant may be a noxious person at the beginning of his trial, and at the moment of the sentence his views may be those of the leader! The reverse may happen too.

A fatal confusion of law is thus brought about, and in civil law too one can no longer speak even of the smallest guarantee of right. No solicitor, if he is honest, can say to his client "You can institute these proceedings; you will win them according to law, if only you can prove your statements". The same theory by the one-sided exaggeration of which Hitler has produced so much disaster in the law of nations—the proposition that a change of circumstances in certain cases may entitle a party to renounce a treaty—is misused in civil law to turn everything topsy-turvy. A safety-valve which jurisprudence had introduced for exceptional cases, where a too sharp application of formal law would result in hardship, is perverted by Nazi justice into a certain kind of "picklock", in order to break up stipulated agreements and to dishonour a merchant's word—naturally only, if a "party member" is on the one side and a former freemason, a democrat or even a Jew on the other. Then it is said that it is not "in the interests of the State" to uphold a contract, "circumstances having changed" in the meantime. That is binding "German law", after the bandage has been taken away from the eyes of German "*Justitia*" quite officially. Nazi justice is perpetually misusing the old "*clausula rebus sic stantibus*"—which incidentally is of "Roman" origin—in order to overthrow, systematically, legally established, unimpeachable claims of adversaries of the



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"move"—by referring falsely to a pretended "change of all fundamental perceptions in consequence of political events". The Nazi "law", that treaties may be broken, if the result of upholding them would be unwelcome to Nazi conceptions, naturally permits all arbitrariness. But that is yet not enough! They have made a special statute ordering that even valid decisions of the courts have to be quashed, if they are directed against a "National Socialist of merit" and no longer correspond with the "new conceptions". You can easily imagine what is the upshot, when all the economic vagabonds, who went smash before 1933 and then found shelter with the Nazis and who, apart from the new statute, for seven years had already exercised a profitable activity as extortioners against their former commercial connections, are now entitled to demand "damages" from all those against whom they formerly lost proceedings, and "restitution" of all that was collected from them years ago in consequence of valid legal decisions. This new "law" is especially informative, because it reveals clearly the minds of the new Nazi legislators and those who inspire them who were, naturally, aware that there was a productive source to be tapped.

"Ce n'est que le premier pas, qui coûte." By the introduction of the legal fundamental "*ducis voluntas suprema lex*" (the leader's will is the supreme law) the steep road was opened on which there was no stopping. One statute after the other was proclaimed, in order to demolish all barriers by which any reluctant law court could still feel obliged, perhaps, to apply the theories which are common to all civilized nations.

In criminal law the fundamental dogma "*nulla poena sine lege*" (no punishment without statute) which has been acknowledged in the whole world as a principle was abolished together with all its refinements. In its place now the so-called "legal analogy" is reintroduced in Germany. That means that punishment even then is possible, if the act does not conflict with a written penal law, if only the court is of the opinion that the defendant deserves the punishment in consequence of the "fundamental idea" of any paragraph in the penal code. And this, moreover, in the sense of the general Nazi theories!—In the whole civilized world for a long time past these "caoutchouc definitions" have been abolished, in view of their danger to life and liberty. The Nazi legislators certainly seemed very crafty to themselves,

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when they removed the "liberal safeguards", destroying thereby the exactness of the definitions which is so eminently necessary even in criminal law, this sharpest instrument in the administration of justice. Actually by this the "punishment of opinions", proscribed in the whole world since the Middle Ages, is reintroduced in the twentieth century and in the middle of Europe! But they then slid a further considerable distance downwards by abolishing with one stroke of the pen all the legal discriminations—developed scientifically through centuries and immensely essential for the amount of punishment—between attempted and completed crime and between instigation, abetting, and aid. But no wonder, when the legislation is in the hands of people who evidently have not even an idea of the problems, about which generations of lawyers and philosophers of all European countries have thought and written, when half-educated men, criminals moreover, can presume to give statutes for a whole people! You may consider what such caoutchouc definitions and the hurling back of the criminal law into the level of the darkest Middle Ages mean especially in a country where no upright, independent, and highly educated body of judges exists.

Of course also the legal dogma valid throughout the whole world was abolished in Germany, that an action committed abroad can be punished only, if it was a crime also according to the laws of the scene of action. In consequence of the abolition of that natural dogma, after the glorious annexation of Austria German courts have sentenced not a few of the newly created German subjects as well as many trapped German Refugees to hard labour because of actions which were not punishable at all according to the laws of the country where they had taken place. Especially "political crimes" and offences against the so-called race statutes were dealt with in this way. After the conquest of Czechoslovakia a new "decree" was made—which is in force now likewise in the other conquered countries—ordering the general application of German criminal law, so that Czech, Polish, Dutch, Belgian, French or other citizens, who in their own countries under their own law acted not only quite legally but, perhaps, even in fulfilment of their obligations, now will be "punished", if their actions were "offending" towards Nazi leaders or "damaging to the Nazi State". This barbarous "statute" evidently intends simultaneously to intimidate the citizens of other countries

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in advance with regard to a potential future invasion by Germany! The case of the Czech barrister Dr. Secanina, who as advocate of Dimitroff in the Reichstag fire proceedings had incurred the hatred of the Nazis, is an example of the manner in which this new "law" is practically applied, and of the Gestapo spirit of German "justice". Dr. Secanina was imprisoned by the Gestapo immediately after the occupation of Prague, then condemned to death by a "special court" and beheaded, because he had "acted against the interests of Nazi Germany".—It was officially explained in the German Press in Poland that the Nazi system is based on the principle, that the weak has to serve the strong, and that for this purpose German Criminal Law must be applied in Poland by special courts of German judges, strongly resolved to carry through "the political will" of the Third Reich!

Germany's honourable legislators naturally did not hesitate either to introduce new criminal statutes—and even the death penalty—"with retrospective force", although everybody who has been occupied, be it ever so superficially, with questions concerning penal law is aware what an immense relapse, moreover what a disgrace it is, to inflict punishment on anybody with regard to an action which was not punishable at the time when it took place.

Whilst in other countries they endeavour to humanize more and more the methods of punishment and have even given up—as useless—the so-called "general deterrent principle", the very wise Nazi legislators evidently are of the opinion that to the heroic mentality of their people concessions must be made, in order to satisfy the instincts of cruelty. The execution of punishment therefore was rendered more severe by the Nazis in the most brutal way and, apart from this, it was ordered that the death penalty in future was no longer to be carried out in the former usual, comparatively humane way of guillotining, but by hacking off the delinquent's head with an axe.

The worst, perhaps, in the sphere of Nazi legislation is the abrogation of liberty and equality before the law.

The legal protection of personal liberty is founded on the respect for the individual human being, and it already stands therefore in fundamental contrast to the principles of the Nazi State which is thought to be entitled to dispose of the bodies and lives of its subjects as of inanimate machines. Every Englishman

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is especially proud of the fact that more than 250 years ago personal liberty was guaranteed in Great Britain by Habeas Corpus. France and the U.S.A. achieved the same right 150 years ago and in Germany also it was introduced, much later however. Former German law ruled that everyone detained by the police as suspected of a crime had to be liberated, if not within twenty-four hours a warrant was issued by a court. Thus it was before the beginning of the Nazi regime. Since then no German court can any longer order the release of a prisoner of the Gestapo, and even if a defendant is acquitted by a court and discharged from custody, it is in no way certain, as you have learned, that he will not be fetched by the Gestapo at the door of the prison and conducted to one of those places from which there is often no return.

It is almost superfluous to mention that, together with the privilege of personal freedom and integrity, naturally the rights also of assembly, free expression of opinions, and of religious liberty are abolished. Freedom to trade, free advocacy, liberty to practice law or medicine is likewise, naturally, oppressed. All these rights are to such a degree a matter of course in every democratic country, that scarcely anybody remembers there that he does enjoy them. To consider the abolition in peace-time of those liberties would be simply impossible for those accustomed to freedom. In Germany the voices of those who have liberty in their hearts have for long been silenced. In the enslaved neighbouring countries this proceeding is in progress, and the young men, students grown up in liberty and not able to forget quickly enough their rights of men, were confronted with a firing squad, or imprisoned, maltreated and crippled. It looks as if the democracies should be reminded again of what they are fighting for, and what threatens the world, if Nazism is victorious in this war.

Liberty—equality—fraternity! The noble idea of the French revolution of the equality of all human beings is inadequate on principle to Nazi law. Its arrogant race theory marks the Germans of Nordic extraction as superior beings, all other races as gradually different, but generally inferior subjects to the German seigniorial rights.

When now again—as in Belgium during the Great War—hundreds of thousands of labourers from conquered countries are

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practically forced to do industrial and agricultural work in Germany—moreover in many cases, in contrast to the law of nations and against morals, forced to do war work even—when the Jews are penned up together in camps like animals and mercilessly ill-used for compulsory labour till their knees give way under them—all this is actually nothing else but the reintroduction of slavery. The hypocrisy is especially evident, when the Nazis proclaim, at the same time, the protection of animals as their pet ideal. Actually the rights of men are abolished in Germany and, above all, the equality of human beings before the law. Here again the Jews form the most striking example, as the Nazis robbed them not only of their rights as citizens, but—as Hitler's friend Streicher in his newspaper *Stuerner* wrote—as “they are not to be regarded any longer as human beings, but ought to be penned up with the pigs in their sties!” If through the example of the Jews the whole baseness of Nazi mentality can best be pointed out, because here, in times of peace, it revealed itself in all its refinements, you ought not to forget, however, that behind the veil of the war the same fate was meted out to Czechs and Poles, at least with the same ferocity. Much of the most revolting injustice, which is inflicted on the Jews under the cloak of the new Nazi law, can also befall any other person in ill favour in the Germany of to-day and in its vassal states, if he is once caught by the law machine. Can a Nazi educated judge, a “member of the Nazi Party,” who has sworn to consider its orders as legal statutes and to follow with every one of his decisions the prescribed world philosophy, can such a man pass an impartial sentence, if on the one side there is a clergyman, freemason or Marxist and on the other a party member? Under the observing eyes of officials, party representatives and Goebbels' journalists, sent to the sessions, there is no choice for the court naturally, as to which side to give credence, to which party an oath can be “entrusted” and who cannot be allowed to take an oath, because he is “unworthy of belief” or “suspected of aiding and abetting”. It is clear *a priori*, to whom, if his condemnation is quite unavoidable, extenuating circumstances must be conceded, because formerly—by the vigorous throwing of beer tankards or swinging of broken chair-legs in beer-cellar fights—he has “deserved well of his country” and “unfortunately made a false step”; and to whom, on the other hand, “the full strength of

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the law must be applied", because—although it is a first offence—the "culpable views of the defendant, dangerous to the State, do not deserve any generosity", and whatever trite but always magnificently sounding, metaphorical expressions may be used for judicial decisions, the hypocrisy and pettifoggery of which is almost the worst a human brain is able to produce. But what an orgy this kind of impartiality and equality of the law celebrates all the more, when actually political matters are involved, if, for instance, a slander of a party functionary, or even of a minister, has to be "atoned for", and if a fine opportunity arises of proving the "unchangeable fidelity of a court of justice towards the Nazi State" by a sentence destroying the lot of human beings! The degree of injustice produced especially by the disciplinary courts is astonishing, and the "collection of the decisions of the German court of honour for solicitors and barristers" from after 1933 is a mine of information, the study of which lawyers in other countries should not miss, in order to get a glimpse of the derangement of mind of their Nazi colleagues. Here the German lawyers have erected a monument of infamy, which will stand when Hitler and his empire have long passed away.

All this, however, is less than the mass injustice which the courts, possessed by race theory and antisemitism, have brought about in the fight against the Jews. The expression "violation of the equality of all human beings before the law" is much too tame. For, what is happening here day by day, has no similarity at all with an application of law; it is nothing else but a misuse of justice for the moral, economic and physical destruction of beings who, following the Nazistic world philosophy, are to be considered and treated as brutes or even animals.

With what sort of sentiments must a defendant face a judge, knowing that the latter is bound to look on him, in consequence of his race, not only as an inferior being but as a noxious brute, born to damage the State and *a priori* capable and suspect of every crime! The judge, as you know, is not allowed to make his decision without "respect of persons". To make sure of this, the Jews are legally obliged—under heavy penalties in case of contravention—to make themselves known, at once, to the court by the presentation of their Jewish passport. Furthermore, in order to defame them, all German Jews with first names other than those of the Old Testament had to adopt the first names of "Isidor" or "Sara".

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Even the legal representative of a Jewish party cannot face the court, the public prosecutor, or the representative of another party as an equal. For Jews can be represented before the courts by Jews only. But there are no longer any Jewish barristers and solicitors. They are "liquidated", like the Jewish doctors, and a small number only of so-called Jewish "syndics" had to be allowed, willy-nilly, because in the higher courts the parties are not admitted without a legal representative. These degraded Jewish syndics, however, lack all the privileges of solicitors and barristers. Apart from the feelings which even a courageous man must have who has to conduct his case with such a legal assistant, you are bound to ask: What can such a Jewish "syndic" who has to stand in awe himself of any frown of the judge achieve for his client against the public prosecutor, or even against the other party's barrister who knows how to utilize his and his client's superior position? It is the game of cat and mouse. This game has to be played obeying quite different rules from those usual at proceedings of Freemasons and Democrats. There is no question of credibility of a party belonging to the "execrated race", and the option is left to the Jew only either to be accused of "typical Jewish impudence"—for his energetic behaviour—or to be reproached with "trying in vain by his disgusting Jewish sneaking to obtain the favour of the court".

All this, however, is the outer framework only of the proceedings. Much worse is the "material law" itself which was especially created to provide, under the hypocritical pretence of a legality in which there is no equality, that the worst injustice not only can, but must be done to the "Jew". We cannot discuss in detail the grief caused by the breaking up of numberless families by the so-called "orders of Nuremberg", the legion of suicides, the low denunciations, and the blackmailing due to these fatal statutes, and only by the way—with regard to the peculiar mentality revealed thereby—the tragedies may be mentioned, when many thousands of "mixed marriages" existing often for decennaries were suddenly poisoned by the new racial laws. Numerous "Aryan" fathers made use of this opportunity to get rid from their wives and "mongrel" children. "Aryan" wives were confronted with the dilemma either to break up all their connections with parents and relations, or to leave their husbands and "racial inferior" children in the lurch. Let alone the secret human misery,

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when a married couple first held together "in the interest of the children", and later the "Aryan" part was not steadfast enough to overcome the loss of home and relations and to share the common fate without occasional embittered and embittering accentuation of his "racial superiority". We will go, however, into some of the refined Nazi statutes in the law of property and taxation thought out in order to outlaw and to rob the Jews "legally"—i.e. naturally all "non-Aryans", without distinction of their religion. Again you might ask, why in view of the mass misfortune brought about in the meantime by the Germans in the conquered countries, these legally disguised robberies are still worthy of notice, as it is sufficiently evident that no law at all is any longer valid in Germany, and therefore the single smelting processes in the big witch's kettle are of no account. For the knowledge of German mentality, however, these "very legal rules", not created in a war, not "excusable" because of the fatal *furor teutonicus*, but imagined and executed with cold-blooded refinement in peace, are of special importance—and this the more, because the approved pattern was applied later almost unchanged against the Poles and all the "undesirable elements" in the other enslaved countries. You must observe that this system of a robbery gradually progressing from hypocritical "legality" to unconcealed confiscation by force is likewise applied, as we will see at the proper places, in Germany's political relations with weaker neighbouring peoples, beginning there with enforced, oppressive trade "agreements" till to the final, open annexation of the "necessary living spaces". The same once for all developed methods are serving the same principle, the "right" of the pretendedly "racial superior have-not", no matter, whether individuals or peoples are in question. All this is originating in a robber's mentality, at the same time primitive and crafty. In spite of all the boasting pleas, the plundering of the Jews under the cloak of the law—in so far as it was not executed simply for the personal enrichment of the Nazi gangsters—was caused already by the necessity to fill the empty coffers of the State and many think that the development will not stop at "Aryan" capital. Hitler's connection with Stalin shows in every case the "German dam" against Bolshevism to be more and more problematical. But all the same, whether the "legal" treatment of "non-Aryans" was forming its own object only and a rehearsal



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of the intended future actions against Polish and Czech property, or whether it was already a general anti-capitalistic prelude—in any case this extremely informative contribution to the knowledge of the German way of thinking and feeling cannot be omitted in a description of German mentality. One thing, incidentally, you are bound to recognize. Towards the Jews, Hitler has kept his word. Towards the Jews the Nazis have fulfilled to the limit all that Hitler had “promised” them!

In the law of property any discrimination between the subjects of a State means injustice; every statute prescribing such a discernment grossly violates the principle of the equality of the law. The Nazi statutes, however, for the liquidation of the Jews are especially characteristic indications, not only for the diminished feelings for right, but for the lack of every moral and cultural restraint. *Vestigia terrent!*

At first all Jewish officials of the State, the boroughs and corporations lost their positions and their pensions too, so that, at once, a part of Hitler's promises towards the Nazi position-hunters could be fulfilled without cost. Next came the turn of the professional men, mentioned already in our discussions about the mentality of the German scientists. Then the great “purge” of Germany's economy began in the interest of the Nazi aspirants formerly attracted by this chance. The employers got rid of Jewish employees without any expense by a new decree forbidding the employment of any person not belonging to an organization of employees; and all these organizations—especially Dr. Ley's new “Arbeitsfront”—of course removed, at once, their Jewish members! This regulation had the big advantage that the misery of these men could be suppressed without any disagreeable discussions in the publicity of a court of law. To the “honour” of the “labour courts” it may be mentioned, however, that they had in the meantime already dismissed some actions of Jewish employees who, after many years of service, were suddenly turned into the street. The labour courts argued that “managers could not expect their Aryan employees and labourers to work together with Jews any longer”.—Countless numbers of these men committed suicide. Even the premiums for old age and health insurances, paid for years by the employees, were lost through their removal from the organizations. The unhappy people became a burden on public charity. But a way was found whereby the boroughs did

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not have to pay them relief. All the Jews of Germany were compelled to join a new organization which had to see to the assistance of poor Jews. Out of what funds the means were to be provided was a riddle, indeed, as in the meantime the property of the well-to-do Jewish people was destroyed by liquidations and pogroms, and as any possibilities for Jews to earn a living no longer existed.—Then the labour shortage began, about the causes of which we shall have to speak in another place, and now the unhappy Jews, whose former positions were in the meantimes occupied by Nazis, were a fine reserve for the new army of slave workers. One exception, it is true, has to be mentioned. That is a small "category" of "economically valuable Jews", exempted from certain restrictions, which was created at the beginning of the war, in order to exploit the irretrievable, international connections of these privileged ones—whereat, indeed, it is difficult to decide, in spite of all understanding of human weakness, whether the lowliness of those who lent themselves for such purposes is not just as great as that of the Nazi slave owners.

The German conception of the equality of all human beings at law becomes especially evident in the taxes and duties which formed a refined means of expropriating the Jews. At first, of course, they were excluded from all the so-called tax privileges. That sounded rather innocuous. The Jews could not demand "privileges" in any case! But the decree became another aspect as soon as it was seen what was meant in reality. By this stroke of the pen all children's allowances were abolished, so that a father of four or even more children had to pay an unattainable income tax—the normal tax already being much higher in Germany than in Great Britain, especially for small incomes. Even the so-called "hardship relief" was abolished so that all the Jews who had suddenly lost their whole income had to pay their old taxes for a further year. Naturally most of them could not afford these duties and lost their last bit of property by forced sales. On one of these occasions a German court made a decision which in spite of its small material importance may be stated here as a curiosity, and because it shows in an especially elegant fashion the German conception of the equality of law for all: A Jewish debtor had taken it as a precedent that wireless apparatus was not distrainable in Germany. The court, however, decided that this was a "privi-

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lege" not applicable for Jews, because they are not members of the community of Germans.

The abolition of the "hardship relief" for Jews proved at a time, when they did not yet wish the intended total liquidation of the Jewish property to become publicly known, a most efficient means to force the Jews "legally" to sacrifice their landed property. They had to pay the high land taxes—which absorb in Germany approximately one-half of the total rent of a normal house—even if the houses were empty, so that every other owner would have been freed from this tax. So their aim was reached. The unhappy Jewish owner either had to sell his house in a hurry, or suffer a forced sale to cover the unavoidable tax arrears. The law, moreover, provided that the "Jew" should not be left with too much through the sale of his property. Every sale of landed property, shares, jewellery, etc., of Jews was subjected to a permit from certain authorities. Although the excessive offers of Jewish property had already brought about a heavy lowering of prices, it was the natural task of the "permit offices" to take care, that on the "transfer of Jewish property to Aryan hands", as the action was so beautifully called, still smaller prices should be paid. This order produced the most exquisite flowers of the antisemitic art of interpretation. For instance: At the sale of a house the permit office found the price much too high. It stated that the Jewish owner had had to lose money, because, in spite of the emptiness of some flats, he had to pay the full rates. The office concluded "logically", that by the sale of the house the "Jew" was making a "profit", to which he was not entitled. To the reply that the buyer would have the full allowances and that he would earn 10 per cent on his invested capital, and much more as soon as the empty flats were let, came the answer that "that was nothing to do with the Jew". For, now it became evident what the intention actually was: The buyer, of course, had to pay the full price which was still very favourable for him. One-third of this price, however, was to be paid to the borough! For that there was no legal foundation at all. The permit office, however, declared quite simply that otherwise the sale would not be permitted. That is a small and comparatively harmless example only of the usual "legal" chicanes, to which such Jews were exposed with whom they were *not* especially angry.

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In other things it was almost worse. For instance, at the enforced sales of landed property and commercial establishments confiscations were carried through, without any real legal foundation, not only by the permit offices but also by the Imperial Bank and many other authorities.—“Pearls” of interpretation were seen in their greatest extent on the enforced sequestration of estates, factories, and other businesses, the carrying on of which was simply forbidden to Jews, even if the enterprise had been family property for more than a hundred years. Mostly, it is true, the “liquidation” took place simply in the form of a pogrom, so that detachments of S.A. and S.S. men under the supervision of the Gestapo smashed the furniture, threw goods into the streets, or divided them among themselves, set fire to the buildings, and transported the owner to a concentration camp. But we will confine ourselves here to the “legal” liquidation of Jewish enterprises by an “authoritatively permitted” sale to an “Aryan” buyer. Of course “good will” must not be calculated in such cases, even if they were important and well-known international enterprises, the names of which, however Jewish sounding, were bravely continued by the new owners. Stocks and outstanding debts were “valued” at fantastically low prices. But even the disposition of a small surplus—if any margin at all remained under such circumstances after the covering of all liabilities—was not at all the concern of the former Jewish owner. On the contrary, the surplus had to be paid to a trustee, appointed by the State for the purpose, to use the money for the payment of a recently introduced “Jew contribution” and of a so-called “duty for leaving Germany”. If one of these unhappy men pointed out that he need not pay this duty, because he did not intend to emigrate, he was taken into a concentration camp, in order to “encourage him to emigrate”.

Many did not even try to save the remainder of their property. They sacrificed all they possessed and let themselves be expelled penniless over the frontier, or they committed suicide. Tougher ones took up the unequal, nerve-racking struggle with the Nazis, to save something, in order to build up a new existence for their families abroad. It was a real fight of despair for the last they possessed.

In 1937 Goebbels had already spoken the word to his officials that the next year there ought to be only Jewish beggars in Ger-

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many. For the new raid they had made further "statutes", now shamelessly revealing their object. First every Jew, besides making the normal tax declaration, had to inform the police of all his property to the last penny. Even the smallest omission resulted in the immediate confiscation of the whole fortune and penal servitude. The value of every single item had to be "estimated" by the owner himself. This order was especially refined. This was to produce the impression—corresponding indications were artificially spread by pretendedly well-informed people—that the whole fortune of every Jew, including his business, landed property, shares, and jewellery, must be delivered over to the authorities, and that—after the deduction of a further Jewish tribute—a compensation by a so-called "Jewish loan" with a low annual interest would be granted. Therefore everybody was afraid that, if his estimate were too small, all his property would be taken over simply at his own estimation, and the owner's computations according to the "normal value" were therefore rather high. Business men calculated the goodwill of their firms, house-owners the normal value of their property. Shares were calculated on the quotation of the exchange, and jewellery on the market price. But in the meantime, in the autumn of 1938, the artificial pogrom "burst out" in its full fury. Firms were "liquidated" without any compensation for goodwill, goods were destroyed or squandered. Even insurance compensation for the damage caused through the pogrom was not to be paid to the insured owners, but must be delivered by the companies to the State, following a new decree especially devised for this purpose, although no logical justification at all could be found for this kind of "regulation".—Pictures, estimated as "works of art," and carpets of high value were destroyed through the pogroms, or stolen, like the jewels of wives and daughters. Many houses were burnt down, or sold at too low a price. And, then, the great surprise came: Still existing property was not taken over by the State at all, but it was decreed instead, that a milliard Reichsmarks had to be raised, as a so-called "tribute", and that every Jew had to contribute a quarter of his—in the meantime mostly destroyed—fortune according to his own estimation made BEFORE the pogrom. A wonderful excuse for this bleeding which had been naturally planned long before was supplied by the shooting of the German Attaché von Rath in Paris, a crime for which the German

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Jews were certainly no more responsible than Hitler himself. And by what means, after the pogroms and liquidations, could the Jews now pay this contribution? The total worth of all that perhaps remained was scarcely more than a half of the former valuation, and so the seeming quarter to be paid was now more than a half.—It is known that forcible loans or property duties can be raised, even in normal circumstances, by small instalments only, extending over many years, if forced sales and innumerable bankruptcies are to be avoided. But here they were not to be avoided at all! On the contrary, the additional result of Jews being forced to throw away their whole property in all haste and at a scandalous price, was a welcome means to drive them rapidly out of the country.

New surprises were prepared for those who still possessed anything. They suddenly received demands from the councils of their religious communities to "contribute, at once and voluntarily, for the repair of damage" a further 10 per cent of their property according to their former estimation. That meant at least a third of what remained after the pogroms and the "contribution". Of course, with these "voluntary gifts" no damage was repaired that was done to the plundered Jews. It was quite simply a new blackmailing trickery—this time executed by Goebbels' propaganda ministry. To this ministry, namely, the Jewish congregations had to deliver over swiftly these magnanimous bounties. If one of these spontaneous donors asked what would happen to him, if he did not pay, he was informed that he would at once be imprisoned in a camp. This private enterprise of Goebbels, for which it was not considered worth inventing any legal foundation, was especially base, as Goebbels forced the Jewish religious congregations to assist his blackmail. It is a fine nuance that the Jewish congregations had to allow themselves to be misused for the enforcing of this tribute from non-Aryan Christians, who had never had any connection with them. The Jewish community as compulsory abettors in Goebbels' blackmailing of Christians!

It will be impossible, probably, in view of the unprecedented disorder and bribery in the Third Reich, ever to find out where the blackmailed millions have gone. But you can suppose that here is one of the sources of the riches of Goebbels, Streicher and other party bosses. These big gangsters, pilloried by Knickerbocker, were, simultaneously, the models of all the many smaller

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ones who utilized this "unique opportunity" for filling their pockets with the blood-money blackmailed from their defenceless victims.

After all these procedures there could not have remained very much of the twelve milliards, at which Jewish property in Germany was originally estimated. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that there was even a small remainder left for the plundered ones. Now, above all, the so-called "real values"—i.e. jewellery, gold, silver, works of art, carpets, to be brief all that the State, greedy for foreign exchange, could sell abroad—had to be delivered over to the appointed collectors, this time against a "compensation"—in paper money. The collection was so thorough, that apart from a silver watch and one knife, fork, and spoon for every person, nothing was allowed to be retained. A special order was necessary even to point out, that artificial gold teeth need not be handed over, but wedding rings.

When this was done and all other taxes were paid, the "duty for leaving Germany" had to be discharged, introduced in 1931 for everyone who wished to emigrate as a compensation for his future liberation from Germany's economic difficulties. The duty of 25 per cent was not unjust, then, because nobody was obliged to emigrate and furthermore, because the voluntary emigrant could then take with him in foreign exchange the full remainder of his property. The Nazis, however, calculated the 25 per cent duty on property ascertained on the 1st January, 1935, and collected the sum from the Jews whom they themselves forced to emigrate. And even then they did not hand out the remaining residue to the emigrants. Almost always, it is true, this 25 per cent of a fictitious fortune of 1935 absorbed the whole actual remainder. If, however, in spite of all, some lucky one were to have anything over, a further cleverly thought-out system was applied, in order to steal even this remainder. The emigration permit was not granted, before the applicant had proved to the last farthing, that his property was deposited at one of the German banks, specially licensed for foreign exchange, as a so-called "emigrant's blocked deposit".—Then he could go, penniless, in order to go begging abroad, with the elevating consciousness of possessing an unattainable "blocked deposit" in Germany. These blocked deposits could be confiscated at any moment, and, indeed, immediately after the beginning of the war, when they felt

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themselves in Germany quite safe from foreign eyes, and, obviously no longer even thought it worth while to save appearances, they simply confiscated the property of the Jews, banishing the remaining ones to the new "ghetto" in Lublin, if they could not be used to work as slaves. But until then—before the new war—the so-called "gold discount bank", branch of the "Imperial Bank", changed—in some special cases—the "blocked deposits" into foreign currency, and this at the proud quotation of 6 per cent. "Only" 94 per cent of the remainder were then already confiscated, even in these privileged cases, and, furthermore, the amount in every single case was limited to a hundred thousand Reichsmarks so that a lucky one—he must have been at least a millionaire to be left such a remainder after all the procedures—could "hope" to receive after his emigration at best five hundred pounds.

Why did they use these ingeniously involved methods in Germany? Why did they avoid the straightforward way of confiscation, which in the meantime has been accepted against "enemies of the people and Jews" in the Third Reich and in the conquered countries?—Because they wished to deceive at first the public in Germany and even more in foreign countries as to the fact, that the principle of private property actually was no longer respected. They feared the economic and political consequences, if the truth were too soon to become obvious, and the partial accuracy, at least, of this speculation showed itself in the permanent support of many wealthy people in foreign countries towards Nazism.

Again the peak of hypocrisy was attained by the Nazi "jurisdiction". If one of these robbed and humiliated people was caught in an attempt to flee from the German hell with a part of his property, the German courts not only condemned him to years of penal servitude, but with bombastic words about the "lack of patriotism" and "dishonesty" shown by his flight from Germany and by the "damage done to the wealth of the German people through the smuggling out of the emigrant's property". This was said shamelessly by the courts of a State which had made these people perish and exposed them to the worst vexations. Here is a typical example of Goethe's words: "You yourselves cause the poor to commit crimes, and then you sentence them"—with one difference only, that here there is no question of crime. You may understand the fury of a robber who has to watch his victim escaping with a part of the expected



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prey; but you had not yet learnt that a "court" acknowledges the justice of a plunderer's view, when he seriously complains that the victim scandalously injured him by escaping. The Nazi judges can be proud of this performance!—The full height of the delicate moral and juridical Nazi mentality in this direction becomes obvious also in the statute, that the male issue of so-called mixed marriages must do military service for Germany, men whose fathers were simultaneously robbed of their citizenship, plundered and expelled from the country.

It is a well-known fact abroad that in Germany might is right. But less known is what—obviously half-conscious only of the actual meaning and correctness of his own words—the Nazi Minister of Justice said in 1938 in a speech about the relations of right and might in the Third Reich. He pointed out: "Formerly we were of the opinion that right preceded might. To-day we are all aware that might must precede in order to pave the way for the German [*sic!*] law." And this is the truth indeed: In Germany the courts have to supply reasons for the injustices committed by might. It is for this purpose that they are there in Germany at all.

## Chapter II

# Gestapo Mentality

Freedom and equality have gone in the new Germany. Instead of fraternity they have introduced the seemingly more "heroic" sounding word "comradeship", the expression—but not the thing! How could a genuine comradeship indeed exist in a country where nobody dares to trust his fellow men, where spying has penetrated into the very heart of every community, the family, and has completely poisoned schools, churches, working communities, and public and private life. No, in the Germany of today there exists neither fraternity nor comradeship, and where you seek them you meet instead—the Gestapo. The Gestapo lurks behind everything. It "watches" over the law and puts its stamp on it. The hangman, as in other countries, was formerly called also in Germany an "executioner". Today, as the German Minister of Justice has admitted, the hangman called "Gestapo" no longer executes a sentence of a court but carries out its own decisions.<sup>1</sup>

In fact you can no longer understand any event in the life of a German without considering how far it is influenced by the Gestapo or by fear of it. The Gestapo plays a part in everything. It supervises the education, the churches, the economy, the private life of everyone, the army and its officers, and even among the captured crews of German U-boats and aeroplanes some of the sailors and observers turned out unexpectedly to be Gestapo men—whereupon incidentally, in one case at least, the offended "comrades", using their new "liberty" as war prisoners, welcomed these gentlemen with a sound thrashing. Among the Gestapo spies themselves there are super-spies and, if you miss anyone in our enumeration, he has probably been taken away by the Gestapo. For they have unlimited power to arrest anybody who has incurred displea-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chap. 10, page 128.

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sure politically or otherwise, or whose disappearance seems for any reason "desirable in the interest of the State", and to imprison him for any length of time without any legal excuse. Nobody outside Germany can imagine what inexpressible misery has been brought about by this institution and is still caused day by day. In this country of the most savage and corrupt party rule, literally every party functionary has the power to destroy an inconvenient personal adversary by a false denunciation to the Gestapo. No upright man can know when going to bed whether the Gestapo will come for him during the night. Perhaps his own child, misled and instigated by the "Hitler Youth", has delivered him over to the Gestapo because of some—perhaps even misunderstood—remarks made in the bosom of the family. Or a colleague has denounced him, because he found the work too heavy or the salary too small. Perhaps this colleague was also a Gestapo man himself. What a dilemma was brought by the Gestapo into Christian families, the children of which were bound to enter the Hitler Youth, and were then incited by their superiors to spy on their priests and to denounce them for seemingly suspect remarks in a prayer in the children's service or in the instruction preparatory to confirmation. The spy system of this organization has been keyed up to an inconceivable height. Every building has its "warden", who will listen through the thin walls of the dwelling of a bad neighbour and find out whether conversations "dangerous to the State" are taking place, or whether a foreign broadcast is being listened to. All private intercourse is watched. Every party has to be announced in advance to the police. Apart from the proverbial orgies of the party bosses, all social intercourse of any greater extent had ceased already long before the war, because no one trusted the other. There was no longer any cheerful, vivacious sociableness; for a long time already a dull and fearful whispering about who had been "fetched off" in the meantime had replaced it. In the war a new "voluntary" spy organization—the "people's service"—was established under the leadership of the Gestapo chief Heydrich, the members of which are obliged to deliver their fellows to the Gestapo for any incautious remark.

The persecution incessantly carried out by the Gestapo since 1933 against innocent human beings—because they were Free-Masons, Faithful Christians, Bible Scholars, Democrats, Jews or

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Friends of Jews—has developed by degrees from a stalking of individual men into a regular baiting, at which thousands are taken prisoners and hundreds are murdered together. They had tried in 1933 in certain circles in Germany to persuade themselves that the then outrages were phenomena concomitant with the “revolution”. Actually there was no genuine revolution in Germany in 1933. A cool observer was bound already in the spring of 1933 to smile at this curious revolt which Goebbels in the name of his master could “declare to have started” and after some weeks “to have concluded”. All the so-called “elementary bursts of the people’s fury” which happened every since were—no denial can change this fact—onslaughts of the party organization thoroughly prepared by the Gestapo and carried through with their help. Before every pogrom the houses for the “actions” were inspected cautiously in advance by the Gestapo and not “released for plundering” before this, so that an “Aryan” with a Jewish-sounding name could not through inadvertence be attacked. When at such a preliminary inspection the lady found out what the aim of the officers was, and pointed out her husband only was non-Aryan, she herself was of Aryan extraction, she could hear the classical remark of the superior to his men: “We’ll have to demolish in any case”!—There hasn’t been one of the innumerable political homicides since 1933 committed by culprits who were not connected with the Gestapo. All the pretended “spontaneous outbursts” which were organized—as required by Goebbels’ propaganda office—from time to time against Catholic and Evangelical clergymen, churches, monasteries, and orders, and the pogroms which “impetuously broke loose”—with a curious preciseness in the most distant parts of Germany always simultaneously, and against the authors of which no court was allowed to proceed—have not the slightest similarity with genuine riots by the people. In their drives against Jews in the autumn of 1938 the Gestapo scarcely concealed their order to catch five thousand each in Berlin and Munich, in Hamburg three thousand, and in every town a certain number of Jews. At that time there was as yet no war. What is happening now behind the curtain in the conquered countries, but also in a Germany more and more secluded from the outer world? In 1938 the mass arrests of Jews took place “only” for terrorization and in order to “encourage” emigration. In an inconceivably barbarous way—apart from the

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violation of honour, intolerable for an upright man who was not conscious of any guilt—these people, among them many over seventy, were herded together first in the police cellars, and then allotted to the fatal concentration camps at Dachau, Sachsenhausen, Buchenwald, etc. According to the new Nazi language all these imprisonments, naturally, were executed by the Gestapo only out of mere kindness of heart, “in order to protect the prisoners against the fury of the people”. The number of the persons administratively murdered in the camps now reaches many thousands, and the lists with the fatal note “shot while in flight” are delivered by the central office to the camp administration before the execution!—What happened to the hundreds of thousands of prisoners of the Gestapo in the concentration camps, is explained in the British White Book, the reports of the British Consuls and the protests of the Polish Government, so that here only a few observations of a prisoner may be repeated: “We have seen people with their eyes knocked out, with their teeth knocked out, with their ears lopped; people who have been killed by being kicked in the stomach, or struck with a stick over the heart; people who have had the ends of rubber tubes forced in their mouths and water poured down the tubes until their insides burst.”<sup>1</sup>

With what shuddering must the people who before the conquest of the neighbouring States had fled from the German hell to Vienna, Prague, and Paris, to Poland, Holland, Belgium, and other conquered countries have heard the terrible news that the Gestapo was again on their track. The Nazi papers wrote triumphantly after the occupation of Czechoslovakia that with the first troops hundreds of Gestapo officials had arrived. Their first action was to close all the frontiers, in order to prevent the escape of German refugees and of all political suspects about whom they had already prepared complete lists in advance. The same methods with the same results were repeated in all the other conquered countries. Even the armistice with France provided the handing over by the French government “all German subjects indicated by the German government in France or French oversea territory”. It is a fact that the Gestapo has special lists on which not only Germans living abroad, but also citizens of foreign States unfavourable to the regime are earmarked for “future treatment”—further evidence for Hitler’s plans of conquering the world. For no-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Daily Telegraph*, November 1st, 1940.

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body will believe that the compilation of these lists was mere amusement, or made in case only one of those "on the list" should fall by chance into German hands.—By closing the frontiers the Gestapo saw to it in time, of course, that the Jewish citizens of these countries whose fortunes the Nazis wished to "put in their pockets", as Goering had drastically expressed it, could not escape. In Poland especially where they did not even confine themselves to Jews or political suspects the accompaniment of the troops by the Gestapo was a refined means of securing the plunder of private Polish property without any distinction, as the regular troops, probably, were not prepared for and, at least, not so skilled in this work; nevertheless the troops too must accept the reproach of having tolerated the slaughtering and robbing of the civilian population by the Gestapo. The "politically suspect" citizens of these countries—i.e. all those who were known opposers of the Nazi fifth columns—were scarcely in a better position than the German refugees whom an unhappy fate overtook a second time. There was no difference in favour of the "nordic" Danes and Norwegians, and the "kindred" Dutch escaped the brutalities of the Gestapo as little as the Czechs and Poles did. Even some Dutch army officers were shot by the Gestapo straight away, because they had been present at the previous execution of a Dutch Nazi traitor.

It became evident in 1933 already by the encroachments of the Gestapo what respect of foreign rights of sovereignty you might expect from Germany. The murdering of a well-known German savant who had fled from the Nazis to Prague, the kidnapping by German spies in Switzerland of the writer Jacob—who later, after hypocritical German denials, had to be brought back in consequence of most energetic measures by Switzerland—are a few examples. The same thing happened, but much worse, after the beginning of the war in the then neutral Holland at Venlo. On this occasion already they ventured to shoot a foreign police officer in his own country and to carry away the body. How many cases may have been hushed up, because the respective small States did not risk "provoking" the Nazis by energetic counter-actions! Here in a small way the hypocritical use of force against weaker peoples was foreshadowed which characterizes Germany's later onslaughts on her neighbours.

From the horrible treatment in the concentration camps of such

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prisoners, from whom the Nazis had actually nothing to fear themselves, you could draw your conclusions about the multiplied atrocities which had to be expected when the brutal people felt the ground shaking beneath their feet, when they began to fear for their own security. But all these frightful expectations are surpassed by the facts. No words are sufficient to describe the mass slaughter—far exceeding the Fascist and Bolshevik models—of the whole intelligentsia, especially students and clergy, the gentry, the landed proprietors and others who “possess”—briefly, of all those citizens, especially in Poland, who could be looked on as potential leaders of a future resurrection. The Lord Mayor and hero of Warsaw Stefan Marzynski is reported to be tortured to death in Dachau. Bishop Bursche, the Grand Old Man of the Evangelical Church in Poland, is murdered, as is Maciej Rateij, the former Speaker of the Polish Parliament. For, the actions of the Gestapo are not at all mere brutalities of the Himmler police, but a considered means of a terroristic system of robbery on the one side and a total extirpation of every resistance on the other. The closing of universities and Technical High Schools in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Holland, the sending of professors and students to concentration camps, the suppression of many thousands of books, the alternating persecution and bribing persuasion of journalists in the conquered countries, all these emanations of the Nazi system are springing from the self-sufficient disdain of the natural right to life and of the honour of others with which we have to deal still at another place. They overlook that the subterranean stream of national life and the sacred fury of all those who have not forgotten their honour and liberty cannot be oppressed in the long run and will burst out, one day, with tremendous vigour—and this the earlier and the more dangerously the more largely the German despotism will have expanded.

One point has to be brought into prominence. That is the fact that a whole army of youths belong to this troop of torturers who make murdering a pleasure. These young men are brutalized and rotten to such a degree that in their sadism they are scarcely able to exist without regular satisfaction to their lust for brutality. There are young Germans from all the classes of the population whose mentality makes them capable of such a kind of work. It is difficult to believe under such circumstances that formerly in Germany a hangman was despised and shunned by his fellow-

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countrymen.—To “inure” them, “The Hitler Youth” now is regularly taken through the concentration camps. That is part of the educational methods of the official German youth organization, of which every boy has to be a member till his sixteenth year. The leader of the horde of youths who—of course by orders of the Gestapo—destroyed and plundered the archiepiscopal palace in Vienna was a sixteen-year-old lad. There cannot be any doubt that the mind of the young and the generation growing up in Germany is most brutalized and poisoned.

Still another widely spread error has to be destroyed here. The Gestapo methods are frequently thought not to correspond with Hitler’s will. In fact, however, the details of the worst so-called disciplinary punishments in the concentration camps are thought out and ordered by Hitler himself, and his personal brutality became evident when on June 30, 1934, he did not confine himself to ordering the great slaughter, but participated in it personally. His personal rudeness together with his hypocrisy, his own typical Gestapo mentality, which is bound to be observed everywhere in his policy and which showed itself in details on numerous other occasions, became first clearly evident to the public at the murdering of Dollfuss, and then in his personal order not to take Schuschnigg, who was dangerously ill, to hospital. These characteristic traits of the German leader are essential also for the judgment of the German mass mentality, because both—as we shall learn later on—are varieties of the same spiritual decay, common to the people and their leader. The German people were not horrified by their leader’s personal cruelty, and their sons are serving in the Gestapo and the S.S. Meanness of personal feelings and the typical vindictive sensitiveness of those who are accustomed to disregard the sentiments of others—qualities which we shall have to enquire into more closely in another place, and which form the chief characteristics of a Gestapo-man—became obvious also in Hitler’s personal participation in the persecution of Pastor Niemöller. The imprisonment of this man in the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen was on the direct order of Hitler himself, who declared that he looked on Niemöller as his personal foe—obviously because he sees a personal offence in Niemöller’s refusal to idolize him. All efforts to liberate Niemöller were frustrated by Hitler’s personal resistance. His Gestapo mentality is responsible for the fact that the endeavours of the many



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organizations and all the well-known personalities abroad proved as useless as the intervention of prominent people in Hitler's own entourage, who—not suspect of any religious feelings, but through cold calculation only—would have welcomed an end to be put to this world scandal. Even Hitler's great parade figure, old General Field-Marshal von Mackensen, fell temporarily in disgrace because he caused one of Hitler's hysterical fits of rage by his intercession in favour of Niemoeller.

The men of the Gestapo, the S.A. and S.S. are the direct executors of the Nazi terrorism. They and the "party members" form Hitler's visible guard of picked men. This gang of at least a million completely callous terrorists would certainly be at Hitler's disposal, ready for combat, if a revolt should ever burst out. From the circles of this million come the "bravos" of the numberless foul deeds not made known, the hangmen of the concentration camps, and the murder troops who through "fire and sword", or, in more modern fashion, with rubber truncheons and machine guns have to maintain "peace and order" in the conquered countries and in the German "Hinterland". They also have to perform occasionally as the "fury of the people".

You may draw certain conclusions from such a number of the vilest elements. This million of genuine terrorists form, indeed, the elect troop of Hitler's adherents only. Therefore it would be quite erroneous to believe Germany was "dominated by a small group of terrorists, with whose mentality the German people had in reality nothing in common". In fact many others are not at all opposed to these active Nazis. On the contrary; from the general reaction of the masses to the conditions which, as we have seen, for seven years have prevailed in Germany in religion, culture, and law, you are bound to conclude that the masses do not feel all this as intolerable. The attitude of the masses towards the bestiality of the Nazi terrorists is characteristic of the mentality of the German people of to-day. At the great pogroms in the autumn of 1938 you might indeed notice some disgusted people in the streets. But even the reaction of these few decent ones was confined to a shameful looking away, and those who evidently felt disgusted were much smaller in numbers than the actual plunderers. The majority remained indifferent, and many, occasionally, pocketed something from the property turned out into the streets.

The cruelties of the Gestapo are German cruelties, Gestapo

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mentality is the German mentality of to-day—perhaps in a certain involution. Is there any difference as regards war atrocities? Do you think that it would be possible to induce British soldiers to shell refugee women and children on the roads? The cruel fight against the so-called *franc-tireurs* in the war of 1870-71, then too easily excused, was repeated during the Great War in Belgium—think of Dinant!—and again much too superficially passed over in Germany itself with a shrug of the shoulders and a “c’est la guerre”. What then still were excesses, however serious, were developed into a system of terrorization by the Nazis. The cruelty shown again and again—during the Spanish expedition in the “retaliation” against the open town of Almeria and in the shelling of women and children from low-flying planes in Guernica—was intentionally increased into fantastic tortures of a defenceless population in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The shelling of refugees in Holland, Belgium and France, the deliberate destruction of churches, hospitals, hundreds of small private houses, and many thousands of lives of civilians in the air raids on British towns, the bombing of lifeboats, the war against neutral shipping with magnetic mines, the torpedoing of passenger ships without warning—all these actions showing a mind of terror, brutality, and hypocrisy without restraint, even the typical Gestapo mind, are no more viewed with horror by the masses of the German people. Their mentality is not apathetic only, but deeply poisoned. The worst barbarism is repugnant to the sentiments of a few only. Even these regard with much too great a resignation the crimes committed—whether they happen in war or peace, in foreign countries or in Germany’s concentration camps. A small number only of Germans are clear that this is the intentional consequence of one brutal, general principle. Even if many of the worst events remain unknown to the masses, because they are hushed up or the very opposite is given by lying reports, both the indisputable facts remain, first that many Germans are again and again prepared to commit such outrages, and second that no deep repugnance is felt by the masses, when the truth finally becomes known, whether by reports of eye-witnesses, relatives of soldiers, foreign broadcasts and newspapers or other ways. When still in peace time it was, more or less officially, announced that Germany in “total warfare” would try to break the power of resistance of her enemies

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by fighting the civilians, that did not provoke any opposition among those whose sons and brothers have exhibited in Poland, Holland, Belgium, and France the corresponding spirit of terrorism only too clearly.

Gestapo mentality! In the masses of the German people any feeling and any power of resistance against such a barbarism must be extinct and their comprehension of right and morals must be absolutely broken. But every feeling also for their own right to liberty must have vanished in the gloomy and depressed atmosphere of the Gestapo. No force on earth would be able to prevent an internally sound people from destroying the whole cruel and hypocritical Nazi nightmare, and—in Schiller's words—to fetch its eternal rights, the rights of man, even from Heaven—if they only felt the need.

## Chapter 12

# Economic Morals—Corruption and Nepotism

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The merchant class was never distinguished or important in Germany. Officials and big landowners were always the leading classes. They, together with the army officers, enjoyed the highest reputation in the State for centuries, and—however strongly capitalistic the economic system was organized—they looked with a certain disdain on the “shopkeeper”. It is indisputable that the general position of a German merchant, apart from some exceptions especially in German seaports, never reached the full economic and social height as in the other commercial countries of Western Europe; this in spite of the immense commercial rise in Germany after the war of 1870-71, in spite of the acquisition of colonies and a considerable overseas trade, in spite also of the creation of a great merchant marine. Something of the mushroom development was still attached to a German merchant. There was a certain inferiority complex on the one hand, a cast of the parvenu and snobbishness on the other. That showed itself in a significant narrow-mindedness, together with methods of elbowing and tactics of the jackboot in foreign trade. A body of great merchants with world-wide connections, settled for generations, conscious of their old traditions, and with genuine enterprising spirit was represented in Germany by a few families only. Even those who “got on in the world” were not fully accepted in the German ruling classes. That became obvious in the time of Wilhelm II by certain jokes about the social manners of the minister for trade, Moeller. It was the first time that a former manufacturer became a minister. He was not even an “officer in the reserve” when he was appointed, and we have reported in another place

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already that—in his sixtieth year—he regarded the promotion to the rank of second lieutenant in the reserve as a genuine social distinction.—The lack of social respect has certainly contributed to the fact that German merchants felt it was not necessary to be better than their reputation. Actually business morals in Germany were not exceptionally high ones.

Even their respect for a given promise was never very high among German merchants—apart from a few prominent ones, who had personally learnt world and commercial ethics abroad. The author remembers that long before the Hitler period a Berlin banker, famous for his scepticism, told him with a smile in a restaurant about a gentleman with a strong Saxon dialect sitting at a neighbouring table. He had made this man's rather important enterprise into a company a short time before, all the deeds were signed, even the usual lunch had taken place. Then a cable arrived at the bank saying: "Impossible to form company." On the astonished enquiry about the reasons came the answer they had considered it again; it was the custom in Saxony that they might "repent" and change their minds in the first three days. The speculation that the banker was reluctant to take proceedings was successful. He even paid the not inconsiderable costs of the formation of the company, pointing out that this new experience was worth the expense. His father had already refused ever to do any business with Saxons, as much too often they were shufflers.—This manufacturer was no very rare exception, and his mentality was not confined to highly industrialized Saxony. Among the business men readers of this book there will be some, probably, who have had similar experiences with the opportunist tendencies of German merchants.

The Great War and the Inflation had advanced many suspicious characters and considerably loosened commercial ethics in Germany. In the inflation period especially a terrific low level of morals and an egoistic mind of boundless, evil rapacity had developed in the leading circles of commerce, and above all among the big manufacturers. The same short-sighted egoism seduced a number of "prominent" merchants and industrialists—as Kirdorf, Mannesmann, Baron Schroeder at Cologne, Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach, Thyssen, and many others, from whom for ethical reasons a strong disinclination to Nazidom might have been expected—to fix their eyes on Hitler, whose "move" they

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considered a "bulwark" against Communism. They did not even cease to admire when, by the robbery of Jewish property, the strange Nazi conceptions of "respect" for private property became clearly evident. Their mentality allowed them to "attach" occasionally to their own companies something of the booty, and the robust mind of these gentlemen was not at all hurt either by Hitler's economic measures for interfering with the property of other "enemies of the people" or of "unreliable persons," at home as well as in the countries conquered by Germany. Still less were they touched by the total enslavement of the subjugated peoples and the Jews. They felt—at least till not long ago—they were far above similar things happening to them themselves, and this mentality of the "captains of industry" is significant of the economic and moral ethics in the so-called leading circles in Germany. Seven years of Nazi domination have brought about by degrees an inexplicable moral disaster in the German merchant class. The "purges" by the Nazis have removed many brains and much energy of value from the business class, and of the remainder the morally and spiritually best have retired from business, some disgusted, some prudently foreseeing the fate to which Hitler is leading German economy. The greater part of the crafty German business men of to-day consists of those who have profited by the Nazi system, who have come into business and property by means of blackmail and bribery.

Many have come from the same *milieu* as Hitler's gang chiefs. Most of these were originally derailed oddities as he himself. Others were, before the beginning of their magnificent new careers, even real criminals. They would have incurred the punishment of death or penal servitude according to the various paragraphs of the penal code. If they are brought to trial after the fall of the Hitler regime, a real justice will prove that actually from the beginning a typical gang joined with the clearly expressed object of plundering Germany. We must pause for a moment at these gentlemen, because their development and their "business ethics" are examples of the mentality which dominates the whole of Nazi economy.

Seeing that these people who owned nothing but debts, who—as for instance Goering with his tavern scores—could not pay the smallest sums and therefore were distrained on, have now heaped up immense fortunes and—apart from the colossal sums, the castles, and manors inside Germany—have smuggled enormous

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riches into foreign countries, you scarcely need to ask how this booty was acquired. It cannot come from their salaries which did not even suffice to cover the ordinary luxuries. The salaries of seven years together do not make one-tenth of what each has smuggled abroad. No, their fortunes undoubtedly come from bribes, embezzlements, sums blackmailed from those who have been imprisoned and liquidated since 1933. While we have endeavoured to explain the various methods of expropriation, so informative for the Nazi German "ingenuity", it must be left to the imagination of the reader how much of the blood money went to the State and the party and how much must have trickled into the capacious pockets of the robbers themselves. It doesn't look like an accident, for instance, if Goebbels—among many other things—owns a former Jewish residence at Schwanenwerder near Berlin, Ribbentrop a wonderful castle near Salzburg, which was formerly the property of one of those who died in a concentration camp, and Baldur von Schirach a famous manor near Vienna. Nobody even denies that the most brutal, bloody Jew-baiter Streicher has earned his millions through frauds from the "Jew contribution", and the *naïveté* is rather enlightening with which Goering not long before the beginning of the war showed his castle fitted out with extravagant luxury to a prominent visitor, asking literally: "Hasn't it been worth while?"

These great models naturally found innumerable not less shameful imitators of all grades. Every "wholesale delinquent", naturally, needed numerous helpers—and these again their assistant helpers—for the carrying through of their enterprises. It is a matter of fact that everyone of these knew how to utilize his "knowledge", in order to feather his own nest. We must forgo proving by special examples the ragamuffin mentality of these medium bosses of Nazism. Only one case may be mentioned in view of the grotesque curiosity of the corruption which becomes evident here. It is that of the mother of the Nazi "police president" of Berlin, Count Helldorf, whose speciality it was to take as much money as possible from Jews imprisoned under the aegis of her son, or from their relatives, for "intervening" in the interests of these "clients"!

The money of the Nazi bosses had not only to be gained; it had also to be smuggled out of Germany. It had to be "protected" against depreciation and was to be used, simultaneously, as a reserve

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for "certain possible cases". In this precaution against the time when, perhaps, one day the splendour would vanish the whole cynicism of the gang becomes obvious. They wanted to live like lords and to play the great statesman as long as possible at the costs of the Germans whom—as their master himself has pointed out—they thought stupid enough, and then withdraw with their booty. They could not shout enough, if a maltreated Jew saved a fraction of his property and brought it to a foreign country, and this fury was, probably, even genuine, because they felt personally damaged by the fact that the man had secured for himself what they had intended to rob him of. For themselves, naturally, the statute that everybody was liable to the death penalty who smuggled any valuables out of Germany was not applicable, although it was decreed by them. Still, after the beginning of the war Goering and Goebbels succeeded in buying enormous values of jewellery and furs in London through neutral agents, and in hiding these investments in Italy. It looks like a robber story when you observe the incredible impudence with which this organization for the plundering of Germany and for the smuggling out of the booty met together. The crimes committed by these gangsters are not at all confined to attacks against the property of others, including robbery, fraud, blackmail, and common theft. Murder was the most usual and most simple instrument, not only for their enrichment and for the satisfaction of their private revenge but, above all, to silence anybody who perhaps might become dangerous. There was murder on a grand style against adversaries and former friends—camouflaged as suicide, accident, or "purge". These people reek of blood.

Not till you have reluctantly come to the conviction that a real gangster organization of such gigantic style was, in fact, possible in the twentieth century, will you fully understand the actual meaning of the phrase so often repeated in Hitler's surroundings, that he and his men are "kept together by an iron band, like conspirators sworn for life and death". You cannot even call it a "political" conspiracy. At least for many of these conspirators politics were the instrument only for a magnificent robbery of Germany. You do not say too much by expressing your conviction that the striving for political power of most of the men round Hitler had little to do with patriotism, but was only a means for obtaining money and position. These gentlemen have proved and



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will prove again and again that they are capable of any crime, in order to keep themselves in power, and that it is totally irrelevant for them, whether Nazism or Bolshevism is at the helm in Germany, if only the power guaranteeing their personal luxuries remains in their own hands. The origin of the world disaster was in fact an enormous, criminal harlequinade, the players of which have developed by degrees into horsemen of the apocalypse.

If you can say about the accomplices without any scruples that they conspired consciously and deliberately to strip Germany, and that it was for this purpose that they made Hitler the leader of their gang, as to himself—with whose personality and fascinating effect upon the masses we will have to deal still more in detail in another place—it is certain, at least, that the acquisition of his immense personal fortune, estimated now at £2,000,000, was a not unwelcome accessory result when he took over the leadership. For seven years not only every party member, but all the members of the innumerable sub-organizations—that is, almost without exception all Germans in the Third Reich itself and abroad—are obliged to possess the “Hitler Bible”. At all weddings young married couples receive from the magistrate a copy of the book, and you won’t be wrong, if you suppose there is more than one copy of *Mein Kampf* now in every family in Germany. It is undoubtedly magnificent business, if you can force a people of eighty millions to buy your book which is not even cheap, and it becomes still better, if you can force the State itself to buy the book, in order to give it to its citizens. If you look at it from a mere business standpoint, it is a stroke of genius to make, by a policy of force and menaces, even the whole external world acquire this book, because they want to know what sort of man he is, and what kind of ideas have brought Germany to such a state of excitement. It is almost as good business, if you, as the leader of a State, can force not only all the authorities and associations but also every individual official and all the members of many immense organizations to subscribe to a newspaper which you are publishing and for which you are securing in the same way an enormous advertisement business. The promotion of such monopolies and the connection of politics and business has always been a profitable thing; only—at least in degenerated democratic States—they did not think it corresponded with morals. You see here again the whole democratic narrow-mindedness! Neverthe-

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less, you might also say that the method of a "chief", getting millions of Reichsmarks from his people, and then boasting that he forgoes the ridiculous salary of Chancellor, is scarcely less contemptible than the robberies of his accomplices.

Hitler's way of "investing" his money in works of art not liable to depreciation is, indeed, as refined a "flight from the mark" as the currency smuggling of his gangsters. For you have to look at this action from the standpoint of a "leader" who cannot get in his own bad books and who is therefore—short-sightedly—of the opinion that he need not, like his ministers, prepare a sudden flight, but that he "only" has to protect himself against the consequences of the inflation inaugurated by himself. Incidentally, you do not even know whether he has not also secured money for himself abroad through his publisher, "Franz Eher Verlag" who managed the sale of his works in foreign countries. Why should you suppose that financially the hands of this man who has heaped up such immense blood guilt are cleaner than those of his fellows? In this case one may think indeed—in Hitler's own vice-versa manner—"Like man, like master"!

Certainly the proverb itself is adequate here. The example from above had an especially strong effect on those below!—The German people believe, indeed, strongly in Hitler's personal unselfishness. Strangely enough, they are convinced also—although they think him not only almighty, but omniscient too—that he knows nothing about the immense corruption in his surroundings. The bribery itself, however, and the fact that it reaches to the immediate proximity of Hitler, is well known in the widest circles in Germany. For long it has been notorious that with the party officers nothing can be achieved without money, but that you can get literally all you want through bribery, and—although one did not know certain figures—the immense currency smuggle of the prominent Nazi people was a "public secret" in Germany long before Knickerbocker's publications. But—paradoxical it may seem—there are too many participants and co-prophiters in the corruption for this general knowledge to become too dangerous. Everyone who knows something is bound to be silent, because either he is not clean himself, or—the other is too powerful. Again the masses which, though without certain knowledge, had, at least partly, the feeling of being led by more or less suspected gentlemen remained indolent. So long as they received their wages, they

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"understood" that he who has the holy water sprinkler crosses himself first.

In all the economic organizations of the Third Reich all the well-paid posts were given in 1933, at once, to party bosses or their cousins, even if—apart from their political reliability—they had no other qualifications for their new positions. Here also one single example will suffice: Goebbels' brother, till then a completely unknown small employee of an insurance company somewhere in the country, was, at once, appointed to the general managership of all the German public fire insurance companies. Nepotism and bribery are inseparable indeed.

It was the same thing in private business. All the greater enterprises felt bound to "adapt" themselves by making their management congenial to the Nazi move. They called that "Gleichschaltung." All those politically not reliable, or Jewish, or "Jewish related" directors, managers, and employees had to be replaced, as we have learnt, by workless, hungry party members who immediately after the revolution energetically demanded their reward in hard cash and could no longer be put off with mere distinctions and most beautiful but unpaid promotions in the party organization. The business concerns hardly opposed them. Some of the companies imagined also that by taking on a few Nazi directors whom they thought they would soon "educate" they could get rid of many disagreeable social achievements of the "Republic of Weimar" as soon as possible, especially from the uncomfortable control of the "workmen's and employees' councils" and the hated trade unions, and become again "masters in their own houses". For this purpose it was almost worth while removing a co-director and proving thereby one's views according to regulations. What actually happened was: They received in exchange for the former approved colleagues party bosses, who had not only to be highly paid but usually understood nothing, although they were very arrogant, and soon proved who was henceforth really master in the house. These gentlemen owned one unique quality, however: They had adequate "connections". If anything in the business "properly would not do", the Nazi director, by his underground connections with the proper quarters, knew how to manage it so that it came right. That was an advantage beyond price which sometimes even brought it about that a general manager worked so well together with his new Nazi colleague that

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a first-class company of corruption came into existence by degrees. You cannot believe how quickly, indeed, bad company destroys good habits.

Too frequently, nevertheless, it became obvious soon after the "adaptation" that the new colleague from Hitler's adventurer followers, apart from his inability, had most evil commercial methods. He made excessive claims, referring to his high position in the "party", demanded cash advances, in order to pay old debts, and frequently one learnt too late that this gentleman, so highly recommended by a party organization, was in fact insolvent and had a business "reputation" as penetrating as the thunder in the German song, *The Watch on the Rhine*. Then, however, it was not so easy to get rid of these sinister companions. They were intimates of the party bosses and referred to the fact that most of these had formerly had similar "small mishaps", and that all that had happened before the Nazi revolution had to be looked on as a consequence only of the "disgraceful conditions of the old system". If you succeeded at all in dropping such a gentleman, it proved, at least, an extremely costly matter. You could congratulate yourself, if the man did not turn the tables, and by means of a deliberately invented charge turned the former manager out and made himself head of the firm.

If you could not get rid of him, the new lazy sponger who assumed an air of immense importance had to be well provided for in order to keep him in good humour. After a short time the former owner who was not able to put up any longer with the situation having lost the necessary "confidence" in the future development of the enterprise, "decided voluntarily for the sake of his health" to retire and to leave the business to the newcomer, even if this gentleman possessed neither money nor brains. The principal condition in such cases was, naturally, that the enterprise—that is the Nazi newcomer—should not be "deprived of capital", and thus the retiring possessor, in view of the "good connections" of his successor and under the appropriate pressure, "decided voluntarily" to leave his money in the business. Sometimes an especially "clever" former possessor succeeded also, it is true, in getting paid in cash. Then a public or private bank, dependent on the party, advanced, in opposition to every generally recognized financial principle, the necessary capital to the new man, because he was a "reliable party member". It did not matter that this

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was strictly opposed to the party slogan of "breaking the slavery of interest on capital". On the other hand, the infraction of the dogma "safety first" was of no importance either. The new bank leaders were mostly inexperienced, often also quite unqualified protégés, brought themselves into their positions through nepotism and political pressure, who sometimes did not even know, certainly however did not follow approved economic theories, but acted according to the wisdom of the new economic Nazi "mis"-leaders. In many cases, moreover, most profitable private transactions could be "combined". The banks advanced the necessary money to the "well-deserving party member" who wished to take over a business, the former owner was paid in cash, and, sometimes, he felt so happy because of that, that—the bank manager could get his share. Cases are said to have been not rare in which the differences of opinion between a former manufacturer who could not adapt himself to the "modern Nazi economic principles"—because he still possessed some capital which he did not want to lose—and the newcomer who took over the business, in order to carry it on "in the new spirit", were solved in this way, to the full satisfaction of all parties! It was still much simpler, naturally, if only a Jew had to be "got rid of". This man was then first "prepared in an adequate manner" for the following attack. The Nazi aspirants had developed by degrees a whole system for this kind of "war of nerves", and you can renew here your observation that most of the Nazi methods in all districts are very similar. No wonder, as they all are based on the same principles and springing from the same mentality. Beginning with the cutting off of raw materials, the exclusion from all public commissions was following, then a total boycotting, then appointing a public trustee; and the system was screwed up eventually to arson, imprisonment, and even homicide in 1938. Since the end of 1938 the last-named has been the usual method, and no "fuss" is made any longer! But till 1937 it had not yet come to that, and they applied the less open but not less effective methods, if—as the "public trustee of labour in Berlin" expressed himself—"a business had to be rescued from a Jew". Even in these cases quite nice business transactions with the bank manager concerned were the order of the day, done according to the Nazi watchword, "self-interest comes before common interest"—pardon, the other way round naturally!—Exactly the same methods

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in exactly the same spirit are now applied against the unhappy Poles. The Chief Press Officer of the "General Government" Hr. Zarske,<sup>1</sup> explained in the autumn of 1940 that the Germans, formerly not accustomed to act as leaders among foreign peoples, would show in Poland their ability to lead the "protected" nation (Schutzbefohlene) in the interest of their German masters. Indeed, both the German officials and the new economic leaders imported from Germany are taking full advantage from their new powerful positions. Whilst a great part of the officials, especially of the Gestapo, take bribes and are blackmailing and embezzling, the Polish factories are plundered under their German "trustees". Many of them are typical parasites misusing their positions first to feather their nests, then, either killing by official chicanes a Polish factory the disappearance of which is "desirable" in the interest of a well-paying German competitor, or helping a friend, if not themselves, to the business of a tortured Polish owner who is "happy" to sell it for a song.—In fact, it is indisputable that the corruption of the enormous number of Nazi adventurers, who give themselves airs in Germany today and dominate the whole economic life of the Third Reich since 1933 have reduced the economic ethics to a niveau much deeper than the lowest level of the inflation period.

Unfortunately we are bound to confirm that the monstrous swindle, to which, as we will learn, even the German Imperial Bank had lent itself—and this still in the midst of so-called peace—in order to deceive the world and its own fellow countrymen about the actual economic situation of Germany, forms a similar inglorious model as the principles of the other "highest offices" and of their representatives. Irregularities of the official issuing bank, as we shall have to discuss in the following chapter, cannot simply be excused by the "hard pressure of the Nazis". That would mean nothing else than an attempt to excuse oneself by one's own cowardice. No high bank official ought to submit and remain in office, if anything is expected from him incompatible with business ethics. Even the claim that it is "a national duty" is no genuine excuse, and it is known that, at least, one leading official of the German Imperial Bank—his name was Brinkmann

<sup>1</sup> The father of this man, living at Danzig, still preferred the Polish final syllable Ki—another small contribution to the German mentality (cf. Chap. 14, page 172).

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—broke down under the pressure of an intolerable responsibility. Other leading men of the Imperial Bank who, probably, still think their own mentality is of the highest standard and that they are able to serve as models, evidently did not even feel the real moral meaning of their own actions. Again, it was not even the deceitful methods of publication alone, intended to mislead the public about Germany's financial position "in the interests of the fatherland"; in many cases the Imperial Bank and its annex, the "Golddiskontbank", have, misusing their powers, also extorted so-called "settlement payments" without any legal foundation—above all, naturally, from Jewish enterprises and emigrants.—How must the business ethics of German merchants in less high positions react to such models? You felt a foretaste by the behaviour of some German export merchants who—under pressure of the German government—did not shrink from lying assertions to foreign authorities, in order to make exports by dumping methods possible at any price. Simultaneously they used, however, the unique opportunity to cheat the Nazi government itself out of a part of the dumping allowances and, by concealing the actual proceeds, succeeded eventually in smuggling foreign currency. Three birds with one stone! For you must not believe that the new German "noiseless merchants" had any scruples about swindling their own Nazi State.

If after the war the question of a reconstruction of German economy with international help arises, it will—apart from the immense practical difficulties—become a nearly insoluble task to find the necessary men in the deeply contaminated German business class deserving the indispensable confidence, which has to be the foundation of all honest trade, especially between nations.

## Chapter 13

# The Destruction of the Economic System

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Hitler had promised the economic resurrection of Germany. Abundance of laurels were given in advance to him by a fanatical population and—oddly enough—even many naïve observers from abroad, looking at the surface only, thought they saw an “economic strengthening” of Germany which did not in fact exist. Certainly there were no more strikes, and no political demonstrations of those of other opinions disturbed any longer the “National unity”—because the trade unions and all the non-Nazi political organizations were smashed and trampled, and an iron fist suppressed every movement for freedom. There was no longer any Press warfare—because the Press was muzzled. The number of workless fell rapidly.—No wonder, if you turn millions of men into soldiers, if you create hundreds of thousands of jobs by expelling a corresponding number of “foes of the people”, Jews and “friends of Jews” from their jobs, not including the dismissed in the statistics of workless, and if you get further millions into work simply by occupying them with the construction of strategic roads and arms. In reality the whole “resurrection” of the economy consisted of unproductive expenditure only, all based on the creation of the newly formed enormous army. The “labour service” was nothing else, indeed, but part of the army. Its work in agriculture was insignificant, and the motor-car roads they built were mostly for military purposes. They erected immense arms and munition fabrics—even the famous factory for producing the “people’s car” at Fallersleben was nothing else. They constructed, partly openly partly secretly, a new navy—the new ships of the “strength through joy” organization also belonged to it. But it seems they



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completely forgot that all this had to be paid for by a people which possessed neither gold nor foreign currency, which not long before had applied for a moratorium, and which, even in the case of a strongly self-contained economy, could not avoid importing large quantities of raw materials from foreign countries for which they had to pay in foreign currency. They forgot that the war machine had not only to be created but also to be maintained, repaired, modernized, and refuelled for the most part with imported fuel. They forgot, above all, that other States also—probably even earlier—had chanced to think of the German solution of the problem of unemployment, a pressing problem for them too, if there had been such a simple solution. But—perhaps again—they did not just forget all that! Perhaps—in the *Kampf* you can find something about it—in the brain of this fanatic it was clear from the beginning that the German economy could not bear this burden for long. Perhaps he undertook, nevertheless, to screw up the armaments of Germany to such a height as to allow him to smash to pieces the neighbouring States, Europe, and the world, and then to confiscate all he wanted. Here indeed the mystery may be found!

With their own “dynamic force” the army was the first to increase. Every increase at one place demanded, at once, new increases at another. Every augmentation of troops brought with it new demands for special troops, new barracks, new armaments and munition factories, enormous expenses in geometrical progression for new war machines, planes, aerodromes, men-of-war, harbours, dockyards, motor roads, military railways, and enormous fortifications on all frontiers. Again the question arises: Was it lack of any foresight about the economic consequences which must follow this burdening a country with immense unproductive expenses? Or was it in fact total indifference towards an unavoidable undermining of the German economic position, because—in spite of all hypocritical, peaceful assertions—they were prepared from the very beginning to acquire, immediately their rearmament was complete, all that they coveted from the “have States” by onslaught and war? If you consider that Hitler and his gang themselves had been “have nots” and how successfully they came to power by the same methods of robbing and hypocrisy, the conviction grows stronger and stronger that *a priori* the new army was created as an instrument for burglary, and that they accepted in

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their cold calculations that the country had to be economically ruined first, in order to strengthen it for the onslaught against the world, whose rich booty they were seeking. But even if you should do too much honour to Hitler by supposing that he had planned all that with terrible clearness since 1933—in any case it developed actually with iron consequence through his methods and the mentality on which they rested.

In order to save the foreign currency getting more and more scanty, and to make Germany “independent of abroad”, first agriculture was ordered to grow textile plants and strongly to intensify its whole production. They began working again mines formerly abandoned as of too poor quality, and they built for their exploitation enormous new factories in the remotest places of production, new transport facilities for which had first to be created. Immense new industrial works with newly designed machines were erected for the production of textile substitutes of artificial rubber, and benzine. They did not want to be reminded of the fact that all these enormous investments were bound to get useless on the very day, when Germany became a member again of the system of world economy, as then at once the whole production of not sufficiently good substitutes must prove an enormous economic mistake. This whole, apparent craze of autarchy, however, gets quite another aspect, if you accept our opinion, that the Germans did not at all believe themselves economically able to carry through their plans for long duration, but that it was their sole purpose to make themselves immensely strong and economically independent of other countries for their “Blitzkrieg”, in order then to bring home the booty. If you look at matters from this point of view, you will at once understand why all the proposals of the U.S.A. and Great Britain for removing Germany’s difficulties by making world markets more accessible, if only Germany would agree to a reasonable policy of disarmament and general renunciation of autarchy, were coolly declined. The Nazis did not want “economic alleviations” and an agreement; their aim was robbery, and whilst—as the experiences in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium and France have shown—they wanted themselves to enslave other peoples and to make them work for their German masters, they hypocritically reproached Great Britain with its “imperialism”.

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The consequences of the vicious economy soon became visible. Lack of labour was the first. This result was only too obvious, if you had to waste immense quantities of human labour for the building of all the new factories of substitutes and for equipping them with new machines which themselves had to be built first for the purpose. Briefly, in an immense vicious circle an enormous expenditure of labour and materials was wasted for the achievement of a rather small output, and this moreover of substitutes, the usefulness of which was itself doubtful. All this again after they had skimmed in advance already the best labour by the creation of an enormous new army and all the gigantic undertakings working for its requirements. The new Nazi method had, indeed, abolished unemployment and succeeded in turning round of the wheels more and more quickly, but at the same time it had brought increasing disorder to the whole of German economy. Now the working hours were increased to sixty a week. Now suddenly women and even children of twelve were brought in to work. The "Stachanow system" and all that they had stigmatized in 1933 as "criminal spoliation and destruction of the people's health", and what ought to be put up with now, temporarily, in the British commonwealth as a bitter consequence of the war, was restamped in 1938-39—in peace-time!—suddenly into a sign "of the resurrection of German economy"!

Germany's whole financial and economic position is shaken for long on its foundations. Some hitherto less known economic events may make it plain even to an economic layman on what a basis of falsehood and deceit public and private economies are resting. These events afford, simultaneously, a further interesting insight into the mentality of the pirates, who are now the leaders of the German business class.

At a private bank in Berlin it was remarked in the summer of 1938—it is no mistake, it is yet 1938—two bank-notes each of the same value bore the same number. Thinking there was forgery, they submitted them to the Imperial Bank, which at once declared both notes to be genuine. There was boundless astonishment—until they decided eventually to believe that the actual circulation of bank-notes must be above even the officially admitted fantastical amount, and that by a curious play with the numbers they apparently wanted to render certain observations more difficult. If that is right—and the business methods of the Imperial Bank as

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described later make that most probable—all the other evil financial tricks recede into the background, as for instance the paying of supplies to the State by so-called "Steuergutcheine" (certificates, which can be used only for the payment of certain taxes and not earlier than after some years). It is obviously lost labour to discuss at all "official German figures", if you cannot trust on principle the method of publicity of the German financial apparatus. Nevertheless even the official figures disclosed an indebtedness of the Third Reich at the end of the first year of the war of 62,800,000,000 marks and a monthly increase of 3,600,000,000 m. Even these figures, however not disclosing by far the greater part of the short-term indebtedness, since Nazi rule began, show that German war finance is developing along the same course as in the war 1914-1918. Actually—according to the estimate of competent neutral experts—Germany's indebtedness was increased during the first year of the war from 11,700,000,000 m. to, at least, 120,000,000,000 m. The Reichsmark note issue—not covered any more by gold or foreign exchange—increased "officially" from 3.5 milliards to 14 milliards at the end of December 1940. In fact, however, even if the figures themselves were genuine, the real legal tender circulation is much greater, as the issue of coins and so-called Rentenmarks is not disclosed.—But you are not at all restricted to mere figures for the judgment of the German conduct of finance. The Nazi German financial methods in peacetime already have been so monstrous that every business man, who did similar things, would be sure of penal servitude for many years. One strangely little known, example of this most ingenious art of "peacetime" finance is the following. It may stir up a reader's own meditation about Germany's financial manipulations in wartime.

When the necessary means for the incessantly growing armament expenses became scantier and scantier, the German authorities forced the manufacturers to accept payments in the form of bills of exchange. This was naturally not in ordinary commercial bills signed by the War Office, which could be discounted at the banks and then through rediscount could find their way back to the Imperial Bank. There they would have reappeared, increasing still more the immense, in no way justified, credit to the Reich. Therefore it must be prevented under all circumstances from becoming known that a new enormous credit was to be

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granted through the Imperial Bank. So they hit upon the following "small shuffling": The German Reich "founded" with the help of some dummy company—the so-called "Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft (company for the research in metals)—MEFO. This company accepted the bills of exchange which the army contractors had to draw for their deliveries. "For the sake of simplicity" the contractors had to hand over to the MEFO at once twelve to eighteen drafts for renewing. The MEFO then returned to the supplier the first draft duly accepted, the contractor discounted it at his bank and so received cash. You see that the Imperial Bank had to finance the business, in spite of everything, and, moreover, that it had to renew the credit twelve to eighteen times. Who else in Germany could have to raise the enormous sum in question? But now—by the "acceptance" by the MEFO—the credit to the Reich had changed suddenly into normal "commercial bills", so that the Imperial Bank, as the bills were handed over with the endorsement of another bank, was not exposed to any uncomfortable questions by the foreign members of its board, then not yet got rid of, and had not to disclose this new uncovered advance to the Government. It was a terrible swindle! Not only were these so-called "three months' bills of exchange" running in fact three to five years, not only were they not at all commercial bills but advances for armaments to the State, not only was the company for research in metals (MEFO)—note the intention to swindle, in the name!—receiving credit, when it ought not to according to good mercantile principles—no, there is something still better! Among the manufacturers paid by these bills—and that happened likewise to great and small contractors—there were some who had headaches, when they received payment for their deliveries to the State in bills of an unknown company which, moreover, they had to issue and endorse themselves, and, at the same time, hand over to the MEFO many renewal drafts, so that they became engaged in draft liabilities to the extent of eighteen times their supplies. As furthermore it was a matter of periodic supplies, any small manufacturer eventually had to sign bills for over millions of Reichsmarks! Then, in order to ease their minds, a printed note was issued, in which you could read that nobody who had signed a "MEFO bill of exchange" would be made responsible for it! This note—prudently signed by nobody, but

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nevertheless officially distributed by the Imperial Bank!—served, simultaneously, to dispel the scruples of the bankers in endorsing and delivering to the Imperial Bank the MEFO bills of exchange which they received from their customers.—These were indeed very good “mercantile bills, running no longer than three months and with three good signatures,” whilst, in fact, nobody was liable for this unique kind of “cover” for the German currency, except the ominous MEFO!

At the end of 1938 came a sign, which made it plain to every expert on Germany's economic conditions that now either breakdown or war was definitely imminent. That was the resignation of Dr. Schacht. It was obvious that, when this turn-coat who had been able to serve not only first democratic and conservative governments and, eventually, the Nazis, but even to become successively a member of these various, political parties, this man who, with admirable routine, till the last moment had done everything conceivable to provide the necessary means for “the Nazi enterprise Germany”, walked out, any common sense in German economy must have ceased to exist. He knew Germany's economic situation, if anyone did. If even the methods of this most versatile virtuoso of finance were drawing to an end, his silent departure, without fate overtaking him—which everyone had supposed to be the case—was, perhaps, his masterpiece. He walked out so elegantly, that he even received a “special commission” which made it possible for him to leave Germany temporarily with the small condition, it is true, that his family remained in the country. Those who knew things and men in Germany were aware at Schacht's departure, that all possibility of exploiting ruthlessly anything of value must now be exhausted. Schacht had skimmed the national wealth again and again and every time more recklessly. He had gone to the last limits of reason in his efforts—reducing imports to the utmost and screwing up exports with a system of cleverly thought-out premiums and all kinds of dumping—to bring about, at least temporarily, a balance of Germany's international receipts and expenditure, until an understanding with the foreign Powers for which he was hoping would be achieved. He had not been scrupulous in his means indeed. Even for the robbery of the Jews, so highly symptomatic as an infringement upon private property, he had still lent a hand. But Schacht knew well the limit which

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he—at least then—did not want to exceed, because he was aware that on the other side no halt could be made. He resigned when Hitler in 1939 began his immense fortifications and his enormous new air and naval programmes, and when it became indubitably plain that henceforth one nail would drive out another, that in fact only the long-planned robberies against other states could help to keep the machinery in motion. The financial *Kampf* had developed into a *Krampf* (convulsion).

The effect of such conduct of finance and economy which had lost any restraint after Schacht's departure became clearly evident before the beginning of the war already. By getting rid of the last foreign members of the administration—another encroachment incidentally, which was suffered silently by the foreign Powers—the last possibilities of actual control from abroad of German public economy were abolished. In the meantime it was ordered by a new "decree", that gold and foreign exchange were no longer cover for German currency. Further financial "laws" were created—without much fuss—empowering the government to "pay" its liabilities by issuing treasury bills to the contractors to an unrestricted amount which, although not included in the official statements, became a new kind of legal tender. The deposits at savings banks and the reserves of the insurance companies were held for public objects, and, eventually, the minister of economy was empowered, without any restrictions, to "make all transactions to his liking which seemed to him useful in the interest of the State!"—Is any further "proof" required after all these follies, that it is not a question of "the beginning of an inflation" in Germany, but that that movement is in full swing indeed?

The "well informed" in Germany had drawn before the war already adequate conclusions from their observations and feathered new nests abroad. They were not all so clumsy as Goebbels whose Suez Canal shares were—temporarily—trapped by the French, and many may have sent their stolen "property" as far as Japan. "It is not the first time" begins a well-known German song, and the first inflation, as you have learned, had suited the "captains of industry" too well. Those who know the mentality of the German economic rulers and their ethics, can scarcely be astonished about the naïve impudence with which they risk the same successful swindle for a second time, so much the more it can be

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carried through now partially at the expense of the conquered countries. Apart from this, these countries are offering new first-class opportunities for Nazi bosses and other "experts" of highly lucrative currency shuffles.

A new theory was invented by Hitler together with Schacht's successor Funck who, incidentally, had proved his ability as a minister for economy less by his former journalistic activities than by his personal, important contribution to the increase in beer consumption! This discovery—that not gold but the people's capacity for work had to form the real cover of the national currency—is in the best case a misleading platitude, as the whole world economy continues to regard gold as the instrument for balancing international obligations. The more this new slogan was futile, as even an approximative "autarchy" was impossible for Germany. Hitler himself explained, eventually, bombastic as ever, that Germany had "either to export or to die", when he became aware—what every expert had known long before—that it was impossible to make both ends meet, when they continually wasted enormous quantities of imported raw materials and a great part of German labour for armament. But the foreign currency obtained by the export of the only raw material which Germany can export in fairly large quantities, i.e. coal, was not at all sufficient. The export of machinery which alone is still of any importance became more and more difficult, as complaints were growing about deficiencies of material—resulting from the use of substitutes—about defective manufacture and retardation of deliveries, the reason for which was a too intense exploitation and the resulting growing weariness of not sufficiently fed German workmen. The more the need of foreign currency was growing the more violently they dragooned by all kinds of political pressure the small States to accept, in spite of their reluctance, exports from Germany which they did not want—their requirements of musical instruments and aspirin being met already. The German negotiators pressed the smaller States to conclude "modern barter agreements," which indeed meant an enforced reintroduction of the primitive trading methods of past centuries. The States of South-Eastern Europe had to yield, moreover, to make their own deliveries in advance against the uncertain promise of counter deliveries. They were seeing angrily Germany's amount of debts grow, in spite of feeling the worth-



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lessness of these. Gradually, and the more since the new war started, this became a real tribute by which the small States could buy day by day "the permission to remain neutral". Longing for the defeat of the German tyrant in the innermost recesses of their hearts, the dilemma will become for them more and more pressing, as to whether they will allow themselves definitely to be drawn by this "one-way traffic" into Germany's economic catastrophe, simultaneously hoped for and feared in view of a dangerous financial loss. It is true Germany's debts were diminished temporarily by additional deliveries of arms by Hitler from his war booty. It must produce curious feelings, however, in these countries to be paid with the instruments of defence robbed from other States which were not long before in the same position; besides the fact, that it may have been not very pleasant to procure armaments from one's own potential aggressor who not only knows the construction of the weapons but, probably, does not even deliver the most modern and effective defence materials to a future foe. Knowing the mentality of Hitler and the Germans, the small States can scarcely have delusions that only opportunist considerations will decide, whether and how long Germany prefers the tributes, or to eat up the countries paying them.

Things are even worse in the conquered countries. Pressed—even in Western Europe—to abandon their highly developed industries in favour of the "people of lords" and to change themselves into hewers of wood and growers of food the new helot peoples must lower their standard of living, at least for an unpleasant present time. Their central banks have to issue "additional" credit in their own currency and against this liability hold an asset in "marks" in the clearing account with Germany. By enforcing very favourable exchange rates for the marks—the overvaluation varying between 30 and 70 per cent—the German buyers are enabled, by paying seemingly normal prices in foreign currency, cheaply to make good scarcities inside the Reich. The real situation of the German finances gets still more opaque by these methods—a not unwelcome by purpose, perhaps. The traders in the conquered countries, however, will have before long the bitter experience of their mark balances becoming more and more inflationary and insubstantial, and their own currency logically depreciated.—The eating up of the unhappy small states can delay the bursting of the developing new German soap

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bubble, however, not for long, as the economic proportion of these countries is comparatively small in relation to the German glutton, and a great part of their own gold and credits is "frozen" in the U.S.A. and in the British Commonwealth. They will be obliged, one day, when they can rebuild therewith their economy.

The annexation of Austria and of the Sudeten district foreshadowed Germany's new enterprises. These smaller actions were not at all carried out for pure national reasons nor alone for ambition and in order to strengthen Hitler's prestige, however much he longed to "augment the Empire". The main attraction was an economic one. They needed the gold and the foreign currency of these countries, their minerals, their power to produce. They no longer wanted to pay for their own imports, moreover they preferred to receive themselves the currency for the exports of these countries. They wished at the same time to open thereby the gates for their intended great onslaught on Eastern Europe. Similar deliberations were decisive for the conquest of the rest of Czechoslovakia, Memel, Danzig, Poland, and—apart from the strategic point of view—also of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg. Hitler, having sacrificed Germany's wealth for its armaments, was bound to carry out his onslaughts against the world. He could not get on any further economically.

If Germany had conducted a reasonable peaceful economy, it did not need more living space; it only had to join in the world economy, as it was requested so often and so urgently to do. The economic distress caused by the rearmament policy could not even seemingly justify this new hypocritical slogan. They had, as we have learned, not even enough labour in Germany to manage their own land and industry, they had before the war already to force women and children to work, and later had to form an army of slaves from the citizens of the conquered countries and the German Jews. Indeed, it was not "living space" they needed; this was the familiar distortion of the literal sense only, which we have discussed in another place and by which those poor in spirit are cheated once and again, although occasionally Nazi chiefs of a second degree—as, for instance, Frank and Darré—blabbed out, that slavery is one of the features of Germany's new order. To give a foundation to the German claims, most fantastic calculations were given about the numbers of human beings living on every square mile of the earth, where all

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the deserts of the whole world were reckoned as fertile soil. Actually the cry for living space was nothing else but the expression of a rapacious aim for the wealth of the countries which they wanted to "pocket" utilizing their populations as working slaves. More and more clearly it became evident, that the wild and dilletante economic theories of the Nazis, whatever their name, rested on the typical mentality of a robber, who seeing the sparkling stones in a jeweller's window cannot regard a thin pane of glass as a serious obstacle. Tacitus said about the invasions of Gaul by the Germans two thousand years ago, that it was their real aim to become masters of this most fertile soil, and he continues: "Freedom and big words were their pretexts, but no man has ever been ambitious to enslave another or to win power for himself, without using the very same words."

Nazi Germany could not venture on a proposed peace conference before the war. It was too late. For, a peaceful arrangement meant a definite and genuine abandonment of all bellicose plans, disarmament, and the restitution of Czechoslovakia. That was in itself already inconceivable to the "wild men" with their ambitious ideas of world domination. Again there was a further reason. A peaceful solution, presuming the reinclusion of Germany in the world economy would have revealed the whole sink of criminal maladministration and corruption created by the Nazis. An expert examination of the German economic situation, unavoidable at such a conference, would have shown much too much of the chaos. It would have made obvious for the whole world the threadbareness of the German claims to "living space" and the fact that the immense rearmament, the gigantic magnitude of which a few only been imagined before, and which had devoured Germany's riches completely, had aimed from the beginning at world domination, and was alone to be blamed for the whole economic disaster of Germany.—Like every robber, blackmailer, and shuffler, Germany did not want cool, expert discussions. It was bound to try to realize its claims, devoid of any legal and moral foundation, by threats and force. At a conference it would have become evident, that the country was totally bankrupt, possessing paper instead of gold, and instead of valuable factories most artificial institutions for the utilization of less valuable minerals and for the production of substitutes, useless playthings for the time, when a free international exchange of

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currency began again. The fury of all the well-fed accomplices of the bribery would have been incited, if, following the recommendations of an international conference, the breaking off of an economically useless over-organization, disarmament, and reinstallation of a normal peace economy would have been carried through in earnest. They would have sold each other, cut each other's throats, and the whole building of corruption would have collapsed.

The gigantic sink could not be revealed; it was simply impossible; Germany had first "to be restored to health" by means of the planned coup against the East. If they first had Poland with its cornfields—as they had imagined, before Russia intervened with its claims—and Rumania's oil wells, they could, supported by this new increase of power, make further blackmailing claims at a future peace conference, without being forced to expose the dirty secrets of the firm and to disgrace the whole Nazi regime past recovery. Again, without a preceding "consolidation" of the German state of affairs by the expected Eastern Europe booty, financial help from abroad would have been necessary in a directly astronomic measure, in order to arrange the German situation so far, that a disarmed Germany could exist at all. The figures of the help needed would have exceeded so enormously the terms mentioned not long before the war in a conversation by a British Minister, that for this reason already a practical result seemed unthinkable.

But if all these difficulties could have been overcome, if even they had mastered the inevitable, gigantic purge inside their own party, an international agreement would have presumed, that they could accommodate themselves in future to a modest and peaceful life. Germany would have been bound to accept a new mentality corresponding to that of its neighbouring peoples. But that was unthinkable for Hitler; even that ran counter too much to the Nazi mind! Hitler and all his myrmidons have said again and again that "forward" is the key-word of their "move" which has no "reverse gear". Only by an unceasing drumming and pushing on, only by incessant visible successes, can the mass psychosis be held in the necessary state of excitement. A stop meant depression, disenchantment, and—return to reason. That, however, would have been the end of the system. Even if his people had first been prepared to celebrate Hitler as a "bringer of peace", too early the loss of prestige and all the other conse-

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quences would have themselves shown with what the abandonment of all the ambitious plans, expressed again and again, would have been attended. It could not be doubted by the masters of propaganda, that in a sobered people all the reactions would have been fully changed. Disarmament would have meant discontentment of ambitious officers and chauvinists, the restoration of Czechoslovakia would have meant not only the abandonment of enormous anticipated "profits", but immense claims for damage by those robbed and the reconstructed Czech State. There and in Austria also much dangerous discussion about the enormous corruption itself would have been unavoidable, even if they could suppress it in the "Old Reich".

Have you ever heard in the history of the world that a dictatorial regime could maintain itself which had been forced to such a total reversal? In a democratic State the rudder can be cast in another direction, a government can be removed, called to account; a new policy can be introduced by the opposition. The State and its form remains unchanged and unbroken. That was impossible in Nazi Germany, quite apart from the fact that Hitler did not want it. In Germany the Nazi system could not exist any longer, if once it could not offer any more, with wild clamour, baiting menaces and boasting promises; if it could no longer put every lad in uniform, provide him with a dagger, and stamp him as a hero; if it could no longer deceive the German people by false promises of a position dominating the world corresponding to their seigniorial nature—if instead of all that it had to be satisfied with what reasonable representatives of other peoples considered in a cool and peaceful conference. In a sober Germany much too quickly the question could arise: Why then Nazism? No—a peace conference before the war would have been equivalent to self-abandonment. Hitler had in the August of 1939 to choose only between a total breakdown of Nazism and suicide for himself—or war on the other hand. Could there be any doubt about the way which this demon would go?

Germany's economic situation in the winter of 1940-41 looks as follows:

The harvest was middling, and poor in most of the occupied territories. Foot-and-mouth disease has increased to a very great extent. Demolished countries like Poland with the remnants of an enslaved population, filled with hatred, countries like Czecho-

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slovakia, Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium, whose capacity for production is highly dependent on a close international co-operation, cannot offer a really essential release for Germany either in agricultural or in industrial production. In the Polish "General" Government the industrial output has sunk in the summer 1940 to 15 per cent of the pre-war level. Even in occupied France the fields are devastated, raw materials and many factories destroyed and exposed to bombardment, and it will take a considerable time before the remainder can be utilized. It is difficult to feed the population of the conquered countries and when the plundered stores are consumed, these countries will become a heavy burden. In order to avoid spreading disease among its own troops and evacuees Germany cannot even expose the Western countries to starvation in such a degree as it does in Poland.

Germany has the "moral assistance" of Russia. But the material help has proved much smaller than was hoped for. Even the question remains, how far Russia will allow the Bessarabian soya beans, so urgently needed in Germany, to be exported. Apart from the doubtful holding of Stalin and his unrealizable claim, to be paid for all deliveries in cash or by immediate counter deliveries, the difficulties arising from the distances and from the bad conditions of the railways of both countries are very high. The previous labour of years, which would be necessary to increase production and to create better transport facilities, makes essential war help from Russia a delusion. When grass is growing, horses die of hunger.—The transport problem is getting more and more one of Germany's greatest troubles. The countries of Eastern Europe have mostly single track railways. The poor upkeep of tracks in these countries as in Germany itself, together with a serious scarcity of rolling stock, is bound to aggravate increasingly the supply of military necessities the more the occupied territories are extending, and likewise export and distribution. The average amount of engines and goods waggons in Germany, besides their notorious obsolescence, was in 1939 20 per cent less than in 1929.

The pressure of the petrol shortage is increasing, especially through the widespread mechanization of farming and the lack of horses. Meanwhile the claims of the forces on the stores of fuel are enormous. The requirements cannot be fulfilled even if the damaged Rumanian oilfields are exploited to the utmost. Rubber,

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palm kernels, copra, cobalt—for the production of magnetic steels and alloys—industrial diamonds, tin and copper and even chin-chona bark—indispensable for medicine—the colonial resources of all these commodities are under the control of Great Britain.

Of course, it is not the purpose of these explanations to make calculations with pen and paper, when Germany will be exhausted, as little as it is our task to deal with military problems. It would mean wishful thinking also to deduce from our interpretation of the growing inflation, that Germany's economic breakdown was immediately imminent. It will be able for a certain time to finance the war by the decrease of consumption through severe rationing—especially in the enslaved countries and among the armies of helots—and by maintaining the production with the help of the new slaves. There is no doubt the booty of the conquered countries, the accessibility of the ore mines of Sweden, Belgium, and Spain, the oil wells of Rumania, and many other sources will defer Germany's starvation, in spite of the many difficulties of exploitation. No doubt that it will squeeze his victims to the utmost and try to find new ones, until the last possibility is exhausted. Here you have already one of the conclusions resulting from the German mentality, and it is interesting, that one is accustomed already to such a degree to the excesses of the German mind, that you look as a matter of course at Germany's complete ruthlessness in their economic warfare, at the ever-growing lack of restraint against the population of the conquered countries and the small neutral States, and, on the other hand, at the hypocrisy with which Great Britain is blamed for starving these countries! A professional burglar, of course, will not die of hunger till he cannot find any longer the necessary provisions by robbing another victim. There are, however, many other conclusions to be drawn by a reader from the destruction of the German economy by the Nazis. The violence with which Germany's whole wealth was deliberately staked for the Nazi raid to subjugate the world, the minuteness and cunning with which this wild speculation was prepared by all technical and economic means, the inner decay, on the other hand, of a totally corrupt body of merchants and officials, the general disdain and the oppression of others—individuals and peoples—also in the district of economy, the typical underestimation of the growing danger resulting from the inner resistance of the oppressed, and many other observations origin-

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ating from an examination of Germany's economic development under the Nazi regime may help a reader to complete his total impression of the German mentality.

The thought forces itself upon the mind that the German economic motor which in peace time already had got hot now and again must fail under war conditions suddenly one day. It cannot be doubted that in consequence of the pressure in so many districts a country under such an economic maladministration and corruption cannot stand the convulsions, which are bound to happen in a prolonged war, if the blockade can be maintained and will be supported by new measures of the U.S.A. One day the strain must become intolerable. One day even Hitler's iron fist will no more be able to keep down the desperate and hungry populations of the enslaved countries.

The average German citizen, however, does not yet see through the situation. He has no serious doubt about the might and splendour of the Third Reich, the stability of the currency and the system of economy, although the daily experience of the havoc of industrial works, railways, and dockyards, etc., by bombardments from the air must have destroyed at least the delusion of Germany's invulnerability. Some discontent and a few attempts at passive resistance against the hard labour conditions were easily suppressed by brutality or small occasional concessions. So long as there is no actual starvation and it is possible to finance the war by onslaughts against new victims, the people's trust will remain imperturbable. It is significant, how they were whispering then about Hitler's "secret war treasure" of 50,000,000 pounds in gold, and later of the immense riches captured in the conquered countries. Nobody realized clearly that the disclosure of this mystic "treasure", which incidentally nobody has counted, was nothing new, the existence of a certain war reserve having become obvious by the delivery to the Reich from the Imperial Bank of the remainder of its gold and foreign currency when the gold standard was abandoned. It was, however, a magnificent means of propaganda to intoxicate the Man in the Street by inventing a new "war treasure" and by fairy tales about the riches found in the conquered countries, although in fact most of their gold was saved from the German grip and their tender had lost its value abroad by the German occupation.

In the meantime a severe rationing has reduced to a very



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minimum the standard of living. It kept the prices rather low and this made it possible for a certain time to persuade the masses that "temporary disturbances in consequence of the blockade by insidious Albion" are alone causing difficulties with the supply. When they begin to suffer from real starvation having eaten up the stores robbed from the conquered countries, even the Germans will learn that it amounts to the same thing, whether you show the depreciation of the money openly, or whether you keep prices down by pen and paper, but cannot get sufficient food, in spite of all. This unavoidable development, visible already in the conquered countries, where the Germans in almost every commodity fixed for the "protected" an amount of food much less than that allowed to their "masters", is bound to work upon the German mind in due time. For, in the long run food cannot be "manipulated" as money and credit. Only you must not expect that this knowledge will become effective before the reduction of the standard of living will be quite intolerable in Germany itself. Finally, the scarcity of commodities, teasing the nerves of irritable, angry women, will, probably, prove as the greatest peril. The women, who formerly contributed so much to bringing Hitler to power, can likewise become dangerous by their disappointment, as the men will do, when they see that they have lost their savings for a second time.

It is known that in the first winter of war the pressure on the German temper caused by actual starvation was most disquieting. This experience had, probably, produced unity between Hitler and his generals, that the "lightning war" should be carried through by the invasion of Great Britain in the autumn of 1940. When this proved impracticable and a new winter gnawing at Germany's reserves had to be faced, the economic situation gives colour to the opinion, that all will be staked either to finish the war by a new "blitz" in the spring of 1941 or, at least, to break the iron ring of the blockade in a furious campaign on all theatres of war, before a third war winter. They know, that also in 1918 the final breakdown of morale came by exhaustion and starvation, and that it is most doubtful how long the German mind will prove equal to the strain. Endurance is not one of the characteristics of the Germans, although much too sanguine hopes on their lacking of power of resistance against may prove wishful thinking, as they possess a certain "Ersatz" in their famous, patient herd-instinct.

## Chapter 14

# The Third Reich and Bolshevism

The "struggle" against Communism was till 1939 one of the main pillars on which the edifice of Nazism rested. By the promise of Nazi Germany to form a "bulwark against Bolshevism" the first money from big manufacturers and capitalists was gained before Hitler obtained access to the State Treasury. With the same slogan he achieved abroad the support of certain circles of bankers and industrialists, who at critical moments opposed a timely hard hitting. No warning could drive out of the heads of the German and non-German capitalists and big manufacturers their delusions, and the fact, that neither the obvious untruthfulness of all the Nazi pronouncements, nor Hitler's disrespect for the rights of the individual and his ruthless methods of force made any impression on them, does not reflect very creditably on the prudence and the ethical feelings of these circles. It is the same sort of wealthy, egoistic, and conceited "politicians" who in the meantime ruined Norway, Belgium and France.

You cannot even say that Hitler himself never took the struggle against Bolshevism seriously. This fight, however, was never an article of faith for him and all the boasting phrases about the "protection of Germany against bloodthirsty Bolshevism" were never more than a piece out of the arsenal of Hitler's opportunist means of propaganda. It was an immensely effectual slogan, with which the fear psychosis of the German citizens who had experienced mob rule in 1919 in South Germany, on the Rhine, and in Brunswick, could be exploited, as well as the "bulwark complex" of the capitalists. In fact, however, the battle-cry "death to Communism" had to be used impartially against all those who opposed Hitler politically, a great part of whom had nothing at all to do with Communism—the Liberals, the Marxists, the Free-

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Masons, the Churches, the Jews, and all the so-called Reactionaries.

The robbing of Jewish capital in Germany was in fact a blow against the principle of private property, which no honestly convinced adversary of Communism ever would have carried out. The great capitalist adherents of the "bulwark theory" who, as we have learned already, were not afraid to acquire for their own household use something out of the big clearance sale, obviously then were not yet thinking that their turn could come too. Not till after the pact with Stalin was concluded, did at least a few become uneasy, that Hitler, instead of the little Polish wolf, had brought the dangerous Bolshevik Russian bear as a new neighbour. Thyssen, president of the United Steel Works in Germany and Nazi High Councillor of State, one of Hitler's earliest and most generous supporters, secretly packed his trunks. Having remarked that Hitler quietly looked on, when Stalin at once began his confiscations, the liquidation of the intellectuals and the classes with property—among them many Germans—and the installation of Local Soviets on his side of the new Polish frontier, he had drawn the conclusion that Communism in some form was also imminent in Germany. At least a few also of Hitler's capitalist friends outside Germany then knew that they must abandon the idea of Nazism forming a "bulwark" against Bolshevism. Nevertheless, the view of far-reaching importance in the Stalin pact for the whole economic system of Germany seems to have been confined to a very small circle. Even the bulk of the great German capitalists obviously still adhered to the opinion, that the accustomed "economic possibilities" for capitalists would continue in Nazi Germany, and the average German citizen and peasant in his characteristic indolence is evidently trusting Hitler's assertions, that "Germany will remain Nazi as Russia Bolshevik".

Actually no new conclusions at all about Hitler's own intentions towards the question of Bolshevism can be drawn from the Stalin pact. It does not mean anything more than a mere opportunist undertaking, only furnishing new proof, that antagonism on principle does not exist between Nazism and Bolshevism. As good an opportunist action, vice versa, was the victimization of thousands of young Germans in Spain with the hypocritical words that Germany under all circumstances must oppose the spread of Bolshevism in Western Europe, whilst indeed this enterprise—simultaneously a final rehearsal of the imminent

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new war, especially in order to examine the German aeroplanes and tanks and to exercise "in practice" their crews—served the practical purpose of acquiring for Germany a position as a leading economic power in Spain, and winning an ally against Great Britain. In Hitler's mind the whole question of the economic system is obviously of secondary importance only. Nobody can seriously doubt, that he has in mind the destruction of Russia, as soon as he feels strong enough after the complete victory he dreams of in the present war. In the autumn of 1940 it was reported, that he was putting again the saddle on his old hobby horse which had won him his first big successes—the "struggle against Bolshevism and Judaeo-Marxism". In order to influence public opinion in America he told—following the same authentic report—his odd peace emissary, Father Odo<sup>1</sup> that it was "the saddest day in his life, when he allied himself with the devil—with Stalin. But he signed this agreement only for the grandeur of Germany, and history will venerate him, when he has liberated Europe from the great beast of Bolshevism, and brought Stalin in chains to Berlin"—all this *after* having finished with Great Britain. —On the other hand there can be little doubt, that no spiritual or moral obstacle would hamper Hitler from introducing in Germany a kind of Nazi-Bolshevism himself at the very moment when this would seem to answer his purposes any better. Exactly at the same time of Father Odo's secret mission to America confidential conversations with Russia were in progress leading to Molotoff's visit in Berlin, in order to buy Russia's acquiescence in a "new world order".

If you try to trace by certain observations the general attitude of the German people towards Bolshevism, again the herd instinct, the lack of power of resistance against the evil methods of Nazism, so similar to the Bolshevik ones, and the deterioration of the whole moral level become visible.

There is first the example of the enforced moving of the Baltic Germans, a chapter for which "idealist phrases and opportunist actions" would be an adequate headline. With the words, they represented the best "material" to infiltrate with "German civilization" the new ground "gained" in Poland, these families whose ancestors had settled centuries ago in the Baltic countries, were actually forced—at a time already, when Hitler could not yet prophesy

<sup>1</sup> cf. Chap. 9, ante, p. 98.

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the actual Bolshevization of these countries—to leave their homes, an action which is to be repeated as you know in other parts of Europe to an even greater extent—if Hitler has his wish. Typical Bolshevik methods and conceptions, force, disregard of the individual and of all private rights, especially of property, were here applied without any protest from inside Germany. All property which these unhappy people had to leave in the Baltic was “liquidated” in favour of the Third Reich, greedy for foreign currency—a “satisfactory result”. Two birds were killed with this “Baltic” stone—the acquisition of foreign currency and the Germanization of the robbed Polish soil, and this corresponds to the Bolshevik and Nazi principle, that the State is by no means created for the citizens the happiness of whom is irrelevant. Not before it is their own turn, do most people think less heroically!

Many of these people had made it impossible themselves, through their own former bragging about their Nazism, to change their standpoint suddenly and to refuse obedience to their beloved leader. As far as they could, they did so, pointing out—this too is German mentality—that their former enforced attitude had not corresponded to their true opinions, that they were not genuine Nazis, and so on.—The same “labile” mentality, incidentally, showed itself with the Germans in Hungary and other countries of South-Eastern Europe who, so long as they could boast of Nazism with safety, had done their utmost, but after having understood the real meaning of Hitler’s appeal for “returning home” suddenly discovered their Hungarian or Rumanian feelings and, perhaps, will have to change their minds for a third and fourth time corresponding to further “developments” in these parts of Europe.—Many of those “returning” from the Baltic at once committed suicide, when they saw what kind of “fortune smiled on them”. The others were “compensated” for their valuable property by paper money, or by estates, houses, and furniture, stolen from the Polish owners, the latter being hunted out of their homes into the woods. The fact that Hitler, later on, could not hinder Stalin from swallowing the Baltic countries—in spite of Germany’s situation getting more and more perilous by the neighbourhood of Russia, and in spite of the uneasiness, which was bound to be felt in Germany about the destruction of the highly developed civilization of their “kindred” peoples—

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forms a striking example of a quotation from a great German poet: "It is the curse of every evil deed, that it is bound ever to produce new crimes."

The German method of "compensating" a "returning" German with the private property of a Pole, lawlessly expropriated "without compensation," is especially significant. It is true, the method has till now been applied in general only in the conquered countries; in Germany itself, however, only against Jews and other more or less official "enemies of the people." But for how long? And was there any protest of German lawyers, statesmen, or citizens against this violation of international law in Poland? Or of the Baltic Germans themselves, who should have considered, that all those who allowed themselves to be "compensated" with the property of the robbed Poles, are receivers exposed to the contempt of every decent-thinking person and that, when Germany has to restore its booty one day, they will be faced with nothing.

The similarity between Stalinism and Hitlerism becomes more and more evident. Even in a personal respect it was interesting, that both dictators obviously looked at the most evil attacks and low personal insults of each other only as a normal way of fighting and propaganda, and that their mutual classifications clearly had not stirred up any feelings of great moment in either gentleman. The identity of the methods, however, is proof not only that Stalin and Hitler themselves are in no way spiritual opposites, but that their systems are in fact congenial phenomena, which have much more in common than only the so-called "dynamic force". On the basis of their common dogmas—that there is no real right of the individual, that a stronger by his strength alone has the "right" to demand all from a weaker one, and that the law or treaties cannot bind the mightiest—Hitler has developed his system for the oppression of his adversaries coinciding with the methods of Bolshevism, and it is amusing to observe, that the typical methods are identical even in the most different cases—the same, whether "claims" shall be enforced against single persons or weaker peoples. Following the principle "out with your property!" all things are developing in Germany according to some established patterns. At bottom—frequently even to the smallest peculiarities—it is always the same, whether Mr. Cohn or a neighbouring State is in question. You will always meet with one of the following varieties:

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Before any "action" the waters in which they want to fish are troubled. The mood of the people is correspondingly "prepared". For this purpose single persons are denounced in public for having committed all thinkable crimes. Homicide and indecent assault, bribery, theft, fraud and embezzlement, smuggling of foreign currency, and evading of taxes are most favoured. With neighbouring peoples the impeachments are murder, arson and plundering German individuals, attacking German minorities, or—since the beginning of the war—violation of neutrality.

The second degree of this "war of nerves" consists in the case of private persons of a "special treatment" by anonymous denunciations to the authorities. For this purpose the necessary "witnesses", who incidentally need not even know the name of the defendant, let alone him himself, are prepared by the party organization. The denunciations have to extend to approximately ten different crimes in every case. As regards clerics, you must add to the crimes mentioned above seduction of minors; as regards Jews, intercourse with "Aryans". The denunciations may be made to the public prosecutor and to a dozen of other different offices, some of which are specially created for such purposes, for instance a special department of the "Gau" of the N.S.D.A.P. and a special "office for commercial ethics" (what a joke!). In addition, in all cases, the denunciation has to be made to the Gestapo. For the better psychological effect of the war of nerves all the denunciations are made on the same day, by that the defendant is summoned by all the different offices simultaneously—if he is not imprisoned at once. The offices are ordered to make the summonses, if at all possible, at the week-ends with an order of demand for a statement by Monday morning—in order to make it impossible for the accused to consult his solicitor and so impose special tension on his nerves.

With neighbouring peoples the "special treatment" is carried through in conformity with the idiom "stop thief"! As the League of Nations—after Germany's retirement and in consequence of its total being Jewish and its democratic conceptions—was out of consideration *a priori*, the denunciation is confined here to a strong campaign in the German Press, in which all that the Nazis have done themselves has to be cast in the teeth of the other people and its statesmen: Provocation, causing of frontier incidents by soldiers, officials, and civilians, violation of German

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territorial and aerial rights, and "dangerous menacing of Germany's security."—It is all the same if the neighbouring country does not even possess one-tenth of Germany's population and military power.—The summonses of private persons are in the case of neighbouring peoples replaced by diplomatic notes—if possible in the form of ultimata—and menacing speeches on the wireless. In order to avoid, or to make diplomatic intervention by another group of nations more difficult, such notes and manifestations were carried on usually here also at the weekends. The time limits, naturally, could have expired already, when the note was delivered!

The climax of the war of nerves is formed in the case of individuals, clerics, or fairly important business men, by demonstrations of "infuriated masses", i.e. of S.A. and S.S. men together with their families ordered and advised by the Gestapo either in front of the private or business houses or the bishops' palaces, with destruction of all the windows, demolition and plundering of the furniture, of sacred monstresses, and—at synagogues always, at monasteries occasionally, elsewhere in exceptional cases only—with the burning down of the buildings. The heavily maltreated person in question has immediately to be imprisoned by the Gestapo in a concentration camp, "in order to protect him against further outbursts of the people's fury". In cases of no special importance the "demonstration" can be spared, and the man concerned is simply arrested, in order to "avoid an outburst of mass fury". On the occasion of his arrest or soon after the prisoner has to commit suicide, or he is "shot while in flight". His property is confiscated. In quite exceptional cases he can be released again—after corresponding "treatment" in a concentration camp—and vanish abroad having "voluntarily foregone" his property.

With neighbouring peoples, instead of the shouting crowds, so-called "Free Corps" have to make demonstrations, and the shooting of foreign frontier guardsmen and the maltreatment of foreign minorities in the country have to replace the onslaughts on individual persons. The men necessary for the Free Corps, as well as the excited crowds, are supplied again by party organizations.—Instead of a summons to the Gestapo, foreign statesmen are invited to Berchtesgaden or Berlin. In the same way as individuals under certain circumstances can avoid going to the concentration camps by "voluntarily" foregoing their property,



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such a procedure is possible also in the case of presidents of foreign States in exceptional cases, if they are prepared, voluntarily, to accept the change of their countries into German protectorates or tributary States, to hand over the State property, and to submit to a protector playing the same part as a public trustee in the case of private persons. If the foreign statesmen fail to appear or to submit at once, according to the destruction and burning down of buildings and to the arrest of individuals, the foreign countries are at once invaded and then annexed, the leading statesmen imprisoned—if they do not succeed in evading the grasp by “fleeing in cowardly fashion, after having plundered the tills of the State”. The eventual “treatment” of former State leaders who are caught is similar to that in the concentration camps. Whilst “reactionary” or “Jewish kindred” company directors are replaced by “reliable” persons presented by the group of Nazi employees of the firm concerned, a “Quisling” is nominated by the fifth column in the case of foreign peoples.—Just as law proceedings do not take place in the case of individuals, so there has been no international arbitration in the cases of nations.

If you compare the Nazi methods with those of Russia, and if you include, perhaps, the bloody “purges” of both the dictators among their own followers—does not the similarity stare you in the face? And is it not more than a simple identity of methods?

Besides the similar economic tendencies of development, only the most characteristic, gradual dissolution of family life—formerly especially close, and the vanishing of religion may be mentioned out of the many examples of coincidences, which indicate the future development of Germany in the direction of Bolshevism.

For years many well-informed observers and numerous newspapers outside Germany have pointed to the spiritual relation between Nazism and Bolshevism and declared it probable that Germany's development, in spite of Hitler's emphatic denials, would terminate in a certain kind of Bolshevism. A dispassionate observer, not possessed by the fatal “bulwark complex,” could not doubt for long, indeed, that the economic situation of Germany under Nazi domination was bound to lead not only to new “diversions” against other countries, but also to a more and more far-reaching interference with private property, by more and more rude force. In the meantime Hitler's dangerous play

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with Communism has begun in earnest. It does not matter that the German economic system is apparently still running without serious disturbances. It is not so very unusual that a seriously ill person thinks himself sound and seems quite cheerful even to a superficial onlooker, or that a bankrupt considers himself a wealthy man. Decisive alone is the fact, that the whole system rests on the general faith in Hitler and on the conviction of his victory and that the German masses in their blind faith in Hitler's assertions have not noticed yet, that the lines of separation between Bolshevik and Nazi conditions have become more and more effaced. In fact, it is amazing that Hitler could burden with the Stalin pact even those philistines, his oldest and truest followers whom he had won by his early anti-Bolshevik propaganda after their experiences with Communism in 1919-20. But can you be astonished at the stupidity of the German philistines, when you see in foreign countries—apart from all the adventurers of similar origin and development as the nucleus of Hitler's German followers—some wealthy business men, unable to overcome their narrowminded, egotistic wishful thinking, recommending "appeasement", still in the winter 1940-41, by pointing out, an agreement with Hitler could preserve the British Empire and make possible a profitable trade between America and the European continent united under Nazi rule and absorbing American produce? Or if you observed, that Pétain, Laval, and Weygand apparently regarded Hitler as an honest and reliable protector against Bolshevism?—Knowing that no honest covenanting with Nazism is thinkable, and that an agreement would actually mean surrender, or a truce, granting time and opportunity for the Nazis to prepare a knock-out blow, Great Britain is resolved to fight this war to till the end. We have here not to deal with Hitler's impossible conceptions for the future resting on the presumption of a German victory. In this case—intolerable and even unthinkable for every civilized man—the consequences in all directions would be so catastrophic for mankind, that any attempt at finding clear results in advance would be useless, indeed. We have to deal with realities only, i.e. now with the war, and then with Germany's defeat. That, however, is to say: Although development may be kept in suspense as long as they still hope for victory—the end of a lost war means much more than a simple defeat for Germany. There is immediate danger of Bolshevism.

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The strength of the Nazi organization is enormous. Everywhere those are installed, who have the Party to thank for their position. Beginning with the seven hundred members of the "Reichstag", who receive a remuneration of 8,000 marks a year for each meeting a few times in Berlin, in order to say yes, then the innumerable officials of the State, the boroughs, schools, law courts, party and economic organizations, the rigidly organized "liberal" professions of the lawyers, physicians, engineers, and artists, to the smallest private businesses, everything that gives a position and an income is in the hands of the Nazis. Common interests, spying and denunciation, nepotism and public bribery provide, that these elflocks are entangled insolubly. All these "sworn together" and, likewise, the small group of big German capitalists, so narrowly connected with Nazism, would be finished at the moment of Hitler's defeat. They are aware, that there is no way out for them, and there is no doubt that they will fight desperately for their lives. All these shufflers and adventurers relying still on victory believe, at least, in a settlement in any way, trusting that by the big raids on the conquered countries and vassal states their pockets will get so well filled, the might of Nazism so strongly increased that, as Hitler promised, the Nazi system can be kept up in Germany. They would, however, have little objections also against a development into "Nazi Bolshevism", if only under Hitler, looking at their own worthy personalities as the potential bearers of a new Nazi Bolshevik *bourgeoisie*, which would develop satisfactorily, if in a gradual passage to a new system confiscating went on against new "enemies of the people".

The masses of German workers, after seven years of deterioration by Nazi influence, have not preserved their former level either. The wide groups of quiet and reasonable workers and employees which were organized formerly in the German trade unions, these pillars of a genuine democracy, have been pulverized in the seven years of Nazi domination. Most of them had been Anti-Communists as well as strong opponents of Hitlerism. From the numbers of the former trade unionists, however, no conclusion can be drawn as to the percentage of reliable Socialists, Communists, and—mere Hitlerists in German labour of to-day, and this the less, as the Stalin pact too has confused the mind of the workmen. It was significant, indeed, of the inner uncertainty of the Nazis that, after this pact, the last surviving

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former trade union leaders in Germany, although they were in their seventies and had long abandoned all political activities, were again arrested. The Nazis were obviously much more anxious to eliminate anew any potential crystallization point of genuine Socialists and opponents to Hitler than Communists. Nevertheless you ought not to conclude therefore optimistically, that strong masses of working people are still prepared to withstand energetically under old or new leaders a future Bolshevization of Germany. A great part of Germany's present labour may fall an easy victim to Bolshevism.

There remains the former middle class of citizens and peasants, the born opponents of Bolshevism. These people, as we have learned, would change themselves into embittered foes of Hitler, if they really thought, that the Nazi regime is bound to end in Communism and that they will be handed over to their worst foe by their own idol. But this remnant of middle-class elements—the heart of a tree, but even that already somewhat decayed—is decreasing continually. Long before the war already literally every day hundreds of small undertakings of handicraft and tradesmen were dissolved, and it was one of the new Nazi watchwords, that “in a modern Germany there was no longer any place for such dwarf undertakings”. It did not matter that at first the Nazi agitators had promised the small industrialist and craftsman, that their professions should again become “mothers of money”.

Whether after these seven years of Nazi maladministration the remnants of the former middle class and of solid and reasonable labour in Germany—i.e. the circles in which, presumably, chauvinistic Nationalism is comparatively smallest and the disinclination to Communism, deference towards democratic ideas, and at least a certain individualism are, perhaps, still alive—can raise enough strength to prevent a Bolshevik chaos in Germany, is questionable. In any case, not before they have clearly understood in Germany, that any possibility of winning the war has vanished and Bolshevism actually knocks at the door, the struggle will break out. Then, however, an embittered civil war, probably, will follow, the middle class shouting “crucify”, the rabble and perhaps many of the Nazis “Heil Moscow”, whilst the bulk of the Nazis will have to fight to the last, as this time it will not be so easy as in 1918 to avoid a well deserved fate by “taking their

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stand on the ground of the accomplished facts". What the result will be, when those forces come to act, is impossible to judge in advance. The great question is, whether the poison of Nazism has left enough public spirit in the German people to reconstruct an orderly, individual economic system. Too much moral power of resistance, too much of economic value has been destroyed, the whole *niveau* has sunk too deep not to doubt, whether the remnant of sober reason and tenacity will be sufficient to end the sickness of Hitlerism by self-disentanglement and to withstand the attraction of Bolshevism. It is, unfortunately, more probable, that in the Bavarian saying "now everything has to go"—a chaos will first be brought about, so that the task of creating a new economic order in Germany after the destruction of the Nazi regime, will fall to Germany's "enemies".

## *Chapter 15*

# The German Conception of Honour

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The "honour of the German people" occupies the greater part of the speeches of Hitler and his ministers. It is likewise given as the reason for rearmament, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles, the departure from the League of Nations, the "liberation" of Austria, of the Sudeten Germans, of French Alsace and Lorraine and of the former German colonies, also for the "return home" of the Germans abroad, the onslaught on Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the "struggle against Bolshevism" in Spain. All this in the name of the "honour of the German people!" "German honour" was defended in beer-cellar fights against any holding a different opinion, and the murderers of Dolfuss "died for German honour". The German conception of "honour" must undergo a more searching examination which will be rather informative as regards the German mentality of to-day.

One is accustomed to the perceptual distinction between outward and inner honour. Nobody can hurt the inner honour of a human being except himself. Only he who dishonours himself by acting dishonestly suffers a loss of his inner honour, which cannot be hurt by any invective from outside. He who insults or calumniates us, damages only our outward honour, the respect which we enjoy in the eyes of mankind. This outward honour, however, can be hurt only too easily.—The law can deal only with the outward honour of human beings, whilst the inner honour plays so much greater a part in the inner experience of the individual and of mankind—in religion and ethics, culture and morals. The conception of this inner honour is deeply rooted in all civilized peoples. It shows its most beautiful flowering in Christ whose passion even the lowest respects, feeling how all insults glide

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off and fall instead on the slanderers themselves. The inner honour is to be seen in the history of the martyrs and it makes itself felt in the experience of every individual who is only outwardly defamed. It is one of the great consolations of history, through which one can regain one's faith in human nature, that it shows the immense reaction, stirring the conscience of the world often after years, and forcing the rehabilitation of a man who was wrongly reviled or condemned.

Such tender impulses have always been rather alien to the Germans. Older readers will still remember from their childhood the immense emotion which took hold of mankind at the end of the nineteenth century, when it became apparent that Alfred Dreyfus had been the victim of a powerful clique. The conscience of the world was stirred. The author, however, cannot forget even to-day his inner shame that at that time in Germany the so-called educated circles spared only a rather self-satisfied smile for the "exuberance" with which the world wanted the injustice repaired.

It is interesting to see that a man like Wilhelm II, who during his long reign often spoke so strongly of honour, always had in mind only outward honour. The inner comprehension of the idea was so remote from Wilhelm's sentiments, as of most Germans, that he did not even find it necessary in the interest of his own inner honour to rehabilitate the outward honour of his Lord Chamberlain, von Kotze, which he had hurt. He preferred the more comfortable way of sending some flowers and cared little for the rest.

The unmistakable feeling, that you are sully your own inner honour by wantonly insulting another, always seemed a little ridiculous to most Germans, and one seldom felt a natural obligation to atone quickly and fully, if one had offended anybody. To apologize is not an obligation to the German conscience, but a most disagreeable and annoying necessity, which one fulfils only unwillingly and if forced to, and which one avoids only too readily, if that is possible when pursuing a higher social position or similar advantages.

It is to be supposed in consequence of her actions that in Nazi Germany inner honour is no longer comprehended or in existence at all. One has only to remind oneself of the base insults and calumnies which its representatives hurl, on principle, at every

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adversary—politicians, priests, Christians, Jews, Germans, foreigners, individuals, and whole peoples. It is impossible to make a Nazi understand, that a reckless slander does not at all hurt the genuine inner honour of the offended, but only his own, and that, on the other hand, punishment does not atone at all, until he has cured his own consciousness by apologizing and repairing a material damage. These who in the Germany of to-day are still susceptible to such old-fashioned sentiments certainly belong to the adversaries of Hitler.

The efforts of educators in all civilized nations are directed towards preparing scholars for the more subtle feelings required by religion and ethics, culture and humanity, sentiments based in effect on the respect of the individual. Such refinements of perception are repugnant to the National Socialists on principle. Consequently they regard them as effeminate and a hindrance to their mass conformation to type, as they have made roughness and brutality their ideals of education.

It has all along been a Prussian principle intentionally to harden the feelings, in order to preserve the people's "sound sentiments". The Prussian Corporal, who showered invectives on his recruits and for whom boxes on the ears were as bread and butter, acted not so much from personal cruelty, as because it was his way of instilling the so-called "discipline" by first completely destroying in the young troops every possible thought of an inner resistance to the unrestricted power of a superior. It especially astonished those Germans who had the opportunity of observing something of the drilling of recruits in democratic countries that one subscribed there to quite different principles, and attained results, which they—rightly or wrongly—considered to be unthinkable with German recruits by so much more humane methods. The Army, again, was the big educational institution of the German people and the intentional destruction of all sense of dignity of man in a soldier's relations towards his superiors was a corner-stone of the Army education.

This planned dulling of sentiments in the Army worked in several ways according to wish. First it hardened the mentality of sergeants, who gradually lost all respect for the personality of a subordinate, whilst they were likewise educated to servility towards the officers. It was practising the doctrine of might is right. Everyone acted so, if he had the opportunity, and he found



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it quite natural if a still stronger forced him to stoop. This was apparent in peace-time in the terrorism of the old privates, tacitly protected by the officers, which drove many more sensitive recruits to suicide. Outrages and cruelties in conquered countries were outlets of that inclination to make one's power felt by the defenceless, and to make them atone for what one has suffered oneself. We observed that the brutality arising out of the Great War did not decline at all during the first period of transition after 1918, and only a little during the comparatively quiet few years before "Hitler's rise". Since the beginning of the Hitler propaganda a new brutality was growing in the German people at a rapid pace, the results of which are discussed in other connections.

It is a principle derived from experience that a primitive person who has very little feeling for the sentiments of others is most sensitive if he thinks himself hurt. His instinct then is to "destroy" the offender, and the objective solution, that an insulting assertion is merely unjust, does not satisfy a German at all as regards his own honour. The primitive sense of his offended outward honour outweighs all else to such a degree, that the offended must have his private satisfaction, his vengeance. This way of thinking, in conjunction with the German "thoroughness," has developed the enthusiasm for duels and preserved it till now in Germany. As all things are driven to extremes in Germany, so is this. The erroneous conception that honour could be proved in a certain manner by personal courage—besides the most doubtful question, whether personal courage itself can be proved by a duel—led in Germany to the code of honour by which the offended had to "challenge" his offender. He was an outcast, if he did not, even if the unjustness of the insult was proved. The intrinsic, that is for a German the outward honour, can only be repaired by a duel. Very often the insulted one was shot in this senseless ordeal. Nevertheless, the upper classes in Germany, and especially the Army, insisted, that an insult committed by a person "capable of giving satisfaction" had to be "washed away with blood." This obstinate, tough clinging to so primitive and obsolete an idea is characteristic of the coarse German mind.—"As the old cock crows the young one learns." So the sporting imitations also, the students' duels, were firmly preserved in Germany, although the cheek hacking certainly did

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not require especial courage. Nevertheless, the scars produced a martial appearance!

This duelling practice of the upper classes, although of secondary importance at a first glance, contributes to a knowledge of German mentality, because this obstinate preservation of such outlived ideas and customs derived from primitive feelings typically shows the German devotion to their own dear personality and their clumsy neglect of the sensibilities of others. The seducer of a "comrade's" wife does not mind shooting dead the betrayed husband who is obliged to challenge him. From the German standpoint the seducer's—outward—honour is damaged neither by the seduction of the wife nor by the killing of the husband in the duel; he does not feel the disgrace he has inflicted on his inner honour by both acts. If the deceived husband had only the social right to ask satisfaction by a pistol shot for his outward honour—for the inner is not hurt—it would be sufficient, certainly, to satisfy an understandable, if primitive, feeling of the deepest insult. But, following the German conception, he is bound to challenge the other and risk being shot by him. By not fulfilling this social obligation he would be going against the German code of outward honour and must expect to be treated as a dishonourable coward.

Such "high-class" conceptions of honour, naturally, are not to be found among the common people, although they are aped rather strongly by the youngsters of the other classes. The apprentices of the Bavarian breweries and the pupils of the hotel school at Dusseldorf, for example, played the fine gentleman by hacking each others faces about, whilst the young hairdressers contented themselves with inflicting "artificial" scars with their razor blades. They did this with the greatest seriousness and with a strong sense of the importance of their own honourable persons. Any inkling of the humour of the affair escapes them, as the Germans are almost entirely lacking in a sense of self-criticism and especially of self-irony.—Actually also these "heroic" imitations prove more than a mere wish to equal the higher social castes. The similarity of the scar-covered German youths with the young warriors of wild tribes in their full war paint teach us what is behind this persistent German enthusiasm for fighting duels. It is a primitive passion for boasting, the showing off of the Prussian smartness, the intentionally frightening phantom of

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outward honour, which has nothing to do with real civilization and very little with genuine courage. It is the same hollow, bullying, superficial, typically German, conception of honour, this exhibitionism and hooliganism which Hitler skilfully flattered by "bestowing" a dagger with the uniforms of the S.A. men, and indeed, of every foolish "Hitler lad," who now fancy that they are all genuine knights.

The artificial cultivation of such would-be heroic sentiments, naturally, strengthened the self-complacency and the boastfulness of the Germans, and this expressed itself in a growing disrespect of all weaker people. If a S.A. man spat in the face of a Jew and the insulted one took up an attitude of defence, it was thought right, that the S.A. squad should batter the Jew to death. Any understanding was lacking as to why the other had not tacitly borne the onslaught on his outward honour. Hundreds of such cases happened in peace-time in public, and if newspapers in foreign countries brought angry reports of eye-witnesses, the Goebbels Press would write with their familiar *tu quoque*, that one should sweep before one's own door, instead of flying into a rage, if an "impertinent Jew got a few boxes on the ears". No genuine "German man" ever thinks yet, that insults to and attacks on a weaker man are as base and dishonest as plundering.

That growing coarsening of sentiments communicated itself quickly from relations between individuals to those of the masses. The monstrous defamation of the Czech and Polish—until not long ago, incidentally, also of the Russian—"hordes," and of the Czech and Polish "races" for which no invective was harsh enough are classical examples. Indifference towards the sentiments of other peoples, races, and national groups, in conjunction with the cunningly fostered boasting and exaggeration of own—outward—honour at the expense of the inner one are as characteristic of the German people of to-day as of the individual Germans—all of which, however, corresponds to the principle, "the strong against the weak". Apart from mere material considerations they cannot even understand in Germany the feelings of other peoples at the robbery of their sovereignty. Accustomed to the brutal right of strength which Prussian Germany had always exercised, whenever it had the opportunity, they cannot conceive how little smaller nations estimate the "honour" to become German—and especially Nazi German slaves. In these aspects

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you must consider, for instance, the much harsher conditions imposed by the Germans on Russia at Brest Litovsk with their own reaction to the Treaty of Versailles. When in the beginning of the discussions about an armistice in the Great War Marshal Foch read some points from a sheet, the German negotiator, objecting that such conditions could not be pressed by one civilized people on another, had to pocket the answer, that these were not the French conditions, but those which the Germans had imposed on conquered Lille!—It was then the same primitive one-sided, and brutally egotistic, conception of honour, the same mentality which shows itself—screwed up proportionally to the general sinking of the level of culture under the Nazis—in the treatment of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Holland, France, etc. Above all, of course, the use of terror, and, likewise, the suppression of all spiritual life in the conquered countries is a considered, devilish means of destroying—in a much higher degree than by the aforesaid treatment of the Prussian recruits—every feeling of human dignity of their victims, in order to suffocate therewith any thought of inner resistance. It springs from the same policy of intentionally creating sentiments of inferiority in the oppressed and, simultaneously, cajoling the primitive feelings of the own “people of lords,” when in the new “Polish General Government” the Poles are confined to the trailers of the trams, because their presence in the cars would disturb their German masters. Incidentally, it is significant also of the German confusion of outward and genuine, inner honour in the relations of peoples, that they could not find a more satisfactory means of “grinding out the notch of 1918” than by a theatrical vice versa repetition of the then armistice scene in the forest of Compiègne.

In the relations of peoples the Nazis developed hypocritically the superficial German conception of honour to extremes. “The honour of the German nation asks peremptorily for the liberation of the German minorities living abroad and the return of the districts colonized by them; for, the ground where Germans are living is German.”—No doubt, such manifestations were flattering to the “chosen people”. No doubt also, however, that nationalistic feelings in Germany then had to be roused first to absolutely artificial dimensions by the Nazi propaganda.

The sentiments of the German masses regarding the South Tyrol were genuine, if, however, not very deep. Every German

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had heard, at least, of the War of Independence a hundred and fifty years ago for that pure German land, where Walter von der Vogelweide had composed and for which Andreas Hofer was executed at Mantua. The mind of every German school child had been inspired by the German song of Andreas Hofer, and here, if anywhere, German honour was pledged indeed! Italy, however—at least temporarily—was not a weak adversary but an “Axis partner”. And therefore it did not touch German honour, when Hitler agreed to the forced departure of the families of the German peasants which for centuries had been rooted in the Tyrol.—It was of no greater consequence when the same spectacle was repeated in the Baltic States, because the policy towards Russia showed it opportune, it could not be helped—also here by surrendering cultural and economic interests which had always been strongly claimed as German, moreover, to the Bolshevik arch-enemy—pardon, the new Communist friend. All this, suddenly, no longer violated German honour—because the right of force was not applicable here for the moment, and also, probably, because the foreign currency which fell to Germany by the liquidation of the property of the “returning” Germans played a much greater part in deciding the whole obscure matter than has been noted till now. It was significant, because of what was behind the boasting speeches about the “demands of German honour”, to observe the astonishing ease with which the German masses swallowed the opportune renunciation of those “unforfeitable ideals”. The evidence is only too clear, that a deep and genuine longing in the soul of the German people was not in question, not even with South Tyrol, let alone elsewhere. Involuntarily one’s thoughts turn to the statue of Strasbourg in Paris which had been veiled in crape since 1871 with the admonition always to think of it, never to speak of it. The thoughts of the Germans circulated very little around the “return of the brothers” in foreign countries, but they spoke of it all the more. Here the hypocritical perversion of the sentiments of the German masses becomes very apparent; they not only tolerated the abuse of the noble phrase of “a nation’s honour” for the purpose of pursuing material and selfish goals, but obviously misused it themselves.

Much less still than for the “return of South Tyrol” the Nazi Germans were willing to die for the incorporation of Austria;

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nor for the Sudeten Germans, let alone for the Danzigers, who were enjoying full liberty and to whom it had to be explained first by foreigners—Hitler's South German brother-in-law, Mr. Forster, and S.A. and S.S. men, disguised as tourists—that they wished so strongly to “return”. Still less for the German settlers in Poland did the Germans in the “old” Reich want to sacrifice their youth, before their rage was artificially stirred up. Long before the conquest of Austria the real frame of mind of that Catholic country was sufficiently well known in Germany, and no Nazi propaganda could ever manage to settle the general doubt in Germany as to how much Austrians wanted to become Germans. From a military, political and economic point of view this union was considered a good acquisition. No one would, however, then have embarked full of enthusiasm on a serious war for the “liberation of the Austrians”. Not even Hitler himself wanted that, as proved by his “strategical retreat”, when Italian troops appeared at the Brenner in 1935, and his hypocritical telegraphic message of condolence, when Dolfuss fell a victim to the murderers sent by him. No feeling of “national honour” stirred then. The necessary incentive of the “strong against the weak” was lacking.—Also with the Sudeten Germans they were not at first quite certain in the “old” Reich as to whether they really wanted to be “liberated”. At any rate the socialist workers in the industrial districts of the Sudetenland did not want to be, as was whispered in neighbouring Saxony, although they did not dare to express their feelings freely for fear of the army of spies. Here, however, the necessary implied condition—to be the stronger—was in existence, and therefore they were “strongly resolved” in the old Reich to liberate the Sudeten Germans, the more one was convinced, that it would pass off without one's own bloodshed. Excitement and noise only, were so great in the autumn of 1938, because they were relying on the assertion, that Hitler makes bloodless conquests, and that the sole thing necessary was to threaten as loudly as possible, in order to attain all they wanted. It would not have been possible then to start a genuine National move for the “return” of the Sudeten Germans, if the masses in Germany had seriously calculated on a European War. The depressed mood of the people in the September crisis, when for a moment a war seemed unavoidable, showed clearly, that alone the general conviction that all this boasting was not

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dangerous, was the reason for the "waves of indignation". Everyone in Germany felt the spuriousness when the baiting of the "Hussites", was rustling in Goebbels' newspaper forest. The Man in the Street was quite aware, that it was "prudence" on the part of the newspapers not to speak of "expansion" and "annexation", when "the return of our German brothers to the home country—demanded by National honour" sounded so much nicer and meant the same! The average German felt not only instinctively that the magnificent words of "demands of German honour" were mere pretence. He was well informed by many speeches and other publications that—besides his leader's ambition—very material desires formed the real background. He even was aware, that the pretext of "national honour" should make it easier for certain foreign statesmen to yield to the German wishes of "Free Hands in the East".—It is interesting, incidentally, to observe on this occasion the difference between the "realistic Roman" mentality of the Italians, to which Mussolini with his significant watchword of *sacro egoismo* unceremoniously attunes his claims of conquest, and the equally cynical, but typical German manner by which Hitler, according to the false "sentimentality" of his compatriots, veils his outrages with hypocritical phrases time and again. Mussolini accepts with a cynical laugh the reproach of stabbing France in the back, whilst the German originator and accomplice of the methods of treachery in quite grand style—all the same, whether from outside, as with the sudden Russian stabbing in the back of Poland, or from inside as with the various Quislings—is deeply offended, if his spade is called a spade.—In any case, like Austria, Sudeten Germany was indeed obtained without bloodshed—at least from the German point of view; for what happened to all those who were not Nazis in the countries so gloriously conquered, was frightful enough. However, Hitler's "prestige" and the German chauvinism came to a head.

The actual goal could not be so easily camouflaged on the conquest of Czechoslovakia proper, because there were no German brothers to be liberated there. It was the same with the Polish Corridor, which had to be created after the Great War, in spite of its unsatisfactory territorial form, in accordance with the principle of nationalities; for almost exclusively Poles were

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settled there. But even here German "honour" found itself suddenly infringed, "because East Prussia was separated from the rest of Germany by the Corridor". A strange point of honour, indeed!—Danzig, above all, was a first-class affair of "honour" so that the people's soul, "seething with rage," could at the same time even demand the immediate solution of the whole "Polish question", although this same soul had remained very quiet, when the necessity of the Corridor, as being Poland's access to the open sea, and the maintenance of Danzig as a Free City was solemnly recognized by Hitler himself a few years before, when the political constellation had yet been a different one. Again most people in Germany were aware, naturally, that all the talk of high patriotic feelings was nothing but an admirable manœuvre on the part of the leader, the same as with Czechoslovakia a year before, and they knew in advance, that precisely the same song would now be sung a second time. Again everybody was convinced, that there would be either no bloodshed at all, or, at the worst, an easy military parade to Warsaw only.

One may think as one will about the political judgment of the Germans; nobody can honestly doubt their clear knowledge of the real meaning of the "liberation of German brothers abroad," the "return of ground sacred to German culture", the "renunciation of all further territorial claims in Europe, especially towards France," and the denial of any intention of taking over one single subject of "foreign race". So every single German acted dishonestly who, by loudly consenting, made himself an accomplice in the misuse of the word "National Honour". The scornful and reckless enslaving in Czechoslovakia of a people speaking another language must have made even the least thoughtful ask themselves, by what law one could simply appropriate the property and liberty of another country, in order to satisfy Germany's pretended need of new "living space," not to mention the obvious hypocrisy of that "need" itself. Every German must have asked himself how it could be made to conform to the "national honour", if one enslaved a weaker nation of foreign race, annexed its country and wealth, clearly in order to enrich oneself, at the same time declaring, however, that the "liberation" of Germans living abroad—naturally in weaker countries only—was "demanded by German honour." Even the most stupid could not fail to remark, that the



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weaker was cynically and unfairly denied what was claimed for oneself by the right of power, and that one hurt one's own inner honour badly by interfering with the outward honour of others in such a way. With the invasion of Moravia and Bohemia in the spring of 1939 at the latest, the bad faith of all Germans who continued to back Hitler's policy became evident.

After the experience with Czechoslovakia, the onslaught on Poland—especially after the partition of the prey with Russia—must have appeared as crass robbery to every German. No moral foundation could be found for it. The Germans, by consenting hypocritically and with enthusiasm to the boasting propaganda against both those countries and to all that befell Czechoslovakia and Poland later on, showed the exact mentality to be expected in consequence of their education in the "German conception of honour". It was the same reaction which, although in somewhat milder forms, the German people and especially the Prussians had always shown at every similar opportunity, and which their "heroes" had felt and inculcated on them. Conclusions about all the following onslaughts on neutral countries during the war, hypocritically disguised as "protection", are so evident, that we can refrain from discussing them here.

You cannot really reply, that the Germans were not asked before Hitler made his conquests, or before he sacrificed South Tyrol and delivered the Baltic countries to the Russians as the reward of Judas, by which to buy Stalin's favour previously was declined by the Western Powers. The German masses had shown only too clearly their consent to Hitler's merely opportunist and hypocritical policy in all its phases and their agreement with the misuse of the proud word, "a nation's honour". The masses exulted at the conquest of Czechoslovakia and Hitler's "bloodless" raid on Prague and the following onslaughts. These were bad indications of the depraved feeling of honour of a people, whose better elements are condemned to silence.

At the same time came the return of the German troops from Spain, and on that occasion Hitler himself pronounced frankly, that his solemn protest against the "insolent lies from foreign countries" regarding the participation of German troops in the Spanish Civil War was a naked hypocrisy, similar to the angry grumbling of the Nazi newspapers a short time before about the

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"offensive doubts" cast on Germany's "sacred promise" to fulfil the obligations of the pact of non-intervention. Hitler explained that now, after all, he could "speak openly" and give the thanks of the Fatherland to the returning soldiers. This enlightenment was something new to some foreign statesmen, perhaps, who till then could not have imagined such blatant lying; but it was nothing new, of course, to the German people, whose men and women themselves were the fathers and mothers of the soldiers who had fought in the Spanish War! The reply from the German side will, probably, be that this kind of "untruthfulness" was in the interests of the country. Earlier, when Hitler was reproached with denying the clandestine rearmament, the example of Scharnhorst had already been quoted in Germany.—In the beginning of the nineteenth century he secretly created a strong Prussian Army by recruiting new men in the place of hastily trained recruits, who were then dismissed in a quick-change over.—The question of moral objection to this secret rearmament might have been a debatable point—if it had served not merely the purpose of world conquest. The sending of German troops to Spain, however, contrary to his solemnly pledged word, certainly could not be justified any longer by "patriotic interest in the fight against Bolshevism", after the unequivocal evidence of Hitler's naked policy of opportunism in the pact with Russia herself. Here is a gross breach of confidence, confessed cynically by Hitler himself, and committed merely, in order to prepare war and to provide economic profits. But what German ever thought this? Who has ever observed any sentiment of this kind in a conversation with the Man in the Street, or had the impression at mass meetings, that a feeling of uneasiness about the falseness and dishonesty of this power policy was even half-consciously present. No, the German masses have proved their failure to comprehend genuine national honour.

But it is not alone the absolute failure of the average German to comprehend the dishonesty of the customary, cynical breaches of the given word in international life. You must not forget the treacherous brutality itself of all the sudden onslaughts on weaker neighbours, let alone the ruthlessness of their execution. Poland could show that in the Non-aggression Pact which Hitler himself had signed it was provided, that, in the case of dissension between the parties, arms should in no circumstances be taken up,

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but all differences should be arranged by peaceful agreement, and it was the same in the case of Denmark. It crossed the minds of very few Germans that something terrible, dishonest, and base was happening, when Germany nevertheless assailed these peoples, like other neighbours whose neutrality Hitler had just promised to respect. One must assert, that a very big part of the German population fully contaminated by the Nazi mentality has lost all appreciation of the sacredness of a word of honour, both in the life of individuals and of nations. Their comprehension of honour has sunk far below that of the democratic peoples who never would tolerate a Government which had dragged the inner honour of its nation through the mire in such a way. It is this dishonest mentality which expressed itself in the rejoicing of the whole "Reichstag" at Hitler's speech of triumph over a brave adversary after the conquest of Poland. It is the mentality of those who allowed themselves to be "rewarded and compensated" by stolen private property, without any feeling for the ignominy of becoming receivers. This dishonourable mentality manifests itself at all mass meetings which exult in the right of power against the small States which are or will be assaulted and their populations enslaved. It is so exceedingly painful for all those who would like so much to believe in the good in a great people, that Nazism has so confused the German sense of honour that the masses are no longer able even to understand the abhorrence with which other peoples—those also of an outwardly much lower "civilization"—regard the German mentality and the actions of that country under the Nazi regime.

The Nazis have removed the last remainder of inner honour from the mystic receptacle with the glittering inscription "National Honour", and replaced it by their "Ersatz"—hypocrisy and boasting.

## Hitler's Mind

### Similarity with Wilhelm II—Reaction of the German People

In the nineties a gay, gaudily coloured sheet was distributed as a prize in German schools, with the inscription "peoples of Europe, preserve your holiest goods", signed with the well-known flourish of Wilhelm II. This sketch of an Amazon, designed to symbolize Europe defending herself against a gang of importunate men, apparently with liver complaints, was intended to encourage the struggle against the "yellow peril". The drawing was as tasteless and clumsy as all the propaganda-methods of the former "war-lord". But Wilhelm's II spontaneous idea—then at least original, not at all stupid, and in any case seriously meant—is one of those which—in spite of "race theory"—were temporarily adopted, then rejected, then resuscitated, and eventually again rejected by Hitler's opportunist policy, changing free of "principles", according as the moment's profit advised him to do, from "anti-comintern" to "Stalin" pacts and back to German-Italo-Japanese agreements.—Some years later the German pupils, to their dissatisfaction, had to practise the *Song to Aegir*, composed by Wilhelm II himself which—combining the inartistic with what was politically harmful—exercised a similarly effective propaganda in favour of the German fleet. As just at that time ghost stories about the New Palace were circulating, the Berliners made the disrespectful joke, that, when you sought at midnight for "spirits" in the castle, you only found Wilhelm II sitting quite alone at his piano playing his *Song to Aegir*—but no trace of any spirit!

Wilhelm was not only a first-rate painter, poet, and composer—at least in his own opinion—he was also a theologist and an historian. When he held services on his yacht *Hohenzollern*, he

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did not confine himself to the reading of the Bible, but preached whole sermons of his own composition. His excellent, "scientific" inventions concerning Hammurabi are as well known and important as his amusing ideas about the history of Prussia and Germany produced in so many beautiful speeches, which had the attraction of newness and would have served much more to cheer up contemporaries, if the author had not drawn conclusions from it, which were to have such bitter and serious political effects. Among the hobbies of Wilhelm II, naturally, the military ones were not lacking—a matter of course for the War Lord of Prussia.—In the South African war he put a war plan, drawn up by himself personally, at the disposal of Great Britain, free of charge, which would have led to immediate victory, if it had not been cast to the four winds.—Dissensions often occur among experts, and so it is of no consequence, that Wilhelm often did not meet with the approval of the critics at the game of war in the staff college and at the manœuvres. After all, the genius of the Emperor was always right, as was shown, when repeatedly the careers of too vehement critics came to an anticipated end. Who knows, whether the loss of the Great War by Germany should not be traced back to the fact that Wilhelm II—much too modest, as always—left the military conduct of the war to others.

The splendid successes of the last emperor in his own domain of politics are notorious. In internal affairs he achieved impossibilities: Social reforms, a bitter struggle against the Socialists, those "vagabonds without a fatherland", and the removal of all contrast of class—all this almost at the same time! Foreign affairs Wilhelm managed entirely by himself. But that this ridiculous talking shop of the Reichstag should intervene in any way; No! He had perceived with one ingenious glance, that the way to the glorious epoch to which he had to lead the German people was not straight ahead, but that zigzag politics were necessary. Those in the country who admonished—ay, "unconsciously making fun of themselves!"—had no idea how important it was to enjoy the "confidence" of the whole world—that in Berlin they were always suddenly attempting something quite unexpected. By turns sweetmeats, or a "lash with a whip"! The grumblers with their short-sighted views of the multitude naturally did not understand the deep wisdom of Wilhelm II, that—in his "gleaming suit of armour", with his sword in "his mail-clad fist" ready to strike—

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he threatened to "smash" everybody who "thwarted" him, and that—at the same time—he swore he would take the "title of an emperor of peace with him into his grave." Only Wilhelm's high-flown mind was able to discover, that there was no more certain way into war—pardon, peace!—but to defeat all peace conferences, and it was better to have strained relations with all the Great Powers and decline the "insidious disarmament plans of uncle Edward", offering, in place of that, an alliance with "Nicky" of Russia—and then badly hurting Russia's prestige by helping Austria against the Serbs.

It was a little too much for a single man. However, when in the hot summer of 1911 an elderly American who was for reasons of health at Nauheim asked at a dinner party where the author was present quite audibly and with the greatest calmness whether, indeed, they did not know in Germany, that in the United States Wilhelm II was generally held to be mad—it was a sensation! For, the German people on the whole was quite satisfied with their emperor. His youthful prank with Bismarck was forgotten. The Germans had always been accustomed to a practically absolute government. A weak effort by certain circles of the Reichstag in 1908 to thwart Wilhelm's politics which they found to be too "personal" had failed, and people were immensely amused, when a well-known East Prussian squire who must have been privy to it declared one day, the emperor would have the whole Reichstag dispersed by a lieutenant and ten men if it was too refractory. They were proud of the somewhat "surprising" jack-of-all-trades by whom they were governed, and they were convinced, that the whole world envied Germany its master. After all, it was the emperor's and not the people's business to decide politics! Many thought thus.—Incontestably Germany's prosperity had grown immensely during the reign of Wilhelm II. The people—quite in contrast to the officers—did not seriously believe, that a war was imminent, and only a few bore in mind the melancholy philosophy of old age, that—in the lives of peoples as well as of individuals—inner decay often has already made big progress, when the surface shows the brightest splendour. Incidentally, in the meantime, the German people has become a "young" one again, like the Italians, although besides their dictators nobody seems to know why.

Is not Wilhelm's likeness to Hitler obvious and, likewise,

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the similarity of the reactions of the German people? It is true, the "Fuehrer" prefers to equal Napoleon or King Frederick II of Prussia. Similarly as with Wilhelm II whose known "marginalia" indicated such morbid tendencies in Hitler's subconsciousness the fantastical idea seems to be developing, according to some psychiatrists, that he is identical, either with his model Frederick II, or with Napoleon, or even with both. But such a similarity is only his own wishful thinking. An inward similarity exists with neither of both autocrats, the significant difference consisting in Hitler's lack of this spirituality which—in spite of all—inspired Frederick's "clarified despotism" and Napoleon's revolutionary enterprises. Hitler owes his enormous successes actually to the appeal of his conceptions to the mediocrity and the materialism of the masses. In all his public manifestations, in spite of their pomposity, you will find the same superficial and hypocritical insipidity and this, simultaneously odious and somewhat ridiculous, bad taste of a philistine, which showed itself typically in the sending for Foch's old dining-car for the armistice negotiations with France in the summer of 1940.—A genuine similarity exists only with Wilhelm II, in person, in outward conduct, in politics, forms, and methods.—One can trace the likeness in small matters. It is strikingly the same type, the dimensions only differing.

At a first glance it seems inconceivable that, while the story of the last representative of the "second Reich" was still fresh in their minds, the imagination of a great people could be caught again, and so much more strongly, by a man of such similar characteristics. But—besides the generally known feature in the life of peoples and individuals, that most follies happen twice—one has only to recall, that Wilhelm II enjoyed, indeed, the sympathies of large classes of his own people until the Great War.—The reactions of the German people to the activities of her two autocrats are nearly the same—in their proportions. The military-absolutist-intellectual-Germany of 1914 was to Wilhelm's II's "genius" as the so much more unruly German people of 1933 to the correspondingly—more barbarous nature of Adolf Hitler. The progress to war was the same—might not also the end become the same?

We observe the same desire of pompous, threatening speeches to the world with Hitler as with Wilhelm II, the latter's more amateurish attempts of intimidation developed by Hitler into an

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essential means of his "war of nerves". Nevertheless, even the speculation on the anxieties of others can result from one's own timidity, and Hitler's medical war record shows the diagnosis of his temporary blindness as "hysterical amblyopia", i.e. blindness due to subconscious fear. His Iron Cross delivers no counter evidence, as the particular feat for which it was awarded is mysterious, and it is said, that the Iron Cross was given to him by Ludendorff, when they became associated after the war.

Hitler's endless discourses, delivered with this disagreeable roaring which produces nervous complaints in every non-German are all of the same structure. They are the same untrue assertions about the betrayal of Wilson's fourteen points, always the same repetitions about the stabbing in the back, the "shameful" treaty of Versailles, the fourteen years of alleged German humiliation, interlarded with wild insults against all opponents who are treated all alike as Bolsheviks—at least until not long ago!—Jews, Democrats, Capitalists, and Warmongers.—Who does not remember Wilhelm's "Vagabonds without a fatherland"? But Wilhelm asked them only to "shake off the dust of their home-country from their shoes", whilst Hitler imprisons his opponents in concentration camps, or causes them to be murdered.—Then unchangeably in the speeches of the "Fuehrer" descriptions follow of Schickelgruber's own prudence, vigour, and self-sacrifice in a manner even more tasteless than Wilhelm's II self-praise, After that, in Hitler's peace-time speeches with an absolute distortion of the facts—his "cultural and economic achievements" were enumerated, whereby "saloon-battles", the fights of intoxicated people in the beer-cellars, were placed on the same level as military combats. Apparently in the conception of this man the injuries done or received with broken legs of chairs or beer tankards are honoured like demonstrations of genuine heroism. Thereupon Hitler "settled his accounts" with foreign statesmen, and "disabled" them scornfully with his childish methods of *tu quoque*. The finish was invariably the declaration, vehemently bellowed at the world, that now Germany would make her—last (for the time being!) claim.

The *tu quoque*, especially, comes regularly into Hitler's speeches. His poor listeners don't even perceive, that an atrocity does not become a whit the better if, when charged with it, you scream at the other like a fool: "And what were you doing?"



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But, even if the listeners felt it, they would enjoy the cheap "disabling" of the opposer, because they are satisfied, mentally and sentimentally, with the actions of the Fuehrer. The *tu quoque* is the very specific for the mentality of the German listeners to oppose all accusations, however justified, and to evade every uncomfortable question. They can or will not understand in Germany, that parallels from long past periods of the history of other peoples, especially of the "insidious Britons", in no way excuse German violations of treaties or outrages of to-day, or prove, that the same mentality—only denied hypocritically—is still in existence to-day among other peoples. Naturally everybody is aware, even in Germany, that the cornerstone of wealth has nearly always been laid with a hardness which seems barbarous to the feeling of our times. But only inside Germany can they not understand, that this fact does not permit the conclusion, that the children who are now using the wealth for the advantage of their peoples, families, and fellow-creatures should be obliged, either to share it with Hitler-Germany, or to admit the right of Germany to use their own much harsher methods against every weaker people in the twentieth century. It is astonishing, that in peace-time only one of the foreign statesmen who were exposed to such a stupid reply—President Roosevelt—suitably "disabled" Hitler with the answer, that the point in question now was not, what had happened 150 years ago in India, but what was going on in Czechoslovakia, 1939. Then there was quietness for a short time. But it was not long, before things went on according to the old-established usage. This everlasting *tu quoque* clearly demonstrates the low level of the coincident, primitive mentality of the speaker and his listeners.

It is a form of dissociation of mind well known to the psychiatrists, when Hitler, apparently himself not aware of it, more and more frequently asserts in his manifestations the contrary of what he has said or done before. Therefore, it needs not always be conscious perfidy if he, the aggressor, unceasingly blamed peaceful neighbouring peoples of warmongering. It is possible, as specialists have pointed out, that those are features of that mania of being persecuted, or that, following his morbid belief in the right of the strongest, which he is convinced he is, he does not see aggression but defence in assaulting foreign peoples who are rebels in his view, because they oppose him. Hitler's

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frequently repeated declaration, that that was his "last" territorial claim in Europe which was then followed, at once, by another last of the lasts probably sprung from the same coercive perception as the drunkard's who always reassures us, that that is to be his "last" pint.

If you compare Hitler's political speeches from 1933 to 1940, you will find in all of them the same lies, the same hypocrisy, the same *tu quoque*, the same cheap, poisonous, and "witty" boasting; all this culminating in self-adulation and combined with a demagogical baiting against his personal adversaries who are stamped into "foes of the German people". All the speeches, quite the same whether they are delivered in peace or war time and whatever their special object—in spite of their contradictions—read as though it was again and again the same manifestation of a dangerous and fanatic madman, and this concession—that he is mad—we are bound, in fact, to make everywhere, when we have to reproach this man with hypocrisy, cruelty, and crimes of every kind.

Wilhelm II and Hitler think of themselves as universal geniuses and grand artists. Hitler has, in the pose of superior learning, made powerfully sounding speeches to an assembly of artists and learned specialists—not only of Germany—and then had them broadcast through the world, although they were so senseless, that they caused homeric laughter at such lack of education and such ridiculous nonsense.<sup>1</sup> The expectorations of a master painter, erroneously thinking himself a masterful painter.

Fully convinced of his own infallibility, the same man—going far beyond Wilhelm's arrogant, scientific fits—pointed out quite new foundations for all sciences. Not only did he turn philosophy, theology, history, biology, and jurisprudence upside down; he gave them at once a quite new, common head, in the hairdresser's manner, to the shuddering horror of all genuine scientists—the new Nazi world philosophy.—Unfortunately also in the spiritual sphere Hitler, even less than Wilhelm II, did not restrict himself to speaking. He made use of his new principles practically and recklessly. He removed from the professorial chairs of the universities all independent and important spirits, from the schools all those teachers who did not immediately conform to the mould, many of them thrown into his concentration camps. He "unified",

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chap. 8, page 87.

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stunted, and stupefied the whole cultural and spiritual life of his own country and of the conquered peoples, closed Universities and High Schools. He banned thousands of books, deprived the galleries of all those works which did not correspond to his own art scheme, which were produced by artists of a "foreign race", or which he was impudent enough to characterize as "degenerate," and, simultaneously, he disfigured the towns of Germany at enormous cost with pompous buildings of the worst pattern. In the demoniacal possession of his naïve race theory he endangers even the public health by forbidding, in spite of an imminent epidemic of typhoid fever, a general protective inoculation, in order not to pollute the purity of German blood.

Nothing appears big enough for him. He pointed out to a foreign diplomatist who declared his admiration of the size of the newly built stadium in Berlin, that all was still too small; it would have to be pulled down and rebuilt much bigger. It was not very rare, indeed, for costly new buildings, just finished—for example, his newly built chancellery—to be demolished immediately and erected again in a yet bigger size.

Wilhelm II was niggard, as far as his private property was in question. Hitler made an enormous fortune by combining business with policy. Both, however, were not at all economical in making use of public means. No layman can misunderstand the medical significance, when a former paperhanger calling himself a national "socialist" forgets so totally his principles of social equality that he builds fantastically fitted castles for himself in Berlin, Munich, Berchtesgaden and on a nearly inaccessible mountain summit at immense expense. At Berchtesgaden, in the extreme south-east corner of his empire where he usually resides he ordered the erection of superfluous government buildings, besides the existing ones in Berlin, in order to be able to govern in better safety from this bomb-proof residence. All this at the same time, when he was making it plain to his subjects, that it was "impossible, unfortunately, to remedy the shortage of houses, because the small amount of building materials and labour were to be used for the defence of the country!"

Wilhelm's projects to extend the German colonies are trifles compared with Hitler's plans of emigration and colonization of more and more fantastic dimensions. Despotically and violently he wishes to enforce a kind of new migration of nations, with a

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grandiose superficiality and without any respect of humanity, traditions and cultural ties, to create new vassal states in Europe with "inferior" peoples working for the German "people of Lords", and to acquire, besides this, colonies in Africa and overseas, the coloured population of which is to be reduced to actual slavery.

Unfortunately the whole world has for long underestimated the immense danger of this man's megalomaniac conceptions in the military sphere. You were inclined to smile, when he appointed himself in peace-time already officially supreme war-lord, held reviews, gave military commands. But soon the former lance-corporal without any professional education made independent military decisions. He ordered—against the advice of his generals—the march into the Rhineland, and, having succeeded with that immense bluff through the love of the democratic Powers for peace, he felt called upon to draw up most hazardous plans of campaign, and—again opposing the counsels of military authorities—to enforce their execution.—War means "force" above all. The use of the brute force of the masses, the intentional blunting of their feelings, and the replacement of all spiritual values by an immense screwing up of technique—all this corresponds extremely well to Hitler's mentality. The unrestricted placing at the disposal of the State not only money but literally all means and working power of a totalitarian country for the secret preparation of an intended war—that was Hitler's work, an action which only a criminal lunatic without any restraint could wage. And furthermore the unique connection of treachery and politics with the military conduct of the war shows characteristic features of Hitler's mind. He would be a bold psychologist who would overlook that sometimes the craftiest plans spring from a sick brain. Also Wilhelm II had his "inspirations" and again the German people of to-day shares the opinion of this violent megalomaniac, that he is a born Commander in Chief. This time even the generals are yielding.

It is impossible to calculate Hitler's immediate actions by means of discriminating knowledge suitable for normal human beings. For some time there were people who swore, that you had only to look up the *Kampf*, if you wanted to know at what time and in what direction the next train would start. After the conclusion of a treaty of friendship with Bolshevism, however, one

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is bound to confess, that even this mariner's compass does not show the direction any longer. Only if you eliminate the thought of every kind of restraint, if you presume every unscrupulous act against friends and enemies, and if you look at things from the point of view of a chemically pure opportunism, will you have a certain chance to understand that mind, the autocratic actions of which, always changing their aims with an insidious malignity, have the evident approval of the mass of the German people.

In his personal brutality Hitler does not need, as Frederick II did, to compound at first morally with the principle of Machiavelli—now again the most fashionable, craftiest rascal of all political theorists—the principle, that international treaties may be broken, if that seems useful in the interest of one's own people; or with Ignatius' of Loyola theory, that the end justifies the means. Both are a matter of course for him. In his opinion only idealistic fools can waste words on the fact that international agreements are only valid so long as they appear to be profitable. His day-to-day opportunism was never troubled by the idea, that the consequent misuse of trust must prove more injurious for himself and the German people in the long run than the instantaneous success was worth. His are the methods and the mentality which Goethe has described in his *Reineke the Fox*. He makes use of Machiavelli's theories without the refinements which had become usual in the course of centuries even in Germany. Power politics and "camouflage", however, have been Germany's specialties long before him, and only the boundless growth of its barbarism is Hitler's original work. Therefore, only a few people in Germany of to-day feel ashamed of those methods, and what makes a few of them uncomfortable is only the brutal form. Even in form, however, Europe had long ago got accustomed to outrages by Germany. As regards modern power politics one only has to remember Bismarck's speech on the Poles: "I have many sympathies with their position; but, if we want to exist, we must crush them. The wolf is not responsible, if he does what our Lord has created him to do." For his opportunism and lack of respect of his most solemn promises Hitler had a splendid example also from the recent German past in the philosophically educated Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg who took the same naïvely immoral standpoint of opportunism, when he pointed out in 1914, that a scrap of paper ought not to hamper the violation

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of Belgium's neutrality, a violation which he claimed to be necessary in the interest of Germany. That was not at all hypocrisy, but indeed the deepest conviction of that man, and he could never understand the world's indignation at the fact, that he had constituted himself a judge in his own case, as now Hitler is doing. That conception then corresponded to the mentality of the emperor, the army, and the German people, and the same conception now, more than ever, suffices the German mind. Only a few in Germany understood then and understand now, that the world's anger at Bethmann-Hollweg's argument in favour of the assault on Belgium in 1914 was as great, at least, as at the brutality of the occupation itself. In Germany the wrath in foreign countries was considered pure hypocrisy, because they were and are, absolutely unable to comprehend it psychically. That is so eminently significant of the mind of most Germans.

The "leader principle" is carried through in Germany to the utmost, much more strongly even than in Italy and Russia. The so-called Reichstag, at the times of Wilhelm II already almost powerless, has only to applaud Hitler and to supply the background for his manifestations. Obstinate and convinced of his own superiority even in this province Hitler enforced a political economy which was bound to lead to war or catastrophe. Wanting war he preferred to part from his last orthodox financial collaborator—for the others are puppets only—than to halt at the barrier, at which even the much-skilled Dr. Schacht shied. But he did not let the man go. Following the example of the old Roman tyrants he keeps him in sight after his dismissal "for special tasks", and Schacht—like many others—cannot travel abroad without leaving his family behind as hostages.

The law of his country Hitler has reduced to a farce. With the help of his pretorian guards and the "Gestapo" he is exercising an unimaginable terrorism. For himself no law exists, no prohibition. One dares still less to deliver unpleasant reports to him than formerly to the emperor. Everybody near is trembling before his hysteric fits of rage. It is useless to oppose him, as that only rouses his passion—and because arguments mostly do not even reach the perception of this insane man who always believes only in his own "inspirations", in spite of the fact, that they are frequently contradictory. Innumerable homicides are evidence how dangerous his fury is which does not stop at anybody in

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whom he sees an opponent. Without any spark of humanity he causes former friends and old "fellow-combatants" to be murdered, if his suspicion has been aroused against them. Following his sadistic impulses he invents exquisite tortures for his victims and—strangely enough—the great despiser of the Jews and of the Old Testament has accustomed himself to the threat, "an eye for an eye!" which apparently suits his mind especially well.

There is no doubt, that his aim is world domination. He thinks he has established already the Nazi empire for a thousand years. He declares frankly he is the greatest German, still more, the greatest man of all times. He abolishes religions, and, more than even Wilhelm II with his theory of the divine right of kings, Hitler is putting the Germans under his ban by causing himself to be deified, on the authority and the prescription of his patron saint Nietzsche: "It is a passion of Germans to follow a despot who has succeeded in ensuring a mystic kind of divine veneration."

Can anyone fail to appreciate the characteristic, medical picture of the megalomania of despots, which Tacitus has already painted in such a masterly and fascinating manner? Boundless, overweening estimation of himself, prodigality, the worst abuse of power, blind hate and reckless brutality against every adversary—all this ending in bloodthirsty madness. Not even the belief of the Roman tyrants in astrology is lacking.

The development could scarcely be otherwise with a man whose whole character and work exhaust themselves in hysterical explosions of temper and brutal rudeness, in no way controlled by self-discipline and any profound training of his mind, and not hampered by any religious or other obligation. It was inevitable, that this man's brain could not stand up for long to the permanent aspect of his own might, to the incessant ecstasy of admiration by flattering, cringing, and, at the same time, fearful creatures, and to the uninterrupted exultation of the fanatical masses. He was bound, indeed, to lose completely the feeling of the limits which are drawn for every human being. The result is the embodiment of every evil.

The intrinsic characteristic, however, of this man's thinking and acting is significantly that with which he, without foundation, most vehemently reproaches—the Jews whom he calumniates most of all. Upon their alleged decomposing mind his particular

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hate rests. But in fact his own work and imagination are always aiming at the destruction of all genuine values. Religion, culture, morale, liberty, tolerance—his “fight” is with all these, and it is not by chance, that not only does his book bear that name, but that he also calls all his other actions “combats” and “battles”. In order to keep his authority he is bound always to start a new alarm, always to commit new atrocities and, eventually, to put the finishing touch to his destructive work by frivolously provoking a new world war. He calls this the “dynamics of his move”. Others—perhaps more rightly—have called it nihilism.



## *Chapter 17*

# Hitlerism—The German Brand of 1940

## Germans Abroad—The Refugees

The whole world is aware, that Hitler is mad. Only Germany does not know it. The average German—accustomed to obedience and under the impression of the day-by-day boasts of the greatness and splendour of the German Empire—for whom the unique and matchless personality of "The Leader" was produced in brilliant limelight, contrasted with a mischievous and disgusting description of the fearful, decayed, and warmongering statesmen of other countries, was already living before the war in an atmosphere of unreality, force, and emotion, perpetually excited anew. Since the new war by a redoubled propaganda and by Hitler's striking "successes" the fanaticism must grow to extremities. To explain the reactions of the German masses to the radiations of this man is the most important part of our investigation. It is certainly the most interesting question psychologically.

We have learned, that education and historical development in Germany had for one hundred and fifty years prepared an especially adequate and fertile soil for every kind of chauvinism, and that the evolution since 1918 and its development into National Socialism conclusively resulted from the spiritual conditions, into which this people, not ripe for a free, democratic system, was bound to fall after the concussions of the last twenty years. The phenomenon, however, that for many Germans National Socialism is summed up in Adolf Hitler, that his person made such an immense impression on their fancy, that Hitler's paranoia was able to infect by degrees the morbid mentality of wider and wider circles, and that "Nazism" finally became "Hitlerism",

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has a further special reason.—The extension of the mass-psychosis and its peculiar development were favoured especially by the fact, that both, National Socialism and Hitler's paranoia, are symptoms of the same sickness. Hitlerism is nothing mentally strange to the masses, but a congenial state of mind. Therefore Hitler corresponded to the instincts of his people with such an extraordinary precision. The poison concentrated in Hitler himself as in an ulcer was infecting the morbid body of the people again and again, and Hitler's own illness is always nourishing itself afresh from the morbid excitement of the masses of his adherents. That perpetually renewed, mutual self-intoxication between Hitler and the sick mind of the people is the main reason why the masses in Germany could not fail to fall so completely into the power of Hitlerism, whilst in other countries with a politically sound population ideas similar to National Socialism could attack only comparatively small circles easily infected by special conditions. Actually Hitlerism is a specifically German mental sickness.

The morbid mentality of the German masses is practically identical with that of their leader, with the distinction, naturally, that the will of the German masses of being dominated meets with the leader's will to dominate, and that his megalomania is met by a corresponding "inferiority complex" on the part of the masses—outwardly a nation of superior beings. Therefore one has to judge the mentality of those of the German people caught by Hitlerism by examining both Hitler's mind and their own. There is a certain kind of spiritual coincidence between Hitler and his followers. That does not mean, naturally, that every single follower of Hitler has to be considered dangerously insane, as has to be done with the leader himself. The mass as a whole, however, has certainly the same genuine mental disorder, although in a minor degree than the leader, and it is at least doubtful whether a big part of Hitler's individual adherents too must not be considered actually insane in the medical sense.

Not only is Hitler's spiritual domination over great masses of Germans an incontestable fact, but there is a certain working on each other also of the mentalities of the leader and the led. Sometimes people abroad were absolutely unable to imagine, that Hitler himself could believe his misrepresentations and contradictory assertions could be taken seriously in foreign countries. Therefore they concluded, that some of his speeches were destined

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only for "home consumption". They concluded, erroneously, the many contradictions were unknown to the Germans. But those present at the mass-meetings in Germany had exactly the opposite feeling. Because of the instinctive coincidence of the mentalities of the leader and the led, the nearness of which cannot be overestimated, the masses felt, that much of what was pronounced at those meetings was destined for abroad.—The hearers were proud to feel, that they belonged a little to the conspiracy, and that they knew something better than "could be spoken out so openly". Those led often perceive instinctively—just because they have that mentality so closely connected with Hitler's own—many ideas very well which may be fermenting in the leader's brain, and if sometimes the gossip of the politicians of the alehouse benches seemed to be hare-brained at first, events confirmed later on, that they were better able to understand the dark odd order of the leader's thoughts than learned diplomats. The reverse is also true; if you try to trace Hitler's thoughts, you are, simultaneously, following the semi-instinctive trains of thought of the masses.

The contradictions in the home and foreign policies of the seven years of the Nazi regime are so notorious, that it would be underestimating the German masses, if you thought that they had not realized them, although they had more or less forcibly to listen to all the speeches of the leader and saw his works.

In home politics Germany has for seven years applauded the most absurd contradictions. The people had consented in 1933 to the shortening of the daily working hours and to the stigmatizing of the Stachanow system as an evil wearing out of the working classes. A full year before the war, however, it allowed the ten-hour-day and an aggravated Stachanow system to pass. They had been persuaded in 1933, that women and children should stay at home and not work in factories, and in 1938, while still at "peace", they agreed, that it was the duty of the housewives to give their work to industry. The people rejoiced in 1933, that handicraft was to be restored, and they consented in 1939 to nearly 200,000 small industries and more than 800,000 other small trades vanishing, gradually, when it was explained, that in a modern Germany there was no room for "dwarf businesses". Not even in the circles of the small industrialists immediately affected could that development disturb the faith in Hitler's

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superior leadership.—German women readily consented, when it was explained to them in 1933, that it was not decent and not “German” to walk in trousers, and when the moral depravity of Russia could not be described in frightening enough terms, because it had “communized” women. When in 1939 at Munich, at an October-carnival nude scenes were publicly shown, in Hitler’s presence, in a manner the shamelessness of which it is impossible to describe, the enthusiasm was no smaller. Even the German “Gretchen” had quickly to learn again, and to accept her new part as a “guinea-pig” according to Hitler’s theory, that the unmarried woman also has to produce soldiers, and that willing fathers are available from the ranks of the S.S. and S.A., if necessary.

Naturally the contradictions in foreign politics also did not remain unknown in Germany. We have already pointed out in another place, that the masses likewise agreed, when Hitler explained, that the annexation of Austria was not in question and then, when he annexed it; when he denied having any further territorial claims in Europe, and then attacked and, practically, annexed Czechoslovakia and half of Poland, and is going to do the same with great parts of France; when he concluded non-aggression pacts, and then broke them; when he boasted, that he wished only men of German blood in Germany, and then incorporated indiscriminately peoples of other races; when he promised solemnly to respect the neutrality of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and attacked them a few weeks later. We have seen, that Germany assented with the same conviction to the roaring tirades about the bloodthirsty Bolshevik Stalin, then to the Stalin pact and Hitler’s congratulations on Stalin’s sixtieth birthday, then to the resuscitation of the anti-comintern pact policy by the German-Italo-Japanese treaty, and, lastly, they hailed Molotoff at his visit in Berlin.

The opinion, so often expressed in other countries, that the German masses would turn away from Hitler, “if only they would be aware of the truth”, is absolutely incorrect. Nothing was too strong before the war for the German mentality, and what other countries thought would arouse the fury of the Germans against the Nazi rulers, if things could only be explained, actually suited the mind of the masses very well. Therefore it was of little use when, during the first period of the war, London and Paris

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broadcasted the most remarkable contradictions of Hitler's speeches in his own "well"-known roaring voice from wax discs to their German listeners—besides the fact, that, in consequence of Germany's seclusion, a breath from abroad is scarcely felt in the hurricane of Goebbels's propaganda. Such means could not influence the morbid faith of the masses in their "leader". Many of them, probably, did not apprehend even why one took these inconsistencies "so dreadfully seriously at all". For, the masses, judging others by themselves, do not only share Hitler's own opinion, that the "whole moral indignation of foreign countries is only hypocrisy, and that, in fact, they think there in just as opportunist a manner as the Germans; more, they believe, that all foreign peoples—as in the time of Wilhelm II—are highly envious of the Germans because of their leader! The German masses have observed with naïve pleasure and primitive pride how magnificently Hitler succeeded in so many things in the fields of diplomacy. They enjoyed his "successful tricks". "Why are you such fools"? was the feeling of the Man in the Street who showed therewith the same working of mind which expresses itself in Hitler's clumsy distortion of the genuine significance of the maxim, when he claims again and again, that his successes have proved, that he was in the "right". As if such a "success" had anything to do with law and morals.

The German masses are also well aware, that what Goebbels in his known "witty" slimy manner, or Goering in his childish, popular mountebank way, pronounced, or what Hitler himself, in bombastic phrases with frightening roaring and fearful threatening, reported about his latest "peace labours", has very little to do with objective truth. They were not in the least disgusted by that, however. Not even the notorious, artificially studied, oily and vomitory tone of the German wireless announcers imitating Goebbels' manner and their impudent and haughty way of pronouncing their daily propaganda lies excited the repugnance of the German masses, although they were once accustomed to better things. The German public ordered to the loudspeakers is, more than ever before, blinded by the war successes of the leader, and, naturally, continues to deify Hitler whose winding and bloody paths it is following, even if it has to sacrifice its youth, to work harder in unconscious slavery and get less to eat. Although everybody in Germany has fully experienced, that Hitler approves to-

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day what he condemned yesterday, and vice versa, and in spite of Hitler's own "struggle"-dogma, that no dictator—not even in matters of secondary importance—ought ever to change his standpoint, "because that would destroy the faith in his infallibility," no average German ever reflected—let alone wished to—on the conclusion which ought long ago to have been drawn. If, after the attempt at Munich they had inferred in other countries from certain signs, that some of the more prudent adherents of Hitler had begun to ask, whether it was not time for the leader to finish the drama, scarcely any of those assertions were true. Such allusions would have cost those who tried to express them very dear. Incidentally, the attempt at Munich, from which one would infer a counter-move inside the "party", did not prove this too much. Although it was undertaken, probably, by someone among the leading Nazi circles, you have always to keep your eye on the fact, that all those round Hitler consist more or less of gangsters, and that—those people are foes one minute and friends the next.

It is not at all fear only, when immense crowds applaud fanatically at the mass-meetings the pronouncements of Goering and Goebbels, that it is great self-deception on the part of other countries to think, that a wedge can be driven between the German people and their leader. When Hitler roars amid the jubilation of the masses, that he and the German people are one, the enthusiasm is genuine indeed. Certainly it is a typical distortion, when Goebbels claims, that "the leadership is only carrying out the will of the German people", but only because that people has no distinct political will at all. Actually it has still the will, however, to run behind its leader. As that is so, Goebbels may claim with some truth, that Germany "need not allow itself the luxury of democratic countries in letting independent newspapers expose their different views to the masses, so that the people can form their own opinion—or even to allow the masses to listen to foreign wireless reports. The government could confine itself to putting one view only to the people—its own; that is more useful for the people, and it assents". The explanation, that way is "more useful" for the people, is certainly enormous impudence; the assertion, however, that the people agrees with this spiritual restriction, is right, as regards a great part of the German population, incomprehensible though that may seem to

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any citizen of a democratic State. The masses of the German people, actually, will not face the single aspects even of the most important questions, nor consider, let alone decide, them. Their absolute disinclination to all individual, political thinking and their herd instinct—contrasting with Gallic clearness and British common sense—was influenced all along, moreover, by their feelings, especially in policy. As they always have been led, they will follow their leader fanatically, whose inspirations they think are of direct divine origin—till the success forsakes him.

In Great Britain the Government and Press informed us at the beginning of the war, that only Hitlerism was being fought, not the German people, and if you spoke with anybody in these countries—high or low—the difference of their position as regards the Germans, compared with the frame of mind of 1914, was obvious. Nobody liked to hold the German people responsible for what the Nazi Government had done and was doing. One could not esteem enough this humane sentiment which expressed itself also in the general attitude towards the German Refugees. But their mentality does not at all—unfortunately—represent that of the Man in the Street in Germany. Letters also of Nazi opposers living inside Germany which occasionally reached non-German broadcasting institutions, foreign newspapers, or reporters in a roundabout way and in which opinions of single German men and women are expressed differing entirely from the Nazi ones—are by no means representative of the attitude of the German masses. Even in an important *Times* “leader” published some time after the beginning of the war it was still pointed out that the “discrimination” between the Nazis and the German people could not be “maintained”, if—as in the Great War—the Germans should not free themselves from their dominators before the war virtually had been won by the democracies. The style of this article was significant in that it shared the widely spread view, that there was a big gap between the Nazi rulers and the German masses. One may, perhaps, suppose, that the hypothesis of *The Times* was intended more as an incentive to the adversaries of the Nazism in Germany to proceed to actions soon, the more as, since war had begun, the condition of a revolution was supplied for which all the adversaries of the Nazi system had supposedly been waiting, i.e. that the people only needed to have weapons in their

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hands. After Munich one had frequently heard in the circles of German antagonists of Hitler, even expressions of regret regarding the prevention of the war, because the possibility of revolt had thereby been hindered.—The observations of the author—it must be stressed—lead in just the contrary direction. Not a small group of Nazis is terrorizing the bulk of the German people. The German masses themselves are Nazis, or, at least, heavily affected by Nazism. Conclusions drawn from old election ciphers, that a strong minority of, perhaps, 40 per cent still exists in Germany, are quite out of date, after eight years of Nazi domination. After the fanatical enthusiasm with which the German masses were following the “successful” war policy of Hitler, it is difficult to understand, that still now some expert observers deceive themselves completely as to the German state of mind. Delusions as to the political opinions of the bulk would be highly hazardous. The masses in Germany are certainly not even contemplating a revolt against Nazism yet. No force of Hitler’s pretorian guards or of the Gestapo could defeat a revolution, if it were really wished for and resolutely carried through by the masses in Germany. They did not need at all to wait first for their arming in the war. The small movements in Czecho-Slovakia which were finally and bloodily suppressed show what the German people could have done, if only the masses had wished it. But they did not want it at all. In spite of occasional discontent, neither deteriorated working or food conditions, nor casualties and destructions in the war were yet capable of seriously shaking the mass psychosis, let alone of rousing a deep bitterness and fury of the people against the Nazi regime. He who knows the Germans must be convinced, that the “successes” in Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland already—and how much more the successful overrunning of Holland, Belgium, and France—had strengthened the faith in the “superior leadership and magic personality of Hitler” to such a degree, that his plans of world domination were accepted triumphantly by the “people of lords” stirred up to extremes by propaganda. You must not forget, that you have to deal with a people whose small power to think for themselves is now so fully paralysed, that they believe according to Hitler’s wishes by turns, or even simultaneously, in the “Jewish Bolshevik blood tyranny in Moscow”, against which is maintained the anti-comintern pact, and in the “friendship” with the same Russia under Stalin. They



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could be talked into believing in the meantime, the Western Powers had aimed *a priori* at the strangulation and the dismemberment of Germany, so that—excited by a nightmare of oppression awaiting Germany after a defeat of Nazism—many would prefer, in their present condition of mind, even a kind of Nazi Bolshevism, however vaguely perceptible, to a British victory. But equally easily they could also be led vice versa into war against Bolshevism, if Hitler wants it and if his friendship with Stalin breaks—with or against his wishes. It is just a total, fanatical, mental derangement of the masses, and, whilst the “successes” are continuing, you should treat occasional reports of apathy and weariness of war with great reserve. He who expects a revolution against Nazism, before Germany’s position in the war is severely damaged, will experience a heavy disappointment. The opportunist masses of the German people will not free themselves from their highest opportunist, before this, for opportunist reasons, seems opportune to them.

Certainly there are many adversaries of Nazism and especially the reckless “purge” in all professions of “unreliable elements”, in order to break up even the last resistance, has naturally created a picked group of embittered adversaries among the dismissed ones and their families. The real strength even of that group, however, ought not to be over-estimated. Besides the murdered, imprisoned, and otherwise “silenced” opponents of Nazism, emigration and pressure to learn again, have done their work. Many sons, daughters, and sons-in-law are Nazis and many a father has forgotten his old love of democracy for their sakes.

The mind of those Germans who seriously decline Hitlerism is little different from that of other European peoples. These are generally speaking the Christian religious circles of all political directions, certain Cosmopolites and all those “Liberals and Marxists” who were all along adherents of a free world philosophy. The mentality of those groups shows the usual political, educational, and class differences, and distinguishes itself from the neighbouring peoples only by a few, not at all bad, peculiarities, as, perhaps, special musical talents, or the well-known German thoroughness, and a strong sense of order and organization. They are neither savage, nor nationalistic, nor intolerant, whilst their love of the home, a strongly developed close family life, a certain sentimentality, and the often mentioned German nostalgia

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are scarcely real national specialties. Among those free-thinking souls, probably, you will not even find "discipline" developed much more strongly than among the neighbouring peoples, although this is indeed a peculiarity of the German character—with the masses frequently degenerating into the fatal "herd instinct". It would be strange to anybody who declines the greatest invention of Nazism, the theory of an inborn, "racial" superiority or inferiority of moral and spiritual qualities, unchangeable by historical development and education, to believe, that even this intellectually and morally intact part of the Germans which remained free from the mass psychosis of Nazism should think and feel essentially otherwise than the neighbouring peoples. Only strong minds, however, living in Germany could really keep themselves free from the immense pressure, and frequently you can even trace the inner reason of such a power of resistance by family tradition, international connections, or any special experience of life, or personal learning which has nothing to do with school education.

Nazi pressure is working even abroad. The world has learned with stupefaction and horror by the activities of German diplomats and consuls, and of many other official and unofficial Nazi organizers and spies, how great and dangerous is the influence of Nazism on the Germans in foreign countries. Although the Germans abroad are able to have true information, in contrast to their fellow-countrymen living inside the Third Reich, they are to a large extent fanatical adherents of Hitler, and even this fact is a strong proof of the assertion of this book, that Hitlerism is indeed the general German mentality of to-day. Even if you make all proper concessions concerning those who for fear of terror only joined the Nazi organizations abroad, the great majority of their members are genuine Hitlerists, and the remainder is, at least, highly suspect to be more or less affected by Nazism. On the other hand, you may suppose that those who kept aloof from the organizations, in spite of all pressure and temptation, are indeed genuine Nazi opponents, and no mere indifferents.—In the underground agitation and in the intrigues of the German fifth columns, in the reckless baseness which became evident in their views and treacherous actions against countries which were their hosts—and, naturally, also against the German Refugees living there—the typical Nazi mind is seen. There could be no doubt,

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indeed, about the urgent necessity for hospitable countries to protect themselves against the activities of the German fifth columnists—men as well as women—with all their energy.

Astonishingly, however, this energy was frequently directed against the Refugees from Hitler's oppression who indeed are not at all suspect of any sympathy with the Nazis. This is another proof of how little the average non-German citizen, especially in Great Britain, has been able till now to see through the problem of the German mentality. Disappointed deepest in his former sympathy with the Germans and righteously furious about the activities of the fifth columns, he could not conceive, that the Refugees, although technically "enemy aliens", represent precisely that part of the Germans which is not *infected* but most deeply *affected* by Hitlerism. Perhaps there may be some Communists among these Refugees who—so long as the friendship between Stalin and Hitler continues—you might think, at least theoretically, to be suspect of a change of mind in a pro-Hitler direction, although it seems almost inconceivable to a clear-thinking mind, that anybody who had learnt the Hitler methods in his own person and had escaped them could at any time forget his horror again. These elements, in any case, so far as they are suspect indeed, will not have escaped the attention of the police of the countries where they are guests, and every reasonable person will agree with their internment. But all the non-communistic, genuine Refugees who have left Germany since 1933 are certainly not suspect of Nazi mentality, and they certainly do not constitute any danger to the peoples that have received them. With their whole heart they, naturally, wish for the destruction of Hitlerism, which robbed them of all they possessed.—It has been said, that these people were adversaries of the Nazis only, not of Germany, and, perhaps, might think it their duty, in spite of everything, to help the German cause in the war. Nobody can share such a superficial opinion who has clearly understood, that this is not simply a war between nations or, perhaps, "mere ideologies", but, indeed, between the eternal and unsurmountable contrasts of ethics and morals on the one side, and barbarism on the other. He who has the slightest idea of what it is in the souls of those who are in fact "Refugees of Nazi oppression" cannot have any doubt, that they are thoroughly convinced they cannot do a better service to the good part of the German people than to

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serve with all their might and to the end the cause of those who are fighting now against Germany. They know, that there can be no renaissance of a Germany, worthy to exist and to live in, if this war does not end by victory of democracy. Everyone of these people would have understood and even welcomed it, if the reasons for his flight from Germany, his personal circumstances, his views were scrutinized to the utmost. It was, however, not only narrow-minded but wrong to poison the minds of these beings by a clumsy, indiscriminating method of treating them simply as "enemy aliens", and destroy thereby the trust binding them to the democratic cause. Unfortunately great damage has been done already in this direction. Immense undeserved, and quite unnecessary, hardship has been caused to the Refugees by the wholesale internment, by the breaking up of their families, by the deportation of many thousands, not to mention the destruction of laboriously created new existences, and the loss of brains and arms for the war effort. Also Great Britain's old-established reputation as a country of asylum has suffered by this strange Xenophobia, and a great opportunity is, at least temporarily, missed to make everyone of these sufferers of Nazi oppression a grateful apostle of British magnanimity. Put yourself in the place of such a Refugee. Having escaped the inferno of a German concentration camp, having found a refuge in Great Britain, he has seen how his fellow-sufferers in Holland were served up on a charger to the sadism of the Nazis, when the Dutch Government, having perceived much too late the peril of the fifth column, in haste robbed all "German aliens", without distinction, of their liberty. How sardonically all the real fifth columnists must have laughed up their sleeves! He has witnessed an even worse development in France, where secret Nazi sympathizers in the administration had prepared for long a similar fate for many refugees from Germany.—Then he experienced the wholesale internment in Great Britain, the deportations, etc., and, finally, when the blunder was recognized, the reluctant and extremely cautious release of certain "categories", still dependent on highly disputable presumptions. "Usefulness", above all, should not have been made a condition of magnanimous hospitality, i.e. exemption of internment, as it has nothing at all to do with the alone decisive question of loyalty. Both points of view ought not to be mixed up, as the Nazis did,

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when they ingenuously liberated "economically valuable" Jews from certain restrictions.<sup>1</sup> You ought not to have any doubt, moreover, that the Refugees willingly will put their services at disposal, if only they are permitted to do it.—Many superficial people said, that it was impossible to come to clear distinctions between "these foreigners". This was absolutely untrue. The great majority of the cases was perfectly clear after the sifting by the Home Office, the immigration officers, the police, and the tribunals. If there was still any difficulty to find out the true opinions of some people, they could be solved simply by asking the proper "Refugee Committee" which easily could trace the antecedents of nearly everybody, as most of the genuine Refugees know each other. Nobody would have made any objections to the necessary measures of protection, if there remained the slightest doubt.—Such a procedure, simultaneously humane and efficacious, would have avoided the heavy damage done by the hasty "rounding up" with its accompanying and following phenomena and by the precipitated deportation of Hitler's victims. It was senseless, indeed, to treat those people like enemies, only because they were born in Germany. It is a fact, that not one single case of treachery by genuine Refugees has happened, neither in Great Britain nor elsewhere, and those who were crying for internment of the "whole lot", because one could not run a "potential risk", did no good service to this country. It is extremely difficult to understand how they could think, that it was an adequate means to fight Hitlerism by locking up the refugees of its oppression! A search for fifth columnists could only be successful carried out among naturalized and not naturalized Germans who were *not* Refugees besides, of course, among British-born subjects infected by Nazism.—The author himself has gained before the war already some personal experience in Holland. He was always convinced, that in the Dutch officialdom there were many fifth columnists, and it is a fact, that a great number of those policemen also, who had to deal with the German Refugees—were secret Nazis. No wonder, that these sympathizers were bravely inclined to imprison genuine Refugees of Nazi oppression showing thereby their own proficiency and patriotic ardour to their own superiors, diverting any suspicion from themselves and their fifth column colleagues, and, at the same time, presenting the Nazi

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chap. 10, page 121.

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invaders with the Refugees!—Gestapo mentality abroad!—It is still time to repair, at least, a part of the damage by quick and magnanimous action. Instead of surrendering the Refugees to embitterment and despair—not trusting them, refusing their willingness to help, robbing them, eventually, of their freedom, and even deporting them—one should make really full use of the energy and skill of all those whose mentality is not suspect. Both traditional British hospitality and political prudence demand, on principle, the treatment of Refugees of Nazism as friendly aliens. By strengthening the trust and the respect of these beings towards their hosts you do not only secure the help of all those who are able to make an immediate contribution to the fight against Nazism, but many of them will be called upon in the future to build a new mentality in another Germany.

## Hitler's War—Sinister Trends of Thought and Methods—Attitude of the German People

The fact that already by the spring of 1939 Hitler had made up his mind that Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and Upper Silesia would have to fall now, is confirmed by the reports of the French ambassador Coulondre and by much information which reached the Polish government. The assault on Poland was an "economic need" for Germany, as we have learned, and further a step on the way to world domination. Moreover, the former lance-corporal was longing for the triumph of a prompt military victory, to legitimize himself as Germany's "supreme war-lord". For, the conquests of Czechoslovakia and Austria had been intrinsically diplomatic successes only. In Poland military honour was obtainable comparatively cheaply, and that was extremely attractive to the mentality of Hitler and his advisers, especially of Ribbentrop, his new Bismarck—*en miniature* it is true, although he outdoes his model at least in one direction, i.e. by his still greater lack of restraint. On the assurances and under the influence of this man to whom the ambassador of Great Britain in Berlin has testified "obstinate stupidity"—although you would better concede him in addition, at least, a big portion of evil slyness and baseness of mind—Hitler, in full accord with his generals and his people, was firmly convinced, that Great Britain and France would become reconciled to his "triumph" in Poland and nothing would "happen" for the time being in the West. As to Hitler's full accord with the generals at the beginning of the war against Poland, there can be no doubt. There are authentic reports, that the generals themselves—all preparations being completed—overcame Hitler's familiar last moment irresolution.

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When the war against Great Britain and France became unavoidable—contrary to all anticipations—and prestige, self-will and, last but not least, the pressing economic difficulties made retreat almost impossible, hastily the Stalin Treaty was made.

It is interesting for the knowledge of Hitler's and the corresponding mentality of the German people to have a short, retrospective look at the "leader's" unprincipled tactics during this first period of the war.—When the "imperialism" of the new eastern friend immediately revealed itself, then obviously Hitler would have cancelled too willingly the whole Russian business, even at a price, rather than be pressed perhaps to death by the new friend in the East at any time. A faltering was clearly sensible.—In every case, then, for the moment it seemed the best for him to settle the war in the West, and immediately a "peace offensive" was launched!—Nobody can decide, whether Hitler himself, in his hysteria and occupied in digesting the Polish prey, then indeed thought his own explanation to be honest, that Poland should be the last of his last territorial "claims". It is not improbable that temporarily he had made up his mind, in fact—not because of honesty of course, but for fear—not to engage in new enterprises in the future, if only he could retain Poland, re-establish peace with the Western Powers, and free his hands anew against comrade Stalin. But, even if Hitler at that time actually wished the restitution of peace in the West—whereby the question remains, how long he would have kept it, if he had succeeded in shaking off Stalin again, and then the appetite, temporarily lost by uneasiness, would have returned—now it was too late. Neither Great Britain nor any democratic government in a still unconquered France could leave Hitler his prey, if they did not want to lose the world's respect, their own self-respect, endanger the safety of the future, and irritate public opinion in their own countries. Hitler, on the other hand, could not abandon his prey, because then Germany would have been finished economically and he himself politically. To resign, however, was out of the question for this gentleman.

The similarity between the development in 1914 and 1918 and of Wilhelm's (II) and Hitler's conduct is striking. Like Wilhelm who, from his dynastic point of view, wished a punitive expedition against the Serbs, even at the price of a war against Russia and, perhaps, France—but not a world war, Hitler wanted his war



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against the Poles, but, at least at this moment, his armament not yet complete, not a great war against the West. Both despots miscalculated likewise Great Britain's resolution.—Still more significant is, however, the attitude of the German people. Whilst in 1914 they simply believed what they were officially told, and obeyed instinctively, so to speak, in 1939 this spiritual coincidence between the "leader" and his herd, this working on each other of the mentality of both was clearly to be felt.

Hitler has obviously understood, but very late, that the attempt to apply his familiar tactics—i.e. to assert immediately after an assault, that this was the last, and that now, fully satisfied, he would keep peace in the future—had been a failure this time, and that, instead of a hoped-for quick and easy victory over a so much weaker opponent like Poland, a war, perhaps against two fronts, had to be conducted at the risk of life to the Nazi regime.—As he, the dictator, did not, at that moment, want a war against the Western Powers, how did they dare to wage a war? They, surely, had no direct material interests in Eastern Europe, and a man like Hitler does not believe in "idealistic" ones. Knowing himself to be prepared to betray all the ideals about which he talks so much, whenever it suits him, he expected others to be the same. From this, his own, point of view, in order to regain peace in the West, he had to convince the others only, that he would be satisfied with Germany's new position of a leading Power in Eastern Europe, and that a plan of world domination never had existed, or was abandoned. He had to eliminate only the anxiety of the democracies to make a new attack on them one day. They had simply to believe him, when he asserted again and again, that he had no territorial claim against France, that he would not go to war against Great Britain in the future about the question of colonies, that he would even be prepared to disarm—theoretically. The foreign statesmen had always until then shown themselves ready to accept new assertions at the very moment when he was about to commit a breach of his word. Why should they not succumb yet once more to their wishful thinking? That was apparently the conception of Hitler and Ribbentrop as well, as the almost unanimous opinion of the German people. Apart from this, they relied, probably, also to a certain degree on the strong, subversive influence on politics of their fifth columns and many other forces of wealthy people and

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semi-Fascists in other countries which later proved so fatal, especially in France. The Germans by their own mentality were certainly aware of the secret, sinister trends of thought of their leader, and as they knew, that he did not wish then a major war, they did not believe in it. However naïvely it may sound, the Man in the Street in Germany in his boundless respect before his leader, like Hitler himself in his megalomania, both were incapable to imagine, that the "degenerate" democracies could really have the audacity to wage a war against the German leader's expressed will. They did not understand, that just what they called "degeneration"—i.e. tolerance, decency, and the wish to avoid the use of force, if at all possible—was in fact "civilization."

Nobody in Germany understood the whole weight of the resolve of all real democrats to put an end to the intolerable threat of aggression, once and for all and at any sacrifice, by extinguishing Hitlerism. The megalomaniac psychopath himself having succeeded so totally in hypnotizing his own people thought, indeed, he could also force the mind of a real democracy to his will—and the Germans shared this conception. Such deliberations led to Hitler's new "peace offensive" after the conquest of Poland. They forgot, that free men have not the dishonest, slavish mentality of German "subjects". No Hitler and no average German will ever perceive the solidarity with which the whole British commonwealth, made up of such various elements, united voluntarily and deliberately in a war in which no material profit was to be expected, and which is entered into "only" for the fundamentals of civilization, in the conviction, that under all circumstances the lawless use of force in the life of peoples and individuals must be stopped for the security of the world, and that honesty and adherence to treaty obligations must be re-established, as these principles are indispensable to the normal living together of peoples as well as of individual human beings. So "antiquated" a conception could only produce—according to temperament—either loud laughter or a pitying smile from such statesmen as Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Goebbels, but also from the masses of the people whom they had corrupted. The boundless cynicism of leader and herd is an ironic answer to all those who still honestly, but stupidly, subscribed to the opinion, that "mere ideological dissensions" should not hamper a nearer co-operation

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with Nazi Germany in the sphere of foreign affairs. Now, when the events in Norway, Holland, Belgium and, above all, in France have unveiled the underground Nazi activity, the social composition of the circles of Nazi sympathizers in foreign countries and their far-reaching influence, the sardonic grin of the German statesmen gains its special significance; but the eyes also now may have been opened of many former isolationists in the United States of America concerning the real meaning of the sinister Nazi mentality and methods.

When Hitler, before the onslaught on Poland, at the refortification of the Rhineland and in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia, swore he didn't wish a war—but, of course, his claims must be fulfilled; when after the conquest of Poland he requested Great Britain and France please to stop, at once, the “unnecessary” war, because he didn't wish a war at all, but only—naturally—wanted to maintain his prey, if the same game was repeated by the Reichstag speech after the defeat of France, we shook our heads at first. But only he was astonished who did not know the megalomaniac, dishonest, and preposterous German mentality. “Even if it is nonsense, there is method in it.”

In one of his poems in Mecklenbourg dialects Fritz Reuter refers to a squire in the middle of the nineteenth century who had employed a new private tutor. At an illustrious party the young man made so bold as to behave towards one of the noblest guests, as if he were a social equal. When he was rebuked roughly by his employer in the presence of the guests, he left his position and claimed a month's remuneration. This was refused energetically, and a little later a writ was delivered to the squire. He, at once, wrote to the court that, however much obliged he was for the summons, he did not wish any proceedings. He also did not want to pay, of course. Then came a second summons, and again the baron wrote, very distinctly, that under no circumstances did he wish any proceedings. When he was sentenced, he lost all faith in the law of his country, and it was never possible to explain to this Mecklenbourg grandee, with the head of a bull on his escutcheon, how he could be sentenced to pay the sum claimed, with costs, as he had simply not wished a case to be brought at all.

Like this squire, Hitler in his megalomania is convinced, that Great Britain and France alone are to be blamed for the war, that they alone are the aggressors, moreover, that almost a real

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state of war can hardly exist without he himself declaring it. It is the same story all over again. The phenomenon, however, is that the German masses share Hitler's mentality, not at all only because they must do so, but because they are all caught by the same mania, like the Mecklenbourg grandee and like their ruler in whom they believe—by that insane, pretended German superiority and conceited seigniorial rights. Hitler, then took only Danzig and those parts of Poland which he really "needed". This arbitrary argument was perfectly sufficient in their opinion. What was that to Great Britain and France? It was beyond Hitler's and the German mentality, it did not pierce the German mind, that the right of the jungle was not still recognized by the whole world generally, and that the Western Powers, although they didn't plan any conquests, were bound to make up their minds in their own interests to put an end to Germany's incessant onslaughts. The absolute inability of Hitler—but also of the other Germans—to understand, that no imperialistic objects were in question, but that the only point at stake was in fact to secure definitely the future peace of the world by the annihilation of the system of force embodied in Hitlerism, forms the real reason why those curious "peace offensives" repeated themselves from time to time, those proposals which—quite apart from the secret mental reservation not to keep them—inévitably contained only incompleteness and superficiality in just those questions about which no bargaining is thinkable; above all, about the restitution of full sovereignty to the conquered countries and the renunciation of all power-politics. These proposals, of course, did not even mention the main problem, that Hitler and Hitlerism must vanish before peace talks are possible at all. Their purpose was by their frequent repetition to induce those neutral countries who longed for peace to press the allies and, at the same time, to demoralize them from within by the combined activities of their Fifth Columnists, the extravagant Pacifists, the Fascists, the wealthy mere Materialists and the Communists. They could not understand, that the firm conviction of genuine democrats, that death would be preferable to a life in a world ruled by Hitlerism, could never be talked down by any German propaganda.

In order to gain a still clearer view into Hitler's and his adherents' political way of thinking, we will go back for a moment to the days of Munich in the autumn of 1938.—For a man of peace like

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Chamberlain, educated in the conceptions of Western European civilization, together with the ideas of democracy, a man of morals and religion, trusting to honest treaties, accustomed, after careful consideration of the pros and cons, to bargain for a reasonable agreement with his opponent—it cannot have been easy to fly three times to Germany, in order to negotiate with his absolute antipode, that completely uncivilized despot Hitler. Even the sensation of looking that world bugbear in the face and competing with his strength, may not have much mitigated the natural aversion of a British Premier to that meeting. Only the firm resolution to do his utmost in the interest of the peace of Europe can have induced this tough and prudent man—in spite of the scepticism of all those who explained how useless and even dangerous it was to try honestly to come to terms with Nazism—to stake himself personally on his conviction, that there is no question which cannot be solved by negotiations—if only all parties are truly willing. Chamberlain's methods, however, were bound to fail against an opponent who looked at them with plain contempt, and who saw nothing else in them than fear and weakness.

Every normal negotiator is instinctively afraid of feeling afterwards, that he has perhaps conceded more than necessary to his opponent. So he acts on the principle, that business is transacted by offering and asking. Hitler has other customs which he obviously thinks more "heroic". He is not able to "negotiate" at all. He almost considers it beneath his dignity to make a definite claim. One ought to make offers to him voluntarily—but not too small ones—which he has only to accept.—Incidentally even this "dictatorial" tactic is neither unique nor Hitler's own invention.—If he takes the trouble to make a "proposal" himself, which means in fact to dictate, he is irritated and offended to the utmost, if his "offer" which is always described as "of prudent moderation"—to leave to the other a small portion of his property and a phantom existence provisionally—is not accepted thankfully at once. Then you have "refused his outstretched hand". In accordance with the circumscription on the Swastika badge "now more than ever" then, like a fool, he claims more and, moreover, feels entitled to use force. If, however, the other has fulfilled his claim at once, no moral hindrance exists for Hitler to demand subsequently more, nevertheless. So it was with Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1938, so with Poland a year later. In both those cases

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Hitler had previously started the "negotiations" with the resolve to confiscate the rest of the other's property by force, as soon as his own first claims were fulfilled, and by that means the adversaries were made incapable of resisting. It is the same tactics of subsequently making additional claims, as applied after the armistice with France. In fact it is not only a question of different methods, as the Nazis would like it to be believed, whether you are prepared for normal bargaining, or whether you begin with a smaller claim, then raise it by degrees. If, in the Nazi manner, one misuses their "method" dishonestly, which is already dishonest on principle, in order to make the opponent incapable of resisting, such a way of "negotiating" is mere blackmail. But these ethics are not understandable to their minds. Such thoughts do not occur to their rude mentality—so long as they are the strongest. They did not even understand, that it was not negotiating but force and blackmail, when Schuschnigg and Hacha or an "authorized representative" of Poland were "invited" to Berchtesgaden or Berlin, in order to sign under the worst pressure ready prepared "treaties", the contents of which were not even communicated to them beforehand. How disgusting is such hypocrisy, if you compare with it the shameless German propaganda about the "dictation" of Versailles, let alone—if one would follow the *tu quoque* methods—the ruthless system of oppression in conquered France and in the small countries which had the impudence to fight for their neutrality. But the Nazi "world philosophy" now proclaims quite officially the theory which, it is true, had already been practised since Frederick II, that against a non-German every means is allowable, if it seems useful in the interests of Germany.

You must know the Nazi mentality and their specific methods before you enter the negotiation room. Above all, you must know that nothing is so unsuitable towards people of such a mind than the usual methods of "asking and offering". Here lies one of the fundamental contrasts between the British and German mentalities. In England the cool, reasonable and peaceful arranging of existing differences to the satisfaction of both parties, whenever possible, the principle of live and let live. In Germany you have the carrying through of one's own will by threatening and force out of covetousness and by the practice of might is right, even if it does not always pay.—Former French governments

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had discovered by degrees the best method of reacting to that German peculiarity. No bargaining; a distinct compilation of unchangeable minimum claims and, above all, the demand of trustworthy guarantees for the accomplishment of an agreement later on. How astonishing it sounds—such harshness forced not only respect from the German rulers, it was even more sympathetic to them than the British inclination to make concessions.

It is quite understandable, that Chamberlain, a man from such an entirely different world who until then had had no personal experience of people with a mind like Hitler's was at first quite unable to appreciate the German mentality. For Hitler, on the other hand, it was incomprehensible, probably, that so intelligent a negotiator as Chamberlain should not have known in advance, that Hitler had made up his mind to go to extremes in any case, and that it was impossible to purchase anything more by a policy of appeasement than, perhaps, a respite. He, however, who by his own observation in the course of many years really knows the mind and the methods of the Nazis—you cannot repeat frequently enough, that this means a further degree of development only of the traditional German mentality, and that it is always the same, in private business and in politics—could prophesy, that already in 1938 at Munich there were two alternatives only: Either the "haggling offer" of the "British shopkeeper" would be refused at once, heroically and bombastically, if, of course, the Nazi rulers felt strong enough to impose their will on Czechoslovakia immediately. But because that risk obviously seemed too great to them at the moment, the second alternative, an agreement "haggled over" by the opponent, was accepted, reluctantly, hypocritically, and, from the beginning, with the definite resolve to break the pledged word at the first opportunity. That happened promptly in the spring of 1939, as soon as the Czechs' power of resistance was undermined, as soon as the preparations in the Sudeten district were completed, and, as was thought, the march into Prague could be ventured on, without the risk of a war against the Western Powers.

The same thing, a year later, was to be repeated with Poland. One can well imagine, that Hitler in the summer 1939 had fully expected a new visit from Chamberlain, and that he was surprised and deeply disappointed to observe, that he had obviously underestimated the man whom he thought to have cheated so thoroughly

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at Munich. Could he really not have deceived him at all? Could this "old Englishman" only have yielded at Munich, perhaps, because there was absolutely no other way out, in consequence of the condition of British armaments in the autumn of 1938? Were Ribbentrop's assertions of the "degeneration" of the British who under no circumstances were prepared to fight nowhere near the truth?—It is especially significant, that Hitler judging, probably, from his knowledge of the underground tendencies in Norway, Holland, France, and other countries—had totally miscalculated the impression which was bound to be produced in Great Britain on public opinion, when by his assault on Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939 he again, and so cynically, made obvious the hypocrisy of his policy, that now there could be no doubt at all, even for those who were no expert connoisseurs of the Nazi mentality. If formerly—and this was none too rare in history—one had reproached a statesman with treachery, or with a policy of opportunism or force, there was generally an element of secret admiration mixed with it, a feeling that, after all, one could eventually come to an understanding even with that buccaneer. Similar feelings may have been predominating with Chamberlain in Munich. But the following onslaught on Czechoslovakia advised every still confident one, that with Hitler and the Nazi Germans the loss of restraint and responsibility had reached such a degree, that any hope for a true agreement had to be dropped. The conclusion had become evident to everybody, and is confirmed yet again by the subsequent attacks on Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg—that there is no bridge between the two worlds of democracy and Hitlerism. The inhabitants of the one do not understand the new hypocritical language—let alone the mind—of the others, and they are bound to despise them, when they have learnt to see through them. It is the difference between a sound and an insane mind, between ethics and an absolute want of civilization.—If Chamberlain and Daladier at Munich had deceived themselves into believing, that Hitler would keep the Munich bargain, Hitler made the same mistake, at least concerning Great Britain, when he did not realize, that by the cynical breaking of his word towards Czechoslovakia he discredited himself, once and for all, not only with the statesmen but also with the British people. Now it was made definitely plain,



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that on the German side the one condition was lacking which according to Chamberlain's declaration is necessary for the regulation of all controversies by mutual agreement—the honesty of the parties. So the onslaught against Poland—like the later blows against the other small neighbouring countries—was a real surprise only for a few incorrigible fools. Men like Hitler and Ribbentrop, however, and the German masses were indeed unable to anticipate from the platform of their own corrupted mentality, that the total disregard of everything considered the indispensable minimum of decency was bound to lead to a real crusade against Germany from all honest minded peoples sharing the opinion of General Smuts, that Nazi rule would mean a thousand years' setback for the world. This mentality and the significant German inability and reluctance ever to look at matters with the eyes of their opponents account for the genuine surprise in Germany, when war was not only actually declared by Great Britain and France in consequence of the onslaught on Poland, but insisted on, in spite of the new German peace offers, notwithstanding temporary setbacks as well as unceasing, tremendous threats of the Nazi bosses. Apparently it was a quite unexpected experience for the Germans, that the faith of the Britons in themselves could not be shaken by boasting and a war of nerves.

On the side of the democracies one question of the highest importance, it is true, remains unsolved by our considerations. If indeed by the second onslaught against Czechoslovakia the unavoidable development towards war was made evident to the then leading statesmen of the Great Western Powers who had learnt by their own, personal observations the mentality of the new German "mechanized Attila"—as a known British politician called Hitler strikingly on the wireless—why then was rearmament not carried through from that moment on a gigantic scale, as everybody had expected? For, there could not exist any doubt, that from the very moment when Hitler and his generals understood, that a new great war was to be carried through, they would begin a new armament drive and preparations of all kinds in the greatest possible dimensions and with an "expert" shrewdness and German thoroughness which it would be very difficult to surpass. Indeed, it is not understandable why one did not secure at least this start.

## Chapter 19

# The Mentality of the Army— Military Revolt ?

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The question of the mentality of the army remains, and whether an army revolt can be counted upon.

It was believed, that Hitler had promised his generals before the beginning of the fight against Poland, that he would not let it come now to a serious war against the Western Powers. Even if that assertion is not correct, many reasons signify, that at the start not only Hitler, but above all the generals, made scruples about the war against the Western Powers. Therefore you do not need far-fetched arguments, as, for instance, the then odd explanation of some newspapers, that the scuttling of the *Graf Spee* was ordered by Hitler—foreseeing the loss of the war—in order to avoid the ship's—in the case of internment—falling into the power of the Allies. It would mean strongly over-estimating Hitler, if you were to think, that he cared a straw what would become of Germany after a breakdown. The order to scuttle the battleship—whether the crew refused to renew the fight or not—sprang simply from the idea, that in this way the “care” of the leader, who did “not want the life of one single soldier to be sacrificed unnecessarily,” and, at the same time, the “proud resolution” that a German warship preferred to go to the bottom rather than be interned, could best be pointed out. The highest “lance-corporal” as a great propagandist simply tried to rob the British navy of their triumph, and falsify the matter into a bloodless heroic feat, overlooking only the fact, that he was taking away the honour of the commander and the officers and men by his ingenious order.—The then uneasiness of the German

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generals about the actually not expected declaration of war by Great Britain and France was based on the—unfortunately unfounded—fear, that the Western Powers would either conduct, at once, a strong offensive against which Germany was not yet sufficiently prepared, realizing therewith the old phantom of a war at two fronts, or, at least, build up, using all their means and powers from the very beginning, new armies and armaments of such a strength, that it would be hopeless to withstand them. Germany in the autumn of 1939 only prepared for the planned stroke against Poland, had lost the initiative for the moment by the British and French declaration of war—the worst thing which could happen to a dictator like Hitler, accustomed to act undisturbed and to follow perpetually his own ideas only. The uneasiness in the ruling German circles, unequivocally revealed by the frequently repeated peace offensives, was bound to lead—many circles combined so—to earnest differences of opinion between the military experts and their beloved war-lord, as to the conduct of the war itself. Political and military arguments were bound to grow more and more, especially because the opportunism of Hitler's policy was directed less by the interests of Germany than by his own interests in maintaining his and his gang's power under all circumstances.—All this has proved as wishful thinking. Even if conflicting views between Hitler and the generals existed in the beginning of the war—at least they did not flare up. If—as is probable—the generals were at first disappointed about the unexpected development of Hitler's politics into a precipitated great war, events have shown, that in the meantime the fundamental idea of strengthening to the utmost the mechanical armament of Germany in the winter of 1939-40 and of using it then without any restraint, especially towards neutral peoples, was carried through in full agreement between Hitler and his generals. After the "successes" of this strategy there is less doubt than ever before, that Hitler is not only in possession of the masses' faith who hopefully expect him to exercise even military leadership personally but that his hypnotism now also holds the military leaders—against whom he carried his points at least three times before the war—so strongly in his ban, that they would put his decision even above their own judgment. The assertion frequently reproduced in the beginning of the war,

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that deep misunderstandings between Hitler and the generals must lead us to expect a revolt of the army under its officers, was lacking in any foundation.

The political mentality of the army—officers and men—differs little, probably, from that of the civilians, and you could verify by spontaneous utterances of captive men of the German navy, aircraft, and army, that the youth of Germany thinks wholly on Nazi lines. The young officers, up to the captains, are “trained to the Nazi mentality” for years. No small number of the older officers were former adventurous followers of Hitler before their re-entrance into the new army. The officers sprung from the former professional army who were educated by General von Seeckt in the old traditions form a small minority only; many of them have learnt now differently and they regard Hitler as re-creator of the German army. Even in the rejuvenated corps of higher officers are numerous men of such a mind, and it is highly questionable, whether the Monarchists and other fundamental opponents of the Nazi system yet form, a strong minority even among the generals. The betrayal of several Monarchist conspiracies since 1937 has led to the “liquidation”—cashiering and shooting dead—of many officers, and you are bound to believe, that the elimination of the Monarchist and other such elements who subscribed to the old ideas and their replacement by “proved” Nazis has made great progress in the meantime. The still existing weak Monarchist tendencies in the army—and so in the civil population—can perhaps attain a certain importance later on, in the course of a common movement of all the adversaries of the Nazis, especially as many of the democratic opposers of Hitler also are rationally inclined to the conviction, that under German conditions some smaller monarchies are the most reasonable form of a German State. These problems however—especially the question as to whether, eventually, a German union, or several single German States corresponding to the historical and ethnological divisions will come into existence after the war—are not even secretly discussed, of course, in a Germany now elated with victory.

It is true, the former closeness of the German army which was founded on the old traditions has disappeared. It makes you wonder how a body of officers, formerly so sensitive and stiff-necked, could so patiently suffer Hitler to adopt not only the title

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of "supreme war-lord", but even in peace-time to assume command, and that they put up with a former captain's (Goering) ridiculous, enforced appointment as a general and now even a "Reichsmarschall" as well as with unheard-of orders such as the scuttling of the *Graf Spee*, so contrary to all good traditions. Then the officers remained dumb, when Schleicher, Fritsch and so many others were shot, and when Hitler sacrificed the Baltics and Finland which were formerly so closely connected with Germany and its army. Even the pact with Stalin did not meet with the close resistance of the officers. The sympathies of the German army, incidentally, never opposed an approach to Russia on principle, as far as purely military considerations were concerned. In spite of the greatest ideological contrasts, at the time of General von Secckt, arms forbidden to Germany by the treaty of Versailles were secretly constructed in Russia in new factories erected there by German technicians. By the progressive infiltration of Nazis into the corps of officers even the instinctive resistance diminished which had resulted formerly from the mentality of the circles from which the German officers then sprang. If the officers of the former Imperial German army extracted from the nobility fraternized with the officers of the Czarist guards, why should not Hitler's Nazi officers do the same with Stalin's officers?

It is impossible to form a definite judgment about the eventual effect of all these and other events on the body of officers, so long as the delirium of Hitler's military successes holds their spirits fast. The old conceptions of honour lead even these to the conclusion, that—above all during the war—they must obey, who personally hate the leader and the Nazi system. The opinion, that the higher duty towards their own people demands the removal of the dishonest government of an usurper whose personality, mentality, and execrable actions deeply hurt the genuine honour of the nation and of every single German is obviously shared yet by a very small minority only. With the new composition of the corps of officers and, above all, in consequence of its infiltration with Gestapo spies, there is no hope, that such views could prevail. Even the often heard theory, that there is nothing in the relations between the Nazi officers and their highest lance-corporal comparable in any way to the personal connection between the officers of the former Prussian army with the Hohenzollern, does

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not lead us very far. There is no reason to suppose, that Hitlerism has infected the officers less deeply than the civil population. Superficial and, moreover, wishful prophesies are definitely worthless. It is not even probable, that differences between the Fascists and the Italian army, which will lead, perhaps, one day to the collapse of Mussolini, would have immediate repercussions in the German army. Indeed, there are no hopes, that a revolt will start from the corps of officers, before a heavy military blow or an economic breakdown has fundamentally changed the situation.

The bad qualities of Nazism have undoubtedly deeply affected the army too. The sentiments and methods of officers and men have become more and more brutal and hypocritical in the same proportion as with the people as a whole, and—as we have learned at another place—a barbarity similar to the Gestapo mentality is prevailing everywhere in the Third Reich as an intentional consequence of the new “education”. It is the same mentality, contrary to all conceptions of military and civil law and honour and of humanity, both of those who give orders and those who carry them out.—The typical Nazi mentality connected with the familiar method of hypocritical propaganda is evident especially among the leading officers. All this was foreshadowed by the publications of the new war theorist Banse and, in 1936, by an essay in the official weekly of the Ministry of War for the German army officers, *Die Wehrmacht*, explaining unequivocally, that the characteristic of the next war would be unrestricted brutality, far exceeding anything ever known before, the use of terror against the civil population as a weapon of war, “to break moral resistance”. This newly invented “total” warfare, another word only for the abolition of the international regulations laboriously created during generations by the common effort of humanitarian organizations and great philanthropists of all peoples, is it anything else than a relapse into barbarism?—Hypocrisy, on the other hand, was stamped upon the well-known telegram of Admiral Raeder to the chief of the United States Navy by which the imminent sinking of an American liner by a British submarine was mischievously announced at the beginning of the war, and the same shamelessness of thinking of the highest officers was unveiled, when this lie was repeated at the return of United States citizens in an American liner in June 1940, besides the *Athenia* case itself. The untrue assertion,

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that the battleship *Graf Spee* was shelled with gas bombs, the misuse of a report of a Swiss professor to prove the allegation, that poison gas produced in Great Britain had been used in Poland, and the invention, that German railway stations and open towns had first been bombed intentionally by British planes, were obviously made by the German military authorities, in order to create an alibi for their own actions of this kind. The ignominious lie of the German naval command, that unarmed German sailors of the *Altmark* had been recklessly murdered with British hand grenades and shells, means the same, and reminds one of a similar slander—the so-called *Baralong* case at the time of the Great War. The impudence, at least, is admirable to call it “retaliation”—as once in Spain—when in the air raids on Coventry, Birmingham, the London suburbs, etc., many hundreds of small dwelling houses were destroyed and many thousands of women and children deliberately killed by German airmen, let alone the destruction of churches and irretrievable works of art. Whenever the question of a violation of the neutrality of other States, or a new attack on a small country was discussed, the whole world was righteously convinced, that no “scruples” ever disturbed the beautiful harmony between the German leader and his generals on this question, which was to be decided by purely opportunist deliberations and absolutely without any reference to “sentiments” resulting from ethical and moral considerations or the law of nations. One had already accustomed oneself so completely to this shameful side of the German mentality, that the question, of which State’s turn would come next, after Czechoslovakia and Poland, was already discussed, even outside Germany, only from the standpoint of military “opportunism”. One takes it now throughout the world as a matter of course, that with Germany the moral point of view must be totally eliminated.

You could hear many prophecies, that the Nazi youth, however hardened and educated to brutality, would not be able to stand the test of war. In fact it was wishful thinking to under-estimate the vigour of combat of the Nazistic youth. You could be sceptical, perhaps, as to whether the new German army, educated to the Nazi way of thinking without the strong footing of religion and steadfast morals, and led by a body of officers without the same inner values and without genuine closeness, would be equal to a

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hard, prolonged fight. But it meant a great mistake to rely on an early breakdown, following the indisputable lack of inner values. Even barbarians have done well in former wars!—It is true, that with the older classes in the ranks real enthusiasm was lacking at the beginning of the war. They had been too confident in Hitler's former promise, that he would complete his conquests bloodlessly. Moreover, among the older men, and especially among those who took part in the Great War, are many secret adversaries of Hitler and Nazism. Nevertheless, and although the author himself heard some older soldiers who could well be believed to be capable of judging correctly say, that many would only support a new war till they faced the enemy, there was no foundation for the frequently drawn, precipitated conclusion, that great numbers were waiting for the moment, when they were enabled to make use of their arms in a way not referred to in the regulations, or at least, they would not fight seriously against an opponent whom they could not consider an enemy. The quick breakdown of the military resistance in Belgium and France, at a time before the older reserves could even prove their strength, has made all these discussions about a military revolt in the German army at least temporarily meaningless. In no case you should attribute too much importance to mere talk as, for instance, that in a prolonged war in foreign countries the German soldier would fail for "nostalgia". The fact, that the Germans are hated in the conquered countries and would be unwelcome guests even in Italy and Spain, as they are in Rumania, may produce frictions with the population. But believing, that this would cause a German soldier to revolt, provided that the food supply is all right, would mean overestimating his delicacy of feelings.

Without a preceding decisive defeat or a total breakdown of the German economic system a military revolt cannot be expected, and the question only has to be asked: "What will come to pass in the army, if by setbacks or for economic or other reasons—as for instance by a revolution in Italy, or serious outbreaks in the conquered countries—the chains are loosened, and the Nazi regime wavers?"—The answer is, that then, presumably, the army will behave—or split—exactly in the same way as the people. The army is no longer—as it was for years in the Great War—an unshakable rock in the midst of changing, political developments. It reflects rather accurately the mentality of the



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people, and it therefore will react in the same way as the citizens. It must be recalled that, although toughness is no characteristic of the Germans, even under the difficult conditions of 1918 it took rather a long time, before the falseness of the official information was generally realized, the inborn herd instinct overcome, and the government overthrown.—If a catastrophe is approaching, the constellations changing permanently and decisively do so more and more quickly in the last few weeks and, frequently, even days. Especially in such a dependent and highly excitable people of such political backwardness as the Germans the current events of the war, the changing pressure of starvation, and many other unpredictable incidents and influences must, eventually, decide which tendency will become uppermost at the critical moment. It strongly depends, above all, whether and how quickly the beginning of the Bolshevization of Germany proceeds. All these considerations cannot lead to a clear prediction, and they do not exclude in the least the possibility also, that at the decisive moment, when the power is there for the taking, a resolute officer will seize it and carry the army and the people with him. Whither? Improvisations of such a kind—even those which may have the most important consequences—cannot be prophesied, nor their direction foreseen.

## Chapter 20

# After the War—Security—Change of Mind

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It was a gloomy picture we had to draw of culture, mind, law, honour, and public morals in Nazi Germany in accordance with the truth. The results may be summed up as follows, in order to define the mentality of the Germans of to-day.

All ethical sentiments have completely fallen out of balance. In many spheres the comprehension of good and evil is topsy-turvy; in others the notions of morals have, at least become, strongly effaced. A prescribed, typicized world-philosophy, stripped of all freedom and based on the principle of a totalitarian State, dominates the masses. All utterances of human life, moreover, everyone's thoughts, have to subordinate themselves to it. A boundless hypocrisy is the result, and it seems worse than scorn, when the Germans claim, that "to be a German means, doing a thing for its own sake". Every kind of individual and independent creativeness is oppressed. Art and science are controlled to the utmost and crippled. The law is totally corrupted. Religion has suffered severely. Instead of the spiritual and moral "renaissance" which Hitler had promised enormous relapses have taken place in all branches of life—economic life included. The so-called "resurrection" of Germany is a mere delusion. Any German who believed in Hitler's powerful words on his "taking possession of power", and who has to apprehend now what a low level has been reached, must beat his chest: "*Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa!*" For, all this ought not to have happened, if the German people had raised their energies in time to conquer their own primitive instincts which made them Hitler's slaves.

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But most Germans, caught more than ever by the mass psychosis of Hitlerism, do not see through their own present conditions at all. In fact, they believe in the wrong doctrines explained to them, and these dominate the German mentality absolutely. The average German believes, indeed, that only that is right which is useful for his own people, and that Adolf Hitler alone has to decide that question. He does not think himself obliged, moreover, not entitled even to consider, whether the hypocritical and brutal actions of his government are in the real interest of Germany, let alone, whether they can be answered for to God and mankind. He secludes himself from the outer world, loyally obeying the orders of the "Minister of Propaganda" supported by the menace of the death penalty, ~~because he must not lend his ear to the~~ "clangs of the sirens from abroad" lest he be "poisoned". Only a few feel a wish to learn the point of view of the external world. The average citizen does not want to penetrate to the core of politics. He prefers foreign statesmen to be "disabled" by the boasting speeches of the "leader" or his Minister of Propaganda, especially by the perpetual *tu quoque*, the primitivity of which a German does not observe. Nevertheless they feel instinctively, and share, the sinister trends of thoughts, of their leader's policy.

(The German, indeed, believes himself to be a superior nobleman. He regards his own people as a nation of racially superior beings who are entitled to resort to robbery and force towards weaker peoples. He thinks himself fit to insult the members of putatively inferior races. He cannot understand, that the right of the strongest has no moral justification at all, that he ought not to extend his own "living space" by robbing that of other peoples and by exterminating or enslaving them in the "interests" of pretended German "necessities of life". The mania is excited by the war successes to extremities.

It was like a refreshing breeze when the government of Great Britain first unmistakably pointed out, in the autumn of 1939, that in this war the question is not only the restitution of the countries assailed by Nazi Germany and the prevention of similar attacks in the future, but that "Nazism" itself be destroyed which, as the whole world is convinced, means hypocrisy, brute force, and opportunism. It was the right, the only, way of encouraging the opponents of Hitlerism inside and outside of Germany. The fear of certain circles of "appeasers", that such plain speaking

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would "strengthen unnecessarily the unity of the Germans", or "excite Hitler's adherents to the greatest fury", was quite unfounded. All those in Germany belonging to the Hitler system in any way were aware, apart from this, that they are all "in the same boat", and in any case they would have made every possible endeavour to maintain themselves in power by all inhuman and savage means. Indeed, the usual political soft pedalling would have made not only the worst impression in the outward world, but produced by its weakness an effect opposite to that desired in the country of "Teutons".

Negotiating is not possible with the Germans in their present state of moral insanity. Therefore you may say, indeed, that a modern "crusade" has started. Any hope, that the war could be satisfactorily terminated but by a military or economic victory must be dropped. The stupidity and dangerousness of any delusion shared yet by some big capitalists and other more or less egotistic friends of a policy of appeasement who in their "bulwark fanaticism" cannot be advised is proved again by the experiences of the Pétain government in France. The German "new order" means, as the *New York Times* put it recently, "murdering of civilization, carried out as systematically as the bombing of London, murder in the name of law, terror in the name of government, famine in the name of redistribution of wealth—a reign of disorder, leading to anarchy". The masses of the German people can be brought only by the language of force familiar to them to the conviction, that there is in the long run no other way to achieve their own wish to live, except by being prepared to allow others to live too, and to arrange matters reasonably with the outer world. All other attempts to influence the present pernicious mentality of the German masses—by broadcasts, the dropping of leaflets, and similar means—are, unfortunately, of secondary importance only for the present. They may help to uphold the mind of Nazi opponents inside Germany, especially by satisfying their hunger for true information about the military, political, and economic situation, and about the actual war aims, whilst it is of little use to explain to the Germans the hypocrisy, hollowness, and the contradictions of Nazism which are only too well known to the Nazi adversaries, whilst others will not listen to foreign broadcasting under the menace of death penalty.—The great metamorphosis of the Nazi mentality will not begin, before the

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war is virtually over. As soon as military setbacks or a real economic breakdown indicate Germany's defeat and loosen the pressure of the Gestapo, it will be the right moment, to begin the great campaign of influencing the German mind and to build a new mentality. In the meantime, in order to prepare that task, one should spare no pains to influence spiritually and to the greatest possible extent the actually accessible German prisoners of war, in spite of all difficulties and contemptuous refusal which is to be expected next. It is worth while, indeed, to try to attune their minds to the meaning of a genuine democracy by competent instruction in the German language. Again it is apparently a consequence of looking at this war simply as one between nations, instead of an international struggle against barbarism, that one has left the prisoners of war exclusively to the care of the military authorities which, for their part, confine themselves to feeding them and to applying the international regulations. Just here, however, is a chance, indeed, of approaching many Germans, and it should not be so difficult, with the help of able German-speaking experts, to separate among them the chaff of incorrigible Nazis from the wheat. Once overcome the ridiculous mistrust, that any German Refugee could be inclined to help Nazi Germany, here the Refugees could do a valuable service, and the German prisoners of war, if rightly treated and converted, can prove eminently useful in curing the minds of their compatriots after the war. In spite of deeply rooted customs and prejudices and of all misgivings on principle, one should differentiate, therefore, in a certain manner between the prisoners of war, which Germany, incidentally, does already in quite another way. Besides the genuine and convinced adversaries of Hitler who can be singled out easily one should leave to themselves as little as possible the indifferent ones capable of improvement. The care bestowed upon a correct elucidation to those people, of the actual political facts and the true causes and aims of the war, the world's opinion about Hitlerism, the new Europe to be created, and the conception a genuine democracy—is a worthy task, presuming, however, really dexterous appliance, whilst clumsiness would have an adverse effect. If it succeeds in influencing those men during their captivity, a first step in the direction of a future change in the German mentality will have been taken.

The future necessities and the way to secure their achievement

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have to be shortly intimidated, at least, at the end of our observations, however strange that may seem just at a time when Germany is at the top of its "war successes". But there are only two possibilities, either the destruction of all civilization, in the case of Germany's victory; or—the definite destruction of Nazism. There is no compromise.

The dangers which the present mental disturbance of the German people involves will not cease even with a new dash to the ground. Even though the Germans, perceiving their position, eventually, should set themselves free from the Nazi regime before the breakdown is complete, as they did in 1918, even then it would be fatal to think, that the Nazi mind would be thereby finished with. That pernicious venom has penetrated the German people much too deeply. If the evolution after the Great War logically had to lead to Nazism, because that politically unripe people, with their herd instincts and inclination for stage effects, educated to militarism and chauvinism for one hundred and fifty years, and not equal to the psychic concussions of defeat and of political revulsions, could not raise the necessary internal power of resistance to the Hitler agitation—matters are no better this time. All the same, whether the Nazi regime will be finally overturned by a mere political revolt, or whether the unavoidable smash will discharge itself, simultaneously, in a social revolution, so that a Bolshevik regime still will have to be dealt with—the necessity for educating the German people for their future collaboration in the welfare of Europe remains unchanged. Many men may assert, after the downfall of the Nazi regime, that they never were Nazis "at heart", or "that their eyes are now open". Little value can be attached to such lip service, and the danger of being deceived is greater this time, just as the education for hypocrisy towards holders of other opinions predominated for years among the doctrines which are crammed into the Germans in all Nazi lectures on their famous world philosophy. A change of mind, however, may correspond, in fact, to the comprehension of many individuals. Notwithstanding, let no one deceive himself about it by asseverations of former Nazis, that—until intensive education has done its work—the danger remains, that the Germans will become once again victims of a refined chauvinistic or Bolshevik instigation appealing to their primitive instincts. We have en-

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deavoured to explain the actual causes of the hurried developments from 1918 to 1933 in more detail, just in order to show the morbid political lability of the average German, to influence whom through his intellect is so extremely difficult, whilst he can be so easily impressed by feelings of sentiment. It is astonishing, how small until now—even in the most intellectual circles of other countries—the understanding is of the necessity to change entirely the German mentality, and how many light-minded and superficial opinions, still exist, in consequence of lack of clearness about the danger of the German bewilderment.

A positive protection against a new reversion cannot be created by the mere negative way of isolation and disarmament of Germany, as the experience of the world war has shown. Only the positive way of creating a "new European order"—in another sense, than the dictators have in mind—and, simultaneously, fighting the mass psychosis of Nazism itself promises a lasting success. The whole German mentality, of which the lust for aggression is only a single feature, has to be cured, and changed in a direction corresponding to that of a new and peaceful Europe. But before the beginning and until the completion of that cure, palpable security has to be created, so that never again shall promises and treaties be torn by Germany like "scraps of paper", or distorted by misrepresentation of compliant helpers of another newly emerging gangster government. It must be explained openly, and unmistakably for Germany itself also, that the Germans cannot again be left to themselves, that far-reaching restriction of their liberty of action cannot be avoided, until it is confirmed, that the mentality of Hitlerism is really a thing of the past. The question is not even only that of giving security to the world against relapses of the Germans into Nazism, but to prevent, furthermore, so that also no Bolshevik troubles can burst out—with or without the Nazi gangsters of to-day—in a people whose mentality has lost its balance so fully. Even if the danger of a transitory rise to power of Bolshevism on the breakdown of the Hitler regime can be avoided, the risk of a new social revolution will remain in Germany, with Russia as a neighbour. Social explosions again, by their consequences, may become little less dangerous to the world than the Nationalist tension which led eventually to Hitlerism.

Above all, it must be provided for, that Germany shall not

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be held in a state of permanent unrest by her own youth, brutalized and completely corrupted by the Nazi mind. The healing of the mass psychosis ought not to be frustrated by those elements. The fact ought not to be passed lightly over, that the evil cruelties in the German concentration camps are carried out by juvenile S.S. men, and that it is the youth of Germany which has to be charged with the worst outrages in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. They cannot be left in their country with full liberty, if you do not wish to conjure up again the most serious dangers lightly and superficially. That is a question of security first. A great many of those young men are totally unable to be influenced spiritually, and with many others this can be done only with the greatest difficulty and very slowly. A great percentage of those gangsters can only be made innocuous. Naturally not by the measures to which they were themselves accustomed in the concentration camps under their control. The only practical solution may be, after sifting out for trial the most evil cases, to divide those thousands of brutal creatures into small groups and—in spite of all difficulties—to try to educate them by degrees again into human beings by a severe military discipline under specially trained officers—but this must be outside Germany. The removal of those elements from their country for a long period is an unavoidable necessity, in order to dam that source of great danger. All adversaries of Hitlerism in Germany who have preserved their own sound mind will agree with this view. They know their young compatriots and have lived to see the exaltations of their psychosis, far exceeding the outrages of the Free Corps, etc., after the Great War.

What other things have to be done, in order to solve the problems of security for a period of transition during which the cure of the German mentality has to be carried through, is greatly dependent on which forces will complete the defeat of the Nazi system; whether this will be done by an energetic general, by a concentration of all the adversaries of Nazism, or—by a Communist rabble. In what way and how long it will be necessary to intervene from abroad depends on the political, social, and economic conditions of Germany at the end of the war.—The chance of a total escape by Germany from Bolshevik disturbances ought not to be over-estimated, although there is a certain probability, indeed, that, after the breakdown of the

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Nazi regime and a passing phase, the more decent spirits will, eventually, get the upper hand in the army and in the civil population. All that is subject very much to the caprice of fortune, and a moment may be devoted to the thought of how significant for the weakness of all human actions it is, that the fate of a great people—and, perhaps, of the world—can be so little influenced by the best will of mankind.

In consequence of the total uncertainty as to the foundations on which the reconstruction will have to take place in the future, it is impossible to define in advance which single measures will be the best to protect the world, so that no new fire can be lit by new adventurers utilizing Germany's dangerous mentality. Some necessities, nevertheless, are already established in the opinion of the world: Total and lasting disarmament must be carried through in Germany, and this time definitely. No doubt exists, that after the removal of the Nazi leaders, after the restoration of the conquered countries, after a genuine decision by Austria herself as regards her national fate in the future—all those must be called to account, who are to blame for the crimes committed, all those "statutes" and government decrees insulting all civilization, must be declared null and void, and as far as possible the damage repaired, in Germany as well as in the conquered countries, done to private persons by murder, robbing, burning, and confiscation. All these things are, of course, demanded by the most elementary justice, the great moral importance of which lies in the healing power of the realization, that might does not triumph over right in the long run.—For the security of the world, however, all this is not enough.

After the liberation of Czecho-Slovakia and the other conquered countries and—if a free plebiscite justifies it—also of Austria, an enormous block of more than 60,000,000 Germans will remain, consisting of very varied groups of compatriots. The fact, that they all speak the German language means very little when considering the question of their interior national unity. As little as the fact, that the United States of America and Canada have a common frontier has led these English-speaking countries to form one State, one can draw similar inferences from the consideration, that in the South American Republics Spanish is the language commonly spoken. So there is little justification for the assertion, that all districts now "unified" in the "German

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Reich" must form a national union by the will of God, in spite of equally great ethnographical differences between their inhabitants.

Historically one cannot prove such a "necessity" at all. The German "dream of unity" had—besides a certain nationalistic undertone—its main source in the senseless preservation, for mere dynastical reasons, of more than twenty single States—among them many dwarf States—which created many difficulties. But the economical goals, which had led at first to the foundation of the "North German Customs Union" in the sixties of the last century and then in 1871 to the enforced creation of the "German Reich" by Bismarck, can also be solved in another way. One may hope, that at the end of this war a new League of Nations or another powerful organization will exist, equipped with the necessary means of power and free of the defects of the old League. You may hope, that an European Commonwealth according to the British model may arise, another nucleus, perhaps, of a future world union, founded on mutual respect and equality of all nations and races, in a total contrast with the Nazi conception of one single "master people". But even if such an ideal solution were impossible within a measurable space of time, an international or super-national organization, at least, will provide against any new economic juggling in Europe, resulting from old or new political frontiers. In the interests of free commercial intercourse, the enlivenment of economics, the raising and cheapening of the standard of life, an international European order will be formed which will make large-scale economics possible without senseless obstacles of political frontiers, and resting on mutual, international confidence. Every creation of unnatural Customs boundaries or other artificial economic hindrances, dictated by the merely selfish aims of a single State aiming at autarchy, will be excluded. In such a way—by means of an inter- or super-national settlement of the question of disarmament, by which any possibility of aggression is excluded—lasting political frontiers are possible, drawn ethnographically, without the unhappy creation of strong national minorities.—It should not be left, incidentally, to the private initiative of world reformers alone to discuss their ideas of a new Europe. It is, perhaps, one of the most urgent tasks, to set up a committee of the best suitable brains, in order to prepare in time, in collaboration with the

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leading statesmen of the democratic peoples, really constructive plans. That would help not only to avoid, either improvisations as in 1918, or difficult and protractive discussions between the allies themselves, when the war is over; it would help also to prepare an explanation of concrete "war aims", which may prove of an enormous propaganda value, when the proper time has come. If a new European order is created—in a spirit as it is shown in General Sikorski's proclamation in the autumn of 1940 concerning the future co-operation of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia—so that economic difficulties can no longer result from the drawing of political frontiers, there is no reason why the various German-speaking groups of countrymen so different from each other which have formed one State since 1871 should not separate again.

An involuntary "dismemberment" of Germany ought not to be in question. It would be a mistake, of course, to put the west of Germany under French and the east under Polish or Czech domination, or even to form new buffer or vassal States after Germany's own pattern. The neighbour States of Germany themselves would, probably, not wish to endanger their own inner unity by big German minorities, and no reasonable statesman—in contrast to Hitler—would advocate an incorporation by force of strong national minorities into a State of another nationality and with another language. But it is quite another thing to restore conditions which existed in Germany until 1866. How little a few decades mean in the history of the world!

We are aware that the "welding together" of the single German states by Bismarck was nothing else, indeed, than an act of power policy, resting alone on imperialistic reasons and carried through with typical Prussian recklessness. It was just one of the most evil examples of the right of might. In Hesse, even more in Hanover and Brunswick, great parts of the populations never recognized the Prussian annexation, and met with a deep inner aversion the Prussian tyrants to whose unaccustomed manners, tone, and methods they never could feel friendly. If most of the older ones, influenced by the economic improvement, compounded, eventually, with their new Prussianism, and if the youth, enflamed artificially with an overheated nationalism, no longer felt Hanoverians, Brunswickers, or Hesses, but Prussians, or merely Germans, notwithstanding there were innumerable people who remembered that their ancestors still had fought under Wellington

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at Waterloo, and who could not forget the loss of their former independence and their antipathy to Prussianism. Officials sprung from the west of Germany who were transferred to East Prussia frequently tried to get back to their western home countries, even if they could get only a minor post there. It is known how difficult it is for the South German or Rhine temperament to become accommodated to the so-called "Prussian peculiarities". Dialects, habits of life, even religion and "world philosophy"—besides the common one of Nazism!—are so entirely different in East Prussia, Baden, Austria, Westphalia, Mecklenburg, and Saxony—only to pick out the strongest contrasts—that a sensitive, inseparable "race-unity of the whole of Germany" is really not at all in question. What has the Catholic Westphalian, Badanian, or Austrian in common with the East Prussian, or the Mecklenbourgian with the Saxonian? The simple men of those countries frequently cannot even understand each other's language. Distinctions in the laws and in administrative practice were in existence in the different districts until recently. Not until after the Great War were lawyers free to practice in any part of Germany. The total dissolution of the administration of the single States was completed only by the Nazis, who for their part installed in the meantime such a chaos of costly State and party mechanism "governing parallel and pell-mell, that a total reorganization on clear and simple principles is an obvious necessity in every case.

It would be a mistake, naturally, to restore a lot of dwarf States. But self-contained States with populations which belong to one another according to their characteristics could be recreated without difficulty in almost every part of Germany, and would become absolutely vital organizations. They could maintain themselves in a new economically reorganized Europe united in a strong, international organization of single States of a limited sovereignty as well as Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, the Scandinavian, and many other States; they would not even be smaller.

When, soon after the Great War, the question of an independent "Rhineland State" was discussed, an immense "national" opposition at once arose in Germany. It was, however, smallest in the Rhineland itself. The reason for it was not the "pressure of the occupation", but the fact simply, that intimidation of the popu-

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lation by the Nationalists was impossible in the occupied area. The storm of opposition in the other parts of Germany was nothing else but a product of an artificially bred chauvinism. Of course, an enraged "national resistance" would rise also against the creation of single, independent German States. Those opposing would behave, in accordance with typical, chauvinistic manners, the louder, the less material justification and the less actual support from the people they had. The suppression of such outcries should not be considered; but all possible care should be taken, that no nationalistic terror could endanger the security of such as hold a different opinion who likewise wish to express their views freely.

Care must be taken, that the separation of parts of Germany aiming at independence should not be enforced by "pressure of the enemies". Only genuine solutions of such a kind, as are achieved by the population itself, are of a lasting value; all pressure would only bring about new tension. However much it would be welcome in the interest of Europe, as a sign of a change of German mentality, if the block of heterogeneous elements were to dissolve itself—the necessary security can be created, eventually, in another way also. In order to exclude any suspicion of an ignoble pressure, all proposed solutions of the question should be discussed frankly by all peoples interested, including those of Germany, and decisions should be made by an impartial organization of disinterested States. When minds have composed themselves, when the disenchantment and the disappointment over the disaster which Nazism has brought about make reasonable reflections possible again, and when those can be discussed in a free Press, without fear of outrages, separatist efforts will, probably, arise by themselves in many parts of Germany, and the rather instinctive disinclination still shown even by many democratic German minds against any idea of a splitting up of the Reich may change, when a new and actually constructive economic order will prove all those to be wrong, who still believe, that a politically united, heterogeneous Germany would enjoy any spiritual or practical advantage. In the Rhineland and Baden, in Bavaria and Wurttemberg, in great parts also of the north-west, probably everywhere where a certain aversion has shown itself hitherto to "Prussianization", they will remember of their own accord their former independence as soon as chauvinism has vanished, and as soon as they are aware, that the

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same economic advantages which led, eventually, to the reconciliation with Bismarck's act of force will likewise be granted to the smaller States in a new Europe. The movement will develop much more quickly than one can believe at present, as soon as the population in those districts begins to feel instinctively, that the mistrust of other countries will more easily vanish in consequence of the separation from Prussia and from the mind of Prussianism. It would be interesting to prove how, under such changed circumstances, even the Saarland would poll, after having in the meantime observed the Nazi methods closely.

One might ask why the creation of single, independent German States is still so highly desirable in a new and disarmed Europe, in a new organization, in favour of which all States would have to sacrifice part of their sovereignty. As, however, the strength, form, and effects of the future, super-national European organization are still uncertain, no reason is recognizable why the unnatural colossus in the midst of Europe which—as matters stand—would be looked at by all its smaller neighbours with a much too justified fear and mistrust, should be preserved. If, on the other hand, the new super-national organization cannot be fitted with the necessary means of power in the beginning, if it has to develop at first slowly from a nucleus, no contribution by the single groups of the present Germany could be better for the creation of a peaceful, united Europe, than the resolute, deliberate separation from the dangerous union which, resting on force and using force permanently, has brought again and again so many disasters to the world.

It will be symptomatic of the German mind what after a time of reflection, the position of the masses will be towards the foundation of separate, independent German States. The kind and the dimensions of the precautionary measures will be influenced strongly thereby. In every case, however, it must be seen to, that Germany, or the different German countries, will be governed in the future according to the rules of a genuine democracy. That is the most important claim in the interest of the security of Europe which will have to be accomplished under any circumstances. Experience has shown, after 1918, that this people cannot be left to itself until, politically matured, it has definitely abandoned its chauvinism and herd instinct. The necessary measures to achieve this should be taken by impartial, neutral

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organizations—if neutrals survive the war—in order to avoid new incitement and embitterment which would result, if the “enemies” had to carry out alone the necessary, far-reaching measures. In no case, however, can there be avoided an actual and effective, long-lasting control by foreign Powers, and security measures of such a kind as to, in fact, exclude all possibility of sabotage in the carrying through of so many penetrating and decisive reforms. Only an international organization, provided with effective powers, above every suspicion of malignity, but also above all feeble-hearted connivance, will prove the necessary guarantee, that constitutions according to democratic fundamentals, and administrations corresponding to modern social ideas will be introduced in Germany, that an independent, legal system will be restored, that religion, culture, science, and arts will be able to develop in full liberty again, and that a corresponding education will be secured. That means, above all, that a new and far-reaching purge—this time a genuine one!—of officialdom has to be carried through by that international organization, of all elements which have obtained their positions in an improper way, or which have misused their offices, or for other reasons are incapable of true co-operation.

It must be the main task of the coming period of development—and it is, simultaneously, one of the most important factors in the curing of the German mass psychosis—to promote the economic restoration of Europe with sensible energy. In Germany as elsewhere the forming again of a sound middle class has to be supported, and of a happy working class with as high a standard of living as possible. For, democratic liberty achieves its true meaning, especially for the more primitive human beings, only when they have learned by their own, practical participation in the amenities of life, the distinction between the conditions in the totalitarian and Bolshevist countries, and those in a State which will serve the interests of its individual citizens. The development of Nazism in Germany was strongly advanced, because the economic difficulties of Germany after the Great War could be utilized for propaganda, in order to excite the fury of the “have nots” against the “ignominious peace treaty of Versailles”. That fault can and ought to be avoided this time, in spite of the fact, that Germany’s frivolity and brutality have destroyed the welfare of the world. Notwithstanding one should help the Germans in the field

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of economics, so that they can help again in the general reconstruction. Help is unavoidable, as Germany's wealth has completely vanished by wasting it for the preparation and carrying on of the war, and literally nothing will be left after the restitution of the booty. But it will be necessary to take care, that the help cannot be misused for new adventures. An intensive, international control, also in the economic sphere, is the more necessary for a longer period, as we have learned, that a body of merchants on whom indispensable confidence could be bestowed still exists only in isolated examples. Subject to the necessary precautions, however, generous economic co-operation will be the most effective, moreover, the only way to clear the atmosphere, to work positively to make Germany innocuous, and, at the same time, to prepare the change of minds for the better. The example of the treatment of South Africa by Great Britain after the South African war has proved the psychological efficiency of economic magnanimity towards a conquered and exasperated people. However strange and difficult for the attacked and damaged ones in an impoverished and totally changed economic world it may be to assist an aggressor people, even after its defeat and the removing of its former rulers—the more magnificently and, above all, the more quickly economic help is granted to a defeated and starving Germany after the end of the war, the better! The more deliberately and with the greater fidelity the new German governments and, especially, the masses will work together, to fit the liberated country into a new Europe! All efforts in the new European Commonwealth must be directed towards the welfare of its inhabitants, to serve their peace, their liberty, their prosperity, and a really righteous, international and social order must not be proclaimed only, but, in fact, created. If everyone is prepared to make the necessary sacrifices—great ones, but small in proportion to the privations of the war and the sufferings of Hitler's "protected" peoples—the most difficult economic questions can be solved, especially the immense problem of unemployment. But it is unavoidable, in order to achieve economic welfare in great and small States of Europe, to secure the best ways of production and distribution by mutually respecting the economic necessities of others. "Ready devotion" must be the slogan, instead of "sacro egoismo". There can be no doubt, that even the masses in Germany, freed from the nightmare of Nazism, will understand

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this eventually. When the scales fall from their eyes, indeed, they will repent, that they ever allowed themselves to be misused by a gang for the most evil purposes.

One of the most important parts in the economic reconstruction of Europe will fall to the trade unions of Great Britain. With their assistance the social order in Germany, totally destroyed by the Nazis, must be restored, and the German organizations of workers which have been deprived of their institutions, their leaders, and their property, will have to be revived. Even more important, however, is the help of the British trade unions who will best win the faith of the German masses in changing the German mind, and in winning over again the German workmen for the ideals of a free democracy.

The cure and remoulding of the depraved mentality of the Germans, their education for an honest co-operation in the community of the European peoples is, in fact, the greatest problem, the solution of which begun by the war has to be carried through with all might and unceasing patience, when the Nazi regime is overturned. For, the German mass psychosis is curable indeed, as immutably bad, "racial" peculiarities of spirit and morals do not exist. Intense and persistent labour will certainly be needed, in order to remove from the German brains and hearts all the nonsense which Hitler's National Socialism has hammered into them. It ought not to be overlooked, that the clumsy and hypocritical axioms of the Nazis, and likewise all their methods of propaganda, were tuned with the greatest cunning to the German mentality, and how much more easily—in connection with their inoculated herd instinct, their fondness for uniforms and every kind of boasting—the instigation of intolerance, brutality, and the right of the strongest, appealed to German ears, than the uncomfortable summons to contemplation will do. One may expect, on the other hand, that the experience of the new war will ease the work of changing the German mind. Nevertheless, we have learned, unfortunately, how quickly the "never again war" was forgotten in that country, and how much smaller was the disgust at a repetition in Germany after the Great War than in France and Great Britain.—For the enormous work of education one has to rely, above all, on the powers for good in those Germans who kept aloof from Nazi-mentality in spite of all pressure. One should try to help them in every possible way. It must be remembered

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how much disaster could have been avoided, if a helping hand had been lent to those forces in the Republic of Weimar. These men have proved the spirit, with the help of which the reconstruction of the German mentality has to be completed. A narrower connection with the world-mindedness of the democratic peoples and a changing, by degrees, of the German thinking and feeling in the direction of genuine culture is bound to awake, eventually, the same ideals of peace, freedom, and inner honour of men and of peoples, which have been common property in the European democracies and in the New World for one hundred and fifty years. But not before one can be thoroughly convinced, that the evil mentality of Nazism has definitely vanished, that free and genuine democratic opinions have finally broken through, and that administrations and officials governed by such a mind and having the will for loyal, international co-operation are leading a people which has the same mentality—the moment will have arrived for the Germans to take their fate into their own hands again.

A land full of weeds cannot be made a clean and productive cornfield by a solitary ploughing up, as the weeds which are always shooting up have to be removed, time after time, until after many years' working the field has changed into an arable one, bringing profit to its owner and no longer endangering the neighbouring acres by spreading weeds. So the false doctrines can be rooted out from the German brains by tough and systematic labour only. The German people must be fundamentally changed... Not until the Germans have learned to be ashamed of the period of Hitler and of National Socialism, when they have found again their religion, their good qualities, their diligence, their sense of order, and when they plan placing their intellectual and artistic abilities at the service of a free development of mankind—will the cure be finished.



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